Geothermal probabilistic cost study by Lee, T. K. et al.
  
 
 
N O T I C E 
 
THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED FROM 
MICROFICHE. ALTHOUGH IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT 
CERTAIN PORTIONS ARE ILLEGIBLE, IT IS BEING RELEASED 
IN THE INTEREST OF MAKING AVAILABLE AS MUCH 
INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19820013882 2020-03-21T08:22:00+00:00Z
j5030-491
I	 Geothermal Probabilistic Cost Stud
Lowell H. Orren
^t	 G. Michael Ziman
Sue Campbell Jones
Tom K. Lee
Roger Noll
Louis Wilde
Venkatraman Sadanand
I	 are -T-IC7-_V7,, C.
o^zc.s.rEM _
August 1981
Prepared tor
U.S Department of Energy
Tnrougr an agreement w th
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
by
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Cabfornia Institute of Technology
Pasadena California
llISTkIB:, ' OF TH6 :)UGL;t,;C,,,T 15 UNLIVITEL'
Page intentionally left blank 
ACK;NOWLLDGM[ENT
Part 0%e of this document was prepared by Lowell ti. Orren,
G. Hich-c l Ziman, and Sue Campbell Jonas of JPL. The Geothermal
Probabilistic Cost Model was originally developed by Tom K. Lee while
he was at JPL and Katsuaki Tere;awa of JPL. Part Two was p repared by
Tom K. Lee of the University of California, San Diego, anti Roger Noll,
Venkatraman Sa4anand, and Louis kiide of Calif-rnia Institute of
Technology.
Robert Lacy and James Nugent of San Diego Gas S Electric,
A. M. Cooper of Chevron, and William Livesay of Lives-iv Consultants
were most generous with their time and prov ided valuable inputs.
Fred Abel managed .-his study f , r the U.S. Department of Energy.
Nis insightful comments and suggestions improved the work in a
number of ways. Inja Pzik managed an earlier .,Lud y for Lhe C.S.
Department of Energy in which the Geothermal Probah ;.Iistic Cost Study
was originally developed.
The document was edited by Martha Martinez. The docur,-nt was tvlped
by Fran `iulvehill and Susan Elrod.
iii
Page intentionally left blank 
11
i
i
1
CONTENTS
PAGE
?ART ONE:
	 INTRODUCTION
i.	 INIRUDUCTION................................................... 1- 1
PART TWO:
	 MODEL. AND SITE STUDY
^.	 Ti:;i	 HEBER GEOTHERMA,.
	
RESERVOIR	 SITE STUDY..... .....	 .......	 ... —
2.-
	
=NTRCDUCTION ........................... 	 ..........	 ......
--
2.4	 DATA	 DESCRIPTIOt: ........................	 ................ -^
2.e.1
	
FINANCIAL	 VAkIABLFS ............	 .	 ......... -j
2.2.2	 L-ECHNICAL	 DESCRIPTION........ ..... 	 .............. -
x.1.3	 CUST ALCUUNTS BY STAGE OF	 DE':E; .jPMF.N............. -7
DE, :;RI?TION OF COSTS IN
STAGE	 _:	 RESOURCE PROVING ............. -7
c.c.}.G	 DESCRIPT ION OF COSTS IN
STACIE	 !I:	 FLRMIT	 PROCESS .............. -
2.,c . ;.	 DESCRIi'f ION OF	 Ci:ST.:	 IN
STAGE !IT:	 DEVhLU..F;hG S: TE i.E WURCE... 4`1'-•d
DESCRIPTION OF COS TS -N
STAGE IV:	 OPERATING THE RESERVUt l:..... 2-9
_.... ;.	 COSTS U.;ED IN THE kEFERENCE SCENAR: rj... 2-10
REVENUE .......................................... 2-14
PkUbABI!,:STIR	 A.;SJMPTIGNS ........................ c-14
c.^	 rESULTS	 OF	 -I'HiL	 BASE	 CA:b ................ 	 ................ - -18
2.}.;	 PROFIT	 IN	 [HE	 BAST;	 CASe.......................... -:B
L.S.c	 COST	 lN	 THL	 B;-'3L	 CASE ............................ 2-ib
BASE	 CASE	 r;E.	 IN	 1990 ............................ 2-22
SENSITIVITY
	 ANALYSIS OF	 THE	 bA6E	 CASE .................... .-24
v
J.
2.4.1 SENSITIVITY
	
TO	 ENERGY
	
PRICE....................... —24
2.4.2 SENSITIVITY
	 TO	 DISCOUNT	 RATE ..................... 2a
2.4.,3 SENSITIVITY
	 TO	 CAPACITY	 FACTOR ...................
2.4.4 SENSITIVITY TO INVESTMENT	 !AX CREDIT.............
2.4.5 SENSITIVITY TO ENERGY
	
ESCALATION RATE............
2.4.6 SENSITIVITY TO GENERAL	 INFLATION RATE............ 2 -26
SENSITI VT. —Y	 TO	 WELL	 LIFE ......................... 2 - 2.
SENSI'.ivlTY
	 TC	 !;ORRELATED	 EVENTS ................. 2-21
THE GEOTHERMAL PROBABILISTI` COST MODEL— ........................ 3-1
3.1	 INTRODUCTION TO THE MODE L AND THE REFERL..'17 zZENARIO..... 3-1
.3.4	 REFEhENCE SCENARIO FOP. A GEOTHERMAL RESERVOIR............ 3-4
.s•e.i STAGES OF GEOTHERMAL RESERVOIR DEVELOPMENT....... 3-8
.-I .l
	 STAGE	 I:	 PROVING THE	 hESOURCF......... 3 -6
.1.4	 STAGE	 II:	 DEVELOPMENT PERMITS......... 3-12
_	 ='•1.3	 STAGE	 III:	 RESERVOIR DEVELOPMENT...... 3-13
3.2.:.4	 STAGE	 IV:	 OPERATION ................... 3-13
;.^	 SOUuCES OF UNCERTAINTY IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF GEOTHERMA:. RF.-=^OLRCES .................................. 3-14
3.3.1 'WELLHEAD
	 TEMPERATURE ............................. 3-17
3.3 .2 COST PER WELL AS A FUNCTION OF
WELL	 DEPTH	 AND	 ROCK	 TYPE ......................... 3-20
j •^•^ WELL	 FLOW	 RATES .................................. 3-20
3 .3.4 CITHEk	 SENSITIVE	 VARIABLES ........................ 3-25
GEOTHERMAL	 PROBABILISTIC COST MODEL ...................... 3-27
3.4.1 INTRO7'UCTION TO PROBABILISTIC
COST	 !;ODELit.j .................................... 3-27
.4.2 FORMAL
	 MODEL ..................................... 3-33
3.4.,j	 1	 THE METHODOLOGY:
	 AN	 OVERVIEW.......... 3-33
3.4.2.2
	 THE	 COMPUTER	 PROGRAM ................... 3-35
{
vi
	 t
I
f
r
I
I
PART THHSE: INS':ITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF GEOTHERMAL DEVELOPMENT
4.	 L.EASING, CONTRACTING, AND INSURANCE ...........................
	 4-1
4..&	 INIRODUCTIUN .............................................
	 4
- 1
4.[ LEAJi:.	 4-3
4.4.1	 CHAhACTERISTICS OF LEASING......... ..............
	 4-3
COMPETtTIVE AND NONCOMPETITIVE. FEDERAL
:EvTHERMAL RESOURCES LEASING PROCEDURE.......... 4-b
4 .3 THE LtAzING, CONTRACTING, AND INSURANCE PROBLEMS......... 4-12
4 .1.1	 THE LEASING PROBLEM .............................. 	 4-12
4.3.1.1	 PFVENUE.^ FROM '"RISING OF FEDERALLY
OWNED GEOTHERMAL RESOURCE LPNPi........ 4-13
^._...._	 INFORMATIUN iN A PRE-LEASING
CONTEXT: THE NASH EQUILIBHIUM CASE.... 4-19
INFORMATION IN A PRE-LEASING
CONTEXT: THE "STACKELBERG" CASE....... 4-24
4.x.1.4	 INFORMATION IN A POST -LEASING
	
CONTEXT ................................
	 4-27
4.}.0	 THE CONTRACTING I'hObLEM .......................... 	 4
-33
4.3.,	 THE INSURANCE PROBLEM ............................ 	 4-40
4.ti.
	 )UMMARY .................................................. 	 4-4b
I APPi:NDIGh_',
A. USERS GUIDE Tu JPL GEOTHERMAL
PROBABILISTIC COST MODEL ...................................... 	 A-i
B. CASH FLOW LEVE.LILAIION ........................................
	 B-1
C. A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE THEORY OF INSURANCE ..................... C-1
Figures
C-1
	
basF Case :" ulative Distribution Function: for h ofit .............. 2-;)G
2-1	 Correlated Events Cumulative Distribution Function fo: P;-ofit...... 2-29
j-1	 Expected Cost of a New Technology .................................. 	 3-2
vii
3-e Compietion Time	 and	 Conditional	 Probability ......................... 3-5
3-3 Distribution	 of Geothermal	 Electric	 Costs ........................... 3-7
	 I
3-4 Time-Lapse	 From	 Non-Competitive	 Lease ............................... 3-10
3-5 Temperature/Depth	 ReiaLions ......................................... 3-18
j-o Distribution	 of	 Temperature	 with	 Depth .............................. 3-19
3-7 Effect	 of	 Depth	 on	 Drilling	 Cost .................................... 3-21
.5 -a Well	 Costs	 as	 a	 Function	 of	 Depth.....	 ...... ........................ 3-22
J-9 Effect	 of	 Deptn	 on	 Production	 Rate .................................. 3-23
3-10 Steam	 Production	 vs.	 Time ........................................... 3-24
3-11 Effect of Time of Start of Sales on Expected Present Worth........ 	 . 3-28
3-lea Negatively	 Correlated	 Events ........................................ 3-31
3-12b Positively	 Correlated	 Events ........................................ 3-31
S-lja Total
	 Cost When Events Negatively	 Cot-related ........................ 3-32
j-13b Discrete Approximation
	 of	 Continuous
	
Events ......................... 3-32
Floc: of Time-Dependen t.	 Cc-s -
	 --_•unts	 in	 RCOST ....................... 3-42
•-1 Typical
	 bargaining	 Region ........................................... 4-37
4 -e Bargaining
	 Region	 for	 "Jame .......................................... x-38
Tail es
-i	 Production Wells ....................................................
	 2-5
e
-2	 Injection Wells .....................................................
	 2-6
-j	 Power Production and -onsumpt.on ....................................
	 2-6
-4a	 Costs Accounts:	 Stages I and II..... ...............................
	 2-11
Costs Accounts:
	
Stage III ..........................................
	 2-12
_	 Cost. Accnunt
	 stage iY ............................................
	 2-13
->	 Density Functions.... ...............................................
	 2-15
-o	 Base Case .let Scenarioz ............................. ...............
	 2-16
-7	 Probabilities in Base Case Set Scenarios............................
	 2-17
viii
2-6 Profit	 in	 the	 base	 Case	 Set ......................................... 2-19
2-9 Cost	 in	 the	 Base	 Case	 Set ........................................... 2-21
2-10 :reference	 Scenario
	 in	 1990 ................................ 	 ......... 2-23
2-11 Present	 Value	 of	 Profits	 in	 1990	 Dollars ............................ 2-23
?-12 Sensitivity
	 Results	 at	 Heber ........................................ 2-25
2-13 Flow	 Correlated	 to	 Stage	 I	 P,'obabilities ............................ 2-27
3-1 Results	 of Sensitivity Analysis From Literature ..................... 3-16
3-2 Capital	 Costs ....................................................... 3-26
3-3 Probability Limit	 for	 the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Theorem ................ 3-47
-i Time	 to	 Obtain	 CPUC	 Certificate ..................................... 4-16
4-2 Leasing	 Activities .................................................. 4-18
4
-3 Payoff	 Matrix ....................................................... 4-23
•4-4 Data on Submitted Bids:
	
signal Oil Co. ana
Union	 Oil	 Co ........................................................ 4-25
•-a Data on Submitted	 bids:	 Union Oil	 Co.	 and	 Phillips ................. 4-25
ix
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
As its critics are quick to point out, geothermal energy does entail
Jrisk. There are risks resulting from unknowns in physical factors such as
required well depth, fluid temperature, and flow rates, and there are risks
resulting from unknowns in institutional factors such as length of permit
procedures, negutiations for price between the energy producer and the energy
user, and liability for faulty performance. To the investor these unknowns
create uncertainty about the economic viability of the project.
In Part One of this study we present a Lool to quantify the risks of
geothermal projects, the Geotherma. Probabiiistic Cost Model (GPCM). The GPCM
model is usea to evaluate a geothermal reservoir for a binary-cycle electric
plant at Heber, California. In Part Two we analyze three institutional aspects
of the geothermal risk which can shift the risk among different agents. We
exam,ne the ;easing of geothermal Land, contracting De:,ween the producer and
the user of the geothermai heat, and insurance against faulty performance.
Fart One
The Heber Site Study is Chapter 2. The basic result is that under
the assumptions and data used, a geotnermal reservoir to Supply heat for a
[	 41.)-MW (net) binary-cycle plant at Heber, California, is an economically
feasible project and woula allow the reservoir developer to recover all
I1	 ni° costs and earn a rate of retu-n suitable for projects of this natlre.
The GPCM is discussed in Chapter 3. The primary output of Lhe GPCM
is the distribution of key financial parameters such as profit, capital
'	 requiremonte, and cost. These distributions can be used to make a rational
investment decision incorporating the inveFtor's ittitude toward risk.
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Two characteristics of Lne CPCM make it distinct from other probabi-
iistic financial models. First, the GP(.M does not merely solve for the mean
and variance of the distributions of financial variab"es--it solves for the
distributions themselves. This is important because many decision makers care
about more than merely the first two moments of a .iistribution. Second, the
GYCM can model cases where different uncertain everts are not stochastically
independent; that is, the GPCM does allow the outcome of an uncertain event to
be influenced by the outcome of another uncertain event. Sue; , correlations
oetween aifferent events is often reality, but cannot, be modeled in the
typical Monte-Carlo-type simuiation model.
Part Two
Chapter 4 analyzes institutional questions in geothermal leasing,
contracting oetween producer and user of geothermal resources, and insurance
for geothermal. After an examination of current procedures of geothermal
,eas,ng, the paper examines the effect of information, about the nature of the
resource on bidding for ,eases. Tne contracting problem is examined in a game
theory model wnich examines how contracting arrangements can :re?te market
structure barriers to the development of geothermal resources. The paper
examines how insurance can spread the risk among different participants ana
examines the question of who should provide the insurance--government or
private insurers.
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CHAPTEh
1	 ThE HEBER GEOTHERMAL RESERVOIR SITE STUDY
i
^.l	 INTRODUCTION
Ine Geothermal Probabi ; istic Cost Model kGPCMI evaluated the economics
of a geothermal reservoir at Heber, California, to provide geothermal fluid for
a 45 MN net) binary-cyc . e e-ectric generating plant. If such a commercial
.size binary facility could be successful :;/ built at Heber, it would mean that
many mecium temperature geothermal sites could produce economical eiectricit;.
The proposed Heber Geothermal Project consists of the reservoir, binary-cycle
plant, and a demonstration period. The power plant and demonstration period
would oe a demonstration project to prove the binary techno.ogy, I but t'te
I
reservoir would be developed as a for-Frofit commercial ventuc t . 1 One- con-
clusion of this study is that the reservoir port.,on of the Heber GecLhermal
Prc.ect seems tc be econom . ca.ly viable, although the degree of profitability
1	 13 sensitive to certain. key parameters.
Ine Heber site was onossr. f^r study using the GPCM mode*. for two
reastons:	 the desire to study a binary site; and (e) extensive engineering
evaluation nas been done for the Heber Geothermai r'roject and much of the work
I
has been made put..,. Although JPL contacted the major participants in tho
heber Project, this study is based primarily on publicly availabit information.
the proposed participants in the funding of the generating plant are
I	 the U.S. Department of Energy, San Diego Gas and Electric Co., imperial
Ir.igation District, Southern California Edison Co., California Department
cf Water hesourees, Electric Power Research Institute. and others. ':he
p ant would be operated by SDG&L.
'	 ine reservoir is a joint venture of Chevron Resources Co., Union Oil
and New Albion Resources ^a subsidiary of SDG&E1. Chevron would !evelop
'	 ana manage the reservoir.
1	 -1
Ihis study models the reservo. at Heber, but not the power plant.
The difficulty with the power plant is that the relationship between costs
and changes in physical parameters is not thoroughly understooc.. For the
reservoir, the relationship between physical parameters such 3s well depth,
flow rate, resource temperature, and cost is understood. s With suff:;eient
additional engineering relationsnips, or uy ignoring physical uncertainties
and considering only time uncertainties, the power plant could be modeled by
the GPCM.
This study models a reservoir development at Heber with the same
technical characteristics as the proposed reservoir development; however, the
actual reservoir to be deveioped could have a slightly different development
path and possibly different costs. The reasons for the diffe^ence are that
the initial exploratory activities with the Heber Reservoir were in search of
oi., not geotherma, neat. Therefore, it seemed unwise to model this period
baseu on what had occurred as the intent was not to find a geothermal reser-
voir. Thus, we have modeled the early develonments on the Heber Reservoir
based on a reasonable pattern of development for a geothermal reservoir
beginning In lvdu. Much of the pertinent data about the Heber °eservoir,
particularly cost dat-i, is proprietary and is not available to JPL, Tc the
extent that our secondary source data differ from the true data, our predicted
results for the reservoir may differ from the antual results of tie project.
2.1	 DATA DESCRIPTION
Tne data des^ription is ' ided into five parts: financial vari-
ables, technical description, costs by stage of development, revenue, and
probabilistic assumptions. Specific assumptions have been made and references
are given. Unless otherwise stated, all dollar amounts are in 1980 dollars.
-ee discussion of OPT Functions in Section 3.4.2.2 of this report.
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The description of the Reference Scenario and other described inputs
'	 form what is termed the base Case Set of Assumptions. The Base Case Set of
Assumptions includes the Reference Scenario (which is supplied : input) and
all other scenarios that are created by the model from perturbations :n the
Reference Scenario's stage times or physical parameter values. 4 Sensi-
tivities to specific parameters in the Base Case are made in a later
section.
t.[.1	 Financial Variables
Energy Price
	 17.5 mills/kWh
-	 This is the price received by the reservoir for each kWh
produced gross. The price used is the price which Cassel
i(Reference 1) clal.= is the competitive price for Heber.
based on 9 years required to develcp the field before
'	 operation and Elie 10% escalation rate assumed below, this
'	 would grow to 41.3 mills/kWh for the first year of
operation.
Energy Price Escalation - 10%/yr
It is assumed that the energy price will escalate along
with fuel costs. DRI (Reference 2) forecasts residual fuel
wholesale price escalation of 13.3% tetween 1980 and 1990
and 0.9% between. 1990 and 2000. The 10% rate selected is a
compromise between these figures.
'	 if any of the financial parameters, cost accounts, or probabilistic
assumptions are changed by the user, a new set of assumptions, different
from the base Case Set, is created. Any such new case would again include
a Reference Scenario, and the model would generate other scenarios as
perturbations of this Reference Scenario. For a discussion of this
aspect of the model, aee Section 3.4.2.
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General Inflation - 9%/yr
-	 All prices other than electricity will be assumed to grow
at this rate. It is based on the DRI (Deference 2)
forecast of ttie wholesale price index growing at 10.1%
fron, 1980 to 1990 and 6.7% from 1990 to 200C.
Discount Rate - 15%/yr
-	 The rate used is the required after tax rate of retu-n ou
capital invested in projects of this risk class. T~e
figur. was obtained from the Atlantic Richfield Co.
Royalty Nate - 10% on Gross Revenue
-	 A comu)n r-, te used for geothermal property.
Federai Tax Ra iuc - 4u%
-	 Standard corporate tax rate.
State Tax Rate - 9%
-	 Corporate tax for California.
Local Tax Rate - i%
-	 btandard for California.
Investment Tax Credit - 1vM
-	 Geothermal would receive an additional credit of 15% fc- a
total ITC of 25%. However, this extra 15% is due to expire
December 31, 1985, before the major capital expenditures
for tnis site study would occur. (Reference 3)
Depletion Allowance - 15%
-	 Although the present rate is 21%, it will decline to 15% by
1984, which is 'before scheduled operation of the plant.
N
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Depreciation Method - Sum of years digits
-	 Th-,s form of accelerated depreciation is used.
2.2.2	 Technical D,:bcriation
The pertinent technical ac*ails about the reservoir are in Tables 2-1,
2-2, and 2-3.
':able 2-1. Production Wells
6umb-er 11 it Production, plus -1 spares for total of 13
Depth b at 4000 ft
b at 0000 ft
1 at 10,000 fL
Diameter 9 5/8 in. at bottom
Flow per we!,. Start 1380 GPM
Maximum 1600 GPM
Total flow to plant Start 7.14 m lb/h at 360°F
End 8.8a m lb/h at 338°F
Well lifetime 15 years
Cost estimate* Depth Cost Per Well in 1980 $
4000 ft $ 611,000
6000 ft 805,000
10,000	 ft 1,21,000
This cost is an estimate for a trouble-free well, pumps not included.
to this cost must be added a "dry hole/drilling problem" expense.
Source: Number, depth, diameter, flows, and well lifetime are from
San Diego Gas & Electric (Reference 6) and conversations with
Chevron. Well cost estimates are from Livesay Consultants,
modified by JPL.
2-5
Table t-I-	 In
	 Well!;
Number	 b in use, plus 1 spare for total of 7
Depth	 3 at 4000 ft
3 at 1)000 ft
1 at 10,000 ft
D4.7-.meter
	 10 3/4 in. at bottom
Well Lifetime	 15 years
Cost Estimate*	 Depth	 Cost Per Well in 1980 $
	4000 ft
	 $ 693,000
	6
	 897,000
	10,000 ft
	 1,317,000
Cost is an estimate for trouble-free well. To this cost must be added a
"dry hole/drilling problem" expense.
Source: Number, depth and diameter are from conversations with Chevron.
Well cost estimates are from Li.vesay Consultants, modified by JPL.
Table 2-3. Power Production and Consumption
Start-
iross Power Production (MW) 61.9 64.1
Auxiliary Power Consumption (MW,
Plant 14.6 15.3
Chevron Production Well Pumps 2.3 3.8
Total Auxiliary Consumption 16.9 19.1
Net Power Production lMW) 45.0 45.0
Capacity Factor 1*0% 70%
Source: San Diego Gas & Electric (Reference 6).
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2.2.3	 Cost Accounts by Stage of Development
The Development of the geothermal reservoir is divided into four
stages of development: resource proving, permit process, developing the
resource, and operating the reservoir. 5 In this section we describe the
cost accounts in the stages for the Heber Site Study, and list the ac;11al
ccsts used in the Reference Scenario.
2.2.3.1 Description of Costs in Stage I: Resource Proving
Rent
This is the payment to the owners of the land. This payment is
replaced by royalty payments when production starts in Stage IV.
Source: Estimate from SDG&E
Exploration Permits
Cost cf securing permits for surface exploration and exploratory
drilling.
Source: Estimate from SDG&E
Exploration and Well Logging
Expenses of surface exploration, drilling exploratory wells and
well logging.
Source: Grieder (Reference 5)
G&A
General and adm;nistrat_ve expenses, :nclud,,ng project
management.
Source: Est imate from .SD41&E
Contingency
Additional al.owance of 10% of all the above Stale 1 expenses
for cont-ngency.
-, This is more thoroughly discussed in Section 3.2.2.
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Lease Acquisition Cost
Payment to land owners to obtain lease.
'lource: Estimate from SDG&E
Surface Occupancy
Purchase of 5 acres for surface installation facilities such as
pad for wells, pipes, c •oaCs, and required structures.
Source: Estimate from SDG&E
t..'.?..2 Description of Costs in Stage II: Permit Process
Pent
See description in Stage I.
GSA
See description in Stage
Regiona! Environmenta: K33essment
Preparation of required document on environmental assessment
before obtaining permit to develop the reservoir.
Source: Estimate Prim SDG&E
Contingency
M of all the above.
2.Z.3.} D^gcription of :osts in Stage III: Developing the Resource
bent
See description in Stage I.
Development 'well Cost
This is the expense of drilling all production and injection
wells. This expense is divided into in 75% intangible drilling
costs and 25$ capitalized expense.
Source: Livesay Consultants
2.6	 1
Dry Hole and ')riliin; Problem
The dev;.lo,mert well costs are for trouble-free wells.
To account fcr cxpe-: 3d trouble during drilling, 201 f the
development well cost is added. This expense is divided into
75% inta%,Ib:e drilling costs and 25% capitalized expense.
I Source-	 .ivcsev Consultants
Surface ineta:.atioti
1	 This is vae expense of all facilities other than the wells. It
also includes down-hole pumps. This expense is divided into 50%
intang_Wit driA ing costs and 50% capitalized expense.
So:;rae: Holt/P-ocon ,heference 7)
G&A
As d-scussed in Stage I.
Contingency
= of surface installation, leasing, and G&A.
2.2.3.4 De-e ^ription of Costs in Stage IV: Operating the heservoir
'-earilling of lie:_--
Deperiing cn the iifetitr p assumption, all we.,s will be
I
redrilled. This expense will be made in the last year of
the lifetime of the well. The expense will be divided into
1	
75% intangible drilling costs and 25% capitalized expense.
1	 Dry Hole and Drilling Problem
Same as described in Stage III.
Operation and Maintenance
This is the expense of GSA, well maintenance, surface
I
maintenance, down-hole surveys, and miscellaneous supplies.
Source: Holt/Procon (Reference 7)
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E.ectricity Expense for Pumping
This is the cost cf electricity to drive the dok •n- hole pumps
on the production we.ls. The power required increases f om an
initial 2..^ Ki to an eventual 3.0 MW. W e assume that power
consumption increases linearly. The price of the electricity
is based on the assumption that the reservoir buys electricity
from the pant at cost, and 40 % of the cost of electricity is
geothermal heat. Thus, the price paid for electricity is
Gi. yo) x ( heat m._. rate / kWh).
Source: SDG&E ( Reference 4)
Contingency
10% of O&M expense.
2.2.3.5 Costs used in the Reference Scenario
The costs used in the Reference Scenario for the Heber Site Study are
Tables 2-4a, 2-4b, and c-4c.
the set of distributions for the four urcertain variables generates
(}) x (2) x. (I) x (3) x ( 3) = 54 scenarios.
These scenarios and their associated probabiiities are shown in Tables 2-5 and
2-6.
,^:.4	 Revenue
Revenue to the reservoir will be based on the gross output of the
generating plant during Stage IV. We assume that the effective operating
rapacity of the plant will be 70%. Thus, for the first year of operatinn the
plant will produce
(.70)(8760 hours)(61.9 MW) = 3.80 x 108
 kWh
::,e revenue during the first year will be this energy multiplied by the energy
price. The energy price will escalate as described in Section 2.2.1.
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Table 2-4a
Gust Accounts: Stages I and II
(thousands, 1980 $)
i
4
V
J
r7
C LM
J n
interval
1 68.75
2 68.75
3 68.75
4 68.75
5 68.75
6 68.75
Accounting
Lifetime 1	 }
Cost
Escalation 9%
•
I
Interval
1
' Accounti :^;
Lifetime
Cost'
Escalation
Stage I
v
w
ud ^
U • v
m >, oj u O
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0 2u0.0 91.67 79.0 325.0 60.0
25.0 240.0 91.67 43.0 0 0
0 800.0 91.67 96.0 0 0
0 800.0 91.67 96.0 0 0
0 800.0 91.67 96.0 0 0
0 800.0 91.67 96.0 0 0
1 yr 1 yr 1	 y^ 1 yr 1 yr 1 yr
9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9%
Stage II
.-4
M
L w >
C L U
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-^ E 61 GJ
M C E tc
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< w > C
Z CJ	 C T O
U 0^ w < :J
75.0 100.0 200.0 38.0
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9% 9$ 9% 9%
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Surface Installation)
Surface Installation-
50% Capitalized
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Table 2-4c
Cost Accounts: Stage 1V
(thousands, 1980 Y)
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v N
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•r1
0. u•1
L+ 7 ro N 
1 0 0 2093.0 209.0 514.0 0 0
2 0 0 2093.0 209.0 526.0 0 0
3 0 0 2093.0 209.0 537.0 0 0
L I 0 0 2093.0 209.0 549.0 0 0
5 0 0 2093.0 209.0 560.0 0 0
6 0 0 2093.0 209.0 572.0 0 0
7 0 0 2093.0 209.0 584.6 0 0
8 0 0 2093.0 209.0 555.0 0 0
9 0 0 2093.0 209.0 607.0 0 0
10 0 0 2093.0 200.0 618.0 0 0
11 0 0 2093.0 209.0 630.0 0 0
12 0 0 2093.0 209.0 641.0 0 0
13 0 0 2093.0 209.0 653.0 0 0
14 0 0 2093.0 209.0 665.0 0 0
15 12450.0 2490.0 2093.0 209.0 676.0 4150.0 830.0
16 0 0 2093.0 209.0 688.0 0 0
17 0 U 2093.0 209.0 699.0 0 0
18 0 0 2093.0 209.0 711.0 0 0
19 0 0 2093.0 209.0 722.0 0 0
20 0 0 2093.0 209.0 734.0 0 0
21 0 0 2093.0 209.0 745.0 0 0
22 0 0 2093.0 209.0 757.0 0 0
23 0 0 2093.0 209.0 769.0 0 0
24 0 0 2093.0 209.0 780.0 0 0
25 0 G 2093.0 209.0 792.0 0 0
26 0 0 2093.0 209.0 803.0 0 0
27 0 0 2093.0 209.0 815.0 0 0
28 0 0 2093.0 209.0 826.0 0 0
29 0 0 2093.0 209.0 838.0 0 0
30 0 0 2093.0 209.0 850.0 0 0
Accounting
Lifetime 1 yr 1 yr 1 y r 1 yr 1 yr 10vr 10 yr
Cost
Escalation 9	 4 9% 9 9% 10% 9% 9%
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The energy output will grcw linearly as the gross power output expands to
b4.1 MW at the end of 30 years.
7'here is no other source of revenue for the rese rvoir other than
the sale of heat for electricity production during Stage IV. We assume a
zero scrap value; this is based on the assu.rption that the resale value of
the land and facilities at the end of Stage IV, would be offset by the
expense of restoring the land for the alternative uses in agriculture.
2.2.5
	
Probabilistic Assumptions
Uncertain variables are entered i.n the APCM as probability distribu-
bu`ions rather than point estimates. In the Heber Site Study there are four
uncertain variables: length of stages 1, 2, and 4, and well flow rate. The
density functions for the Base Case Set of Assumptions are shown in Table 2-5.
The Base Case Set scenarios and their associated probabilities are shown in
Tables 2-6 and 2-7.
The probability for an entire scenario is the product of the
probabilities of the outcomes for each of the uncertain events. For example,
using Table 7 the probability of Scenario 1 is
(.2) x (.d) x (1.0) x (.2) x (.2) = .0064.
(This is shown in Table 2-8.)
In the Base Case, uncertain events are not conditional upon the
outcomes of other uncertain events; however, the GPCM does have the power
to have uncertain events conditional upon the outcome of other events.
This capability is used in a se-isitivity anaiysis in Section 2.4.6.
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Table 2-5. DenS.ty Functions of Uncertain Input Variables
Variable Possible Values Associated Probability
Stage 1 3 yr, 0.2
5.5 yr* 0.6
b yr 0.2
Stage 2 1 yr* 0.6
1.5 yr 0.2
Stage j 2.5 yr' 1.0
Stage a 20 yr 0.2
30 yr* 0.7
35 yr 0.1
Well Flow Rate 1035 GPM 0.2
1350 GPM* 0.6
1725 GPM 0.2
i
This value is used in the Reference Scenario.
.source: baked on information provided by Chevron.
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Table 2-6
Rase Case Set Scenarios
:.^r^	 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 State 4 Flow Pate
^.Ji+	 1) l.)J1))0 1.51)UJJ 10.0)0))1 IgsSO)OJ•J/! f.•1J•,•,u
	 i I .0+)1 )JO
..',00000 ?0.0,)).) 11) 1 so ).44 )JU 13 ,.•1v.^,	 11 /.JJJJJO I . SJJGOu eO . O-J)JJ0 17ls.JJJJO)I.)JO.J1 1.031340 1.5')WOO 10.0)))1) 10313.on400)
++)^) I..)1J1)0 I.SJI .IUU 3J . vj))J0 IJn0 . 0UJ0U)t )J 1 1 .J )v I.0 1.SJ WOO fJ.0JiJ10 I Ve%.JOJOJ 1/ +. JuuJ•J) 1.) + 1 )JO I .50)0043 35.0.0)0 )0 1 U.S S.000OJ)
o +.000001 I.,,n)JJ 2.)U)000 35.001)70 13HU.0))03"1
I•JIJJ)) I.J))J)U I.SO)00J 35.0)0040 1725.000017lU I. JJOOJ J 1 .5 )J) W 1.SUJUOJ 10.0JJ0-)0 1J;S.OJ00011 I.	 )J40J l.5 fn7 ,)U ..SJ1u0u 10.0010uu IJa0.44 )JO )
1I 1.-iJ)uJ; I .S I ) )J1)
.501)00 2n.UJ•)JJO 1715 .0.10043
L3 s.Jquu•)) 1.510000 1.SJ)J1)0 30.OJJ340 1035.00000014 f .	 )')uuu) i .S)) ))U 1.5J)OJ.) 10.OJJ ) )0 l 3bJ.000031I S f.	 I +U ,,uJ 1 .51 )1))J 1.'10.)30+1 3U.U)JJ)0 1 /15.0.))0311 v I . )uu,10 1 1 . SJ h)Ju :. 30 »00 P) .OU )0 )0 03%.000000
17 I.JJOJOJ I.h)J1)0 ;.SoJJ00 35. 0))0)0 I3o1) . 03000.)Id I.uuUvU) l.5);,.)JO t.Sajuo0 11).JJ ) )J0 l/2S.00JUOJ
Iv •,.5000JJ 1.'01:))0 2.5UJ000 ?O.OUJ3J0 1035.000000
JO ,.SJOJOI I.J)JI)J 1,SgJUJU IO.UJ)1)O 13Hn.00000411 ,.5,1000) l . J )u )JU :.50 3 JuJ 20.4J03JO 11l S.O4J073
11 ..300000 I.JJ.JJU 1.SJ))UU JO.0)JJ)J 1035 . 00000)1 1) S. Wood') 1 .U•) )J)0 300000 30.0 )0000 1 30 0.00000114 S.SJJU9 ) 1 .J I WJJ .50111100 JU . OuJJ ) 3 1125.0)003115 ^.5000JJ 1.001)30 1.SJ?000 J5.0133)0 1035.J0000O
14 h.S000J) 1.04uJ )U c.SUJJUJ 35.00/JJ0 1380.000001)1 I ,'•	 1;..+,,	 J 1 . J M . )) 1 1. 303+000 35 .0)) I )0 M5.030003lb :.S)JJJ3 I.S)))JJ t. A-) JJO ?U . 04)JJUJ 103.).000000
IN .,JJJO'J I.SJJOJO le.SUCIJOJ IJ.OJJJJJ 1380.0000003u .•,ouUul 1.570100 ..SJJJJO ?J.OJ)lJJ 1125.00000)
it JJud) 1.5))OJJ I.SJJOUJ 30 . 000000 1035.000000Jl JUJU I 1 .5 )U )01) . ,000OU 30.00000') 1380.400030J1 .. )))J ) 1 .5 )n )1)J 2.')J)300 JO.00)9JJ 1175.00001)034 S.JJOOOI l.5MIJO 1 . tW3000 35.JUJJJO 1035 . 000000
35 11.50,1000 1.5)0400 ?.SJ)000 15.0JJOJO 13b0.)00000J(, 4).SJJOOJ 1 .5)UJO) 2.5ut+)00 35.00J04) 1125.0JJJUI
JI a.0001u) 1,	 )uJOJ I.hOUJJJ 10 . 0)JJ)O 1035.0000OU
JO n.0IOuJI I.	 JUJJJ 11.)UJ000 X . 01))03 138^.OJJ00)
JY h.JOUJ I ) 1.000:) ) 0 I.SJJJO0 20.04 ) 030 1715 . 00000)4U o.UJOJJJ I.J Mduo I.SO00UU JO.OJJ)UO I035.0J0003
4I o.00Juu/ 1.0)J)JJ I.50JJUO 30.00JJJO 1380.000000
42 Ii. JJUJ()I 10)o,)0) 2.50)Ou0 30.uI))J0 111S.OJJ000
43 rs.0 JUOU J I oo P))JO 1.50JJU0 35.03)300 1035.00100044 a.JJJJJJ l ..) )J ) )J 2.,:, + OJO 15.01J)JO 138a.031000
aS .4.•)U0uu1 I Uk. JJ4 .50)OJJ 35.J)J)JO I/IS.0)_	 1,
rf, b.(V)UUOJ 1.5)u1JJ I.50)JU0 ?O.OJJ)IIJ 1JJ5.0)300041 1.OJJUU) I.SIJIJJ I.SO))00 ?0.OJ)3,30 1Jb0.UJJ0011
40 n.J44)001 I	 )Juu 1,507000 2U.u)OO)U 1725.0000034 10 n.JJJJu) .,„)))) ,SOjI1J 30.00)•)40 1035.0106.1)
5u I.UJOJ- ) I ..	 n+ 2.SJJOJO JO.U)))J4 IJbJ.00JUJ)
hl n.Jv/u ) 1 1.	 I	 " I.S000(jJ JO.U-))OJJ l/2S.00)00)
3! d.^IJJ)0 I.'•	 „	 );) ?.hJUJJJ 03.31) )00 Io35.000(jJJ
s3 )s.J0JJJJ ..'	 ,J IJ.) L.Su)uJJ 35.311JJ) I JbI.00 )000
54 d.OJUUJJ l.'+JuJJJ e.5Uu000 351.OJ)J00 IIlS.0030J0
(Stages are in years. flow rate is GPW per production well)
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Table 2-7
Probabilities in Base Case Set Scenarios
St	 1 Sta e 2^_ Stage 3 Stage 4 Flow Rate
^Cthakll.
1 J.IJO)Ji U.bJJOJU I.D07000 O.IJJJOJ J.2000O)
1 J.luol)J) 1.000)J) I	 JOJJOJ J.[J)30,1 0.63000)
3.133333 J.000J00 1.001090 0.2J0000 0.10300)
• ).CJuu)) J.8uJJ00 1.033000 0.ICJOJO 0.2JOOJI
'i J.IJJJ)) 'i.djj000 I.OJJOUO 0.700000 3.600000
t ).2J0)uJ ).MUOI)OU I.OJ,)JOO U.1JJ.)JJ ).10000)
1 J.1JI)JO) u.dv::UJO 1.))1000 J.IJ)JOJ ).23000)
b J.IJ000) 0.81)0000 1	 )J,)OOO JIIOJJ00 ).60)03)
4 J.IOOJJ) U.H000OO 1.000000 O.1UJ000 0.20000)
10 ).10103) J.tJ0J00 1.)00000 U.10O000 0.203JJJ
11 J.IJOUOJ U.200000 L.JOJJ00 U.IJ0000 J.600001
11 J.l000UJ u.1000OO 1.00D000 0.23000J 3.23000)
13 1.20UJJ1 U.1J03UJ I.)O0000 0.100000 0.20000)
14 J.2J000J u.1J0000 1.JJJu00 0.700003 0.600017I
11 ).ZJuuu) J.100000 1.JJ0000 0.133000 0.20000)
16 J.2UJOJ) U.200000 1.300000 U.IJJOJJ 0.200OU3
11 J.IJOJJJ U.100000 I.000UUO 0.100JJ0 0.000000
Lo O.IJOJJJ 0.100t1OJ I.JJJJOJ 0.1000)0 3.200001
l+ U.tUOJI)J 0.000000 1	 Ju)000 0.100000 0.200003
lU J.6DDOO) 0.800000 I.00VUUU 0.10)OJJ 0.60000)
ll 0.0JUUJ) 0.630000 1.000300 a.gOO106 0.17000,)
11 J.oJJJJJ 3.800000 1.300000 0.70JJOJ 0.2000UJ
13 0t000O) ).810003 I.00J000 0.700000 1.60UJJ3
24 0.600JUJ O.d)0000 1.000100 0.103JO0 J.200000
25 J.6JutiJJ U.8000JU 1.000000 O.IUJJJO 0.200JOD
to 0.600001 O.d000U0 1.300000 O.IOJOJO 0.600000
e 0.00000) 0.800003 i.00JJU0 O.IJJJJO 0.2000JJ
1b J16OU000 U.100000 I.000DUU 0.200030 ).20300)
2Y O.&JOOJJ U.2000OJ 1.000000 O..OJOJJ 0.603000
30 J.b00JO,) 0.2JOO!,J 1.000000 0.200000 0.100JU0
31 r,,600003 J.20000J I.Ou)J00 0.70JOJO 3.23000)
31 u.6(l•)UUJ J.200001 1.JOOJUJ U.70JUJO 0.60000)
33 J.bJO00J U. 1 .)U000 1.000000 0.10)000 ).10'00)
34 J.6JDUJJ J.2J00uO 1.JJI)000 0.100000 3.2JJ000
35 0.600000 0.230000 1.000000 O.IOJJJO 0.600000
36 O.6000U1 0.200000 l.U0DUUO 0.10,)000 0.100OOJ
37 0.2JJOu) U.800)00 1.000300 U.lOJJJO 0.20000)
38 0.2u00o) U.dOOaOO 1.0JOJ00 0.100030 0.600001
3 y O.COuuOJ 0.800303 1.000JO0 J.I000JO
-).20000)
4u J.2000OJ O.d,)0000 I.J00000 0.100000 0.26J00)
' 41
41
).2000UJ
J.Z000)J
O.AJOJ3u
J.d30300
1.000100
1.300000
0.100000
U.700000
0.60000)
0.200003
43 0.100001 0.800000 1.00JJOO 0.10J000 0.200000
4 ,* O.ZOJUUJ J.830000 l.JuOUuu 0.100JOJ 0.60030)
45 J.l000JJ 0.800 )00 1	 J00000 0.100030 J . 2cJ001
4b 0.20001) J.100000 1.000000 0.1000OJ 0.20000')'
41 J.20000) J.200000 I.JOJ000 6.100330 ).60)000
4b U.2000J) 1. 2000JO 1.)JJ000 O.10JklJJ 0.200uOJ
4v 0.[0000) O.I000OO 1.:100000 a.113 of) 0 0.200000
5U 0.10000) J.IJ000J I.J-)J000 0.7000JO 0. 60000.)
51 J.I000J) 0.200000 1.a1)30OJ 0.703000 0.104011)
51 ).Zuuu,)J 0.1UuJUU 1.033000 3. 10J00J 3.10000)
51 J.IJJJuI J.2J0000 1.00)000 0.100300 0.600000
54 U.IOOJJ) 0.130333 I . JJJJJO 0.1000JO 0.20)OOJ
•
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N2.3	 RESULTS OF THE BASE CASE SET OF ASSUMPTIONS
This section presents the results of operating the GPCM with the Base
Case Set inputs as described in Section 2.2.
2.3.1	 Profit in the Base Case Set
The present value of profit in the Base Case Set has an expected value
of $5.76 million; however, the Reference Scenario value is $7.64 million. It
must be remembered that the model uses a revenue-requirements method of compu-
tation. (Reference 8). :n-refore, profit is the residue from revenues after
substracting all costs including taxes anc a 15$ capital payment.
The profit for all scenarios is shover. in Table 2-8. The cumulative
distribution profit function is shown in Figure 2-1.
2.3.2	 Cost in the Base Case Set
The costs of produQing heat in the Base Case Set are shown on
Table 2-9. For each scenario the cost shown is the cost in a real levelized
stream beginning in the first year of the operation, Stage IV, and continuing
to the end of the operation. 0 The stream is real levelized and will rise
with the rate of energy inflation. Thus, for the Reference Scenario, the cost
is 3t.97 mills/kWh beginning 9 years after the start of exploration in 1980.
This cost will be 40.67 mills/kWh, or 10% higher, the following year. in the
ninth year after exploration, the energy price will have risen from 17.5
mills/kWh to 41.26 mills/kWh. Comparing the first year real levelized cost,
3b.97 mills/kWh, to the first year price, 41.2b mills /kWh, we see there is a
profit based on levelized costs of 3.70 mills on each kWh sold. There will
also be positive profits in each of the remaining years of operation as both
the price and the real levelized cost stream rise at 10%.
See Appendix B for discussion of levelization.
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CUMULATIVE OENSI rY FUNCTION
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Table 2-9
base Case Set T .evelized Cost for First Year of Operation
	
Years to
	
Years to
	
Scenario Operation	 LEC*
	
LEC in 1980$	 Scenario Operation	 LEC*	 LEC in 1980$
1 6.5 31.80 17.12 28 9.5 42.62 17.23
2 6.5 30.33 16.;2 29 9.5 40.72 16.46
3 b.5 29.45 15.85 30 9.5 ;9.57 16.00
4 6.5 30.19 16.25 31 9.5 40.38 16.33
5 6.5 28.95 15.58 32 9.5 ;8.77 15.68
6 6.5 28.20 15.18 33 9.5 37.80 15.29
7 6.5 29.72 16.00 34 9.5 39.73 16.07
8 6.5 28.55 15.37 35 9.5 38.21 15.45
9 6.5 27.85 14.99 36 9.5 37.30 15.08
10 7 33.35 17.11 37 11.5 51.97 17.37
11 7 31.81 16.32 38 11.5 49.70 16.61
12 7 30.89 15.85 39 11.5 48.34 16.16
13 7 31.65 16.24 40 11.5 49.14 16.42
14 7 39.35 15.58 41 11.5 47.23 15.78
15 7 29.58 15.18 42 11.5 46.08 15.40
16 7 31.16 15.99 43 11.5 48.33 16.15
17 7 29.94 15.36 44 11.5 46.52 15.55
18 7 29.20 14.98 45 11.5 45.44 15.18
19 9 40.63 17.23 46 12 54.43 17.38
20 9 38.81 16.46 47 12 52.17 16.62
21 9 37.71 15.99 48 12 50.75 16.17
22 9 38.50 16.33 49 12 51.55 16.43
2s
1
9 36.90 15.67 50 12 49.56 15.79
24 9 36.03 15.28 51 12 48.36 15.41
25 9 37.88 16.07 52 12 50.70 1b.15I	 26 9 36.43 15.45 53 12 48.81 15.55
27 9 35.55 15.08 54 12 47.68 15.19
* LEC is real levelized energy cost starting the year of
operation in Stage IV, expressed in mills/kWh.
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Comparisons of cost between different scenarios with different
times before operation can be misleading. For example, the first year real
levelized cost for, Scenario 10 is 33.35 mills/kWh. Because this cost is less
than the first year real levelized cost of the Reference Scenario, one is
tempted to conclude that Scenario 10 is more profitable than the Reference
Scenario. However, the real levelized stream for Scenario 10 would start only
7 years after exploration, rather than 9, and the energy price would be only
34.10 mills/kWh. The actual profit for Scenario 10 is $i.41 million, which
would make it less profitable than the Reference Scenario, even taough its
first year levelized cost is lower.
When first year levelized costs are deflated to 1980 dollars, the
cost can be compared to the energy price of 17.5 mills/kWh to determine
whether a scenario is profitable. However, comparing the LEC in 1980 dollarF
for scenarios with different times before the start of operations can still be
misleading. For example, comparing the LLC in 1980 dollars for scenarios 2b
and 5i, it might be concluded that Scenario 51 is more profitable because it
has a lower cost; however, Table 2-8 shows that Scenario 26 is more profit-
ao.te. This is true because the profit in Scenario 51 must be discounted back
more periods than Scenario 2b as it is )2 years before Stage IV in Scenario
51, and only V years in Scenario 2b.
1.2.3	 Base Case Set in 1990
While the project has been viewed from the year 1980, it is also
useful to examine the project in terms of a different year to see the impact
of inflation. Table 2-10 examines selected items of the Reference Scenario
for the year 1990, which is the second year of the operating stage, Stage IV.
Table 2-11 expresses the profits in terms of 1990 dollars.
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Reference Scenario in 1990 (1990$)
Energy Price
Real Levelized Energy Cost
Annual Operating Expenses (thousands, 1990$)
O&M
Electricity Expense for Pumping
Contingency
Cost of We..s • (thousands, 1990$)
6000 ft Production
b00C ft Injection
45.39 mills/kWh
40.67 mills/kWh
4955
1245
495
1445
1640
wells are dr_._ea in 1990.
Present Value of Profits in 1960 for the
base Case Set expressed in iy90 Dol;ars
(M_llions, 1990$)
Expected Profit 13.bo
Stanaard Deviation 5.92
tl:nimum P rofit .86
Maximum Profit 2-9.79
Reference Scenario lb-07
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2.4	 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF THE BASE CASE SET OF ASSUMPTIONS
Sensitivity analysis on the Base Case Set was done for energy, price,
discount rate, capacity factor, investment tax credit, energy escalation,
general price escalation, well life, and correlated uncertain cven^s. Results
are shown in Table 2-12.
,, .4.1
	
Sensitivity to Energy Price
As would be expected, profit is very sensitive to the price received
for the electricity produced. A 2.5 mill/kWh increase in price translates
into a $4.4 million increase in the present value of expected profits and a
$4.b million increase for the Reference Scenario.
A change in the energy price also affects the cost of produc-
tion. A 2.o milt/kWh increase in the 1980 price results in 3.3 mill/kWh
increase, or 1.4 mill/kWh in 1980 dollars, in first yea- real levelized cost
for the Reference Scenario. Costs increase with price because cost includes
royalty and taxes; royalty payments increase with price, and taxes increase
with profit which increases with price.
e.4.e	 Sensitivity to Discount Rate
An increase in the discount rate will lower profits and raise costs.
Ar:en casn flows are evaluated using a 20% discount instead of 15%, as in the
Base Case Set, present value of expected profits declines by $7.1 million
dollars, making it negative; and first year real levelized cost rises by
5 mills/kWh.
The discount rate used in this analysis is the required after tax
return on capital. Although 20% may seem high, it m ,a:;; :)e reme,rberea that it
is a nominal rate of return. When adjusted for 9% general infla` . ior,, r.sminal
returns of 15 and 20$ become 5.5 and 10.1% real returns, respectively. For a
project with the risks of a g-othermal rt g ervo:r, these are
not unreasonable.
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2.4.3	 Sensitivity to Capacity Factor
A reduction in capacity factor from 70 to 65% will reduce the
quantity of output sold. It lowers both expected profits and Reference
Scenario profits by $2.5 million, and increases first year levelized cost
by 1.2 mill/kWh.
2.4.4	 Sensitivity to Investment Tax Credit
The investment tax credit (ITC) was increased from 10 to 25% and only
marginal changes were observed. Present value profit rose about $1.2 million
for most scenarios. Th-. change in ITC had the gr test impact on scenarios
with the greatest capital investment, namely, those with low flow rates and
high investment in wells.
The increase in ITC would have had a greater effect if a lower
percentage of drilling and surface installation expenses had been indirect
drilling costs UDC). In the Base Case, 75% of drilling and 50% of surface
installation costs were IDC. With ITC at 25% rather than 10%, one might
consider capitalizing a greater proportion.
2.4.5	 sensitivity to Energy Escalation Rate
Profit is very sensitive to the energy escaiation rate, the rate
at which the price of the heat increases. A 1% increase in the energy
escalation rate, from 10 to 11%, increases expected profit by about $6.4
million. Because these projects are long, a total of 39 years for the
Reference Scenario, the addition of a 1% escalation increase is very
significant..
2.4.b	 Sensitivity to General Inflation Rate
Profit was slightly less sensitive to changes in general inflation
than to changes in energy escalation. A 1% rate of increase in general infla.-
tion from 9 to 10$ reduced expected profits by about $3.5 million.
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'	 The high sensitivity of profits to energy inflation rate and the
'	 general inflation rate indicates the use of caution when choosing their
values.
'	 2.4.7	 Sensitivity to Weil Life
The Base Case Set assumeu well life was 15 years. That meant the
'	 wells would all be replaced once in a 30-yr operating life. If well life were
only 10 yr, wells would have to be replaced twice, and if well life were 30
'	 yr, no replacement would be required.
As the results show, profit is sensitive to well life. It is
especially sensitive for scenarios where there is a low flow rate and more
wells are needed.
2.4.b	 Sensitivity to Correlated Events
In this study we exploit a property of the GPCM not used in the
'	 base Case Set: the ability to model the reservoir where the distribution
of an uncertain variable depends upon the value taken by another uncertain
'	 variable. We will assume that the distribution of the flow rate depends upon
the length of time required in exploration, Stage I. The distribution used is
defined in Table 2-11.
'	 Table 2-13• Flow Rate Correlated to Stage 1
Outcome of Stage	 Possible Value
'	 (yr)	 (GPM)	 Associated Probabilit
3	 1035	 0.1
	
1380	 0.1
'	 1725
	
0.8
5.5	 1035	 0.15
'	 1380	 0.35
	1725
	
0.50
6.0	 1035
	
0.2
'	 1380	 o.6
	
1725	 0.2
'	 Source: JPL Estimates
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The cumulative distribution of profit in this case is shown in
Figure 2-2. Com p arison of Figures 2-1 and 2-2 shows that the distribution of
profit in the base case is probabili-s tically dominated by the distribution of
profit in the correlated event case. 7 With no assumptions about the utility
function of an investor other than that more profit is preferred to less, we
can conciude that an investor would prefer to invest in a geothermal project
with the characteristics of the correlated events case, rather than a project
with the base case characteristics.
The correlated events case cannot be handled by the standard
Monte Carlo type model, and the ability to handle such correlated input
data is a prominent feature of the GPCM.
Probabilistic dominance is also known as stochastic dominance. For a
discussion of probabilistic dominance see Reference 9.
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aCHAPTER I
THE GEOTHERMAL PROEAHTLISTIC COST MODEL
3.1	 TNTRODUCTION TO THE MODEL ANT) THE REFERFNCF. SCENARIO)
The development of a geothermal energy resource presents a potential
'	 investor with a number of uncertainties, both in the geothermal resource and
in the development process itself. These elements of uneertaint.,v can be
incorporated into cost estimates properly if probabilistic cost models are
used. This chapter provides the reader with a description of one suer! model
that has been developed at the .Jet Propulsion Laboratory. The model calc_u-
laces the probability distribution for the cost of a project, as well as for
other financial factors such as profit and required capital. It has long been
a tradition to provide a single point estimate for these factors, but it is
our conviction that at hest such estimates are expected costs and more often
tend to be on the low side. Expected cost alone provides a limited amount of
information. Usually, the expected cost for a new technology is higher than
the current conventional energy cost. Thus, based on the criteria of expected
cost alone, such a new technology would not appear econoa. aly attractive.
'	 However, the variance of the cost estimate may be large enough to indicate
that there may be a significant probability that the new technology is
competitive. This is illustrated in Figure 3-1.
3.1.1	 THE REFERENCE SCENARIO
Many projec
with the cost of the
tion of the stage in
time-horizons, it is
the stages (and ,.n
is or processes can be considerci as occurring in stages,
activities for the project being dependent upon the dura-
which thev occur. in projects of this type with long
often the case that the duration of at l east some of
the cost of the activities in those stages) will be
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f
uncertain. Thus, final lost and profit will be sens'tive to the length of
time required to comolete e3en of those stages. In addition to the stage
durations, ot y?- variables that have in effect on cost, such -is ohvsical
parameters, may also be uncertain.
The model described in this paper deals with these uncertainties by
conside r ing individuall y all permutations of tunes (for the stage durations)
and values (for the uncertain physical variables). From each such permutation
of times and values, a 'scenario' is Constructed and then analvzed. It would
be quite Costly to have an architectural engineering firm actually calculate-
the costs associated with all possiole oombinations of these variables
'	 well flow :^ates, reservoir depth, fluid temperature, and Dermitti.ng and con-
struction ti'nes) for a given site. To avoid the enormous information costs op
generating these cost accounts for ea^h such combinati:)n, the model makes use
of a Reference Scenario. A t<efe nence Scena r io is defined as the most likely
developmental pattern. Cost-accounts are input into the program for cnl y this
Referen ce Scenario. For all otner scena r ios, onl y their Sta ge ttm- :e q , D 11vC 'al
parameter V31-;es, and the associated p robabilities are in put: thei r  -ist
accounts are derive] within th° orogram b y moiifvinR the aD0^1n^il.°_ 9°F':^en ^_°
'	 Scenario Coat accounts for 3 117 differences in the le ngth of the starter or for
any differences in one values of the p 1ristca 1 oa^am°- `_?rS. Th lis, as °S
in Section 3.4.2.1, the Reference Scenario is reall y a baseline car- `-on
which 311 other scenarios are derived. 4s a result, tie length y an7 diffi^-Ilt
'	 task of providing detailed cost accounts for the site under studv has to tie
oerformed only onoa (for .ne Reference S.Anario;.
The Referenc es r-enario also serves as a standard Form fgr Dresen`.ina
i3ta for the motel. It is important to note that the mathematical motel
~	 developed is flexible enough to nandle as manv stages and ^_ost accounts as
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the user desires. The Referen^e Scenario framework described in Section 3.2
provides a suggested framework for aggregating the accounts in the model and
for orgat.izing the data collection.
The user of this model should realize that the amount of data
required, and therefore the computer cost, will vary with the number of stages
identified, as can be seen from the sample decision tree in Figure 3-2. For
example, if there were eight stages with two alternatives in each stage, there
would be 256 (2 8 ) scenarios. I:, additionally, there were two physical
variables with two possible outcomes each, the total number of scenarios would
be 28 x 22 - 2 10 . Therefore, the user should always try to delineate
only the essen'.ial stages.
It should be noted again that a Reference Scenario must be defined
for each site where the model is applied. This is in keeping with the Federal
C--othermal Energy Program recognition of the need to focus "not only on
generic research and development, administrative and policy initiatives, but
also on site-specific development requirements." By demonstrating the risk
associated wit: the development of each site in that site's cost distribution
(i.e., density function), the model will be helpful in fulfilling these
requi.ements.
The next section describes the Reference Scenario framework for the
model. Section 3.3 provides the rationale for treating specific factors as
random variables. These are presented before the formal model (Section 3.4)
to provide the reader with background information that should be useful for
understanding the model.
3.2	 REFERENCE SCENARIO FOR A GEOTHERMAL RESER': iR
As described in the preceding section, a probabilistic cost model has
been developed to analyze the development of a geothermal resource. Although
3-u
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the model can be applied to the development of the reservoir for the
production of steaR as well is to the construction of a power plant for the
generation of e l ectricity, this section descrihes only the development of the
reservoir. ) The model examines the time-dependent activities, as well as
the time-independent activities, that must be completed 'before the developer
of the geothermal reservoir can provide steam to the owner of a power plant on
an ongoing basis. About 50% of the cost of electricity from a geothermal
facility is attribu'able to the production of steam (see Figure 3-3). About
10% is due to annual expenses related to the power blant, and the .remaining
3 0% iQ allocated to the initial power plant investment. The cost of geo-
thermal steam is about equally dependent on the ^_ost of field development
(45%) and the cost of operating the field (46%). Tha remainder of the cost is
due to field exploration.2
The Reference Scenario for the development of a geothe rmal reservoir
is structured around the essential processes or stages of development. Only
the stages that are important from the stanapoint of cosi or time will be
explicitiv incorporated in the Reference Scenario. Minor stages have been
aggregated to form these generic stages.
Each geothermal area has different geologic iharacteristi^s and
construction requirements and perhaps even different permitting procedures
depending on the state in whien it is to^3ted and whether it is on orivite,
state, or federal property. Therefore, data colleted from the experi pn2e at
one site might not be relevant to another. The aDolicit i on of the ii st nol-'
i Tne Todel may be applied to any investment pro!ect with lince-tiint y , as
long 33 the ]der ^an provide all the required cost data 3ni engineering
relatiorinips.
The percentages differ for individual sites. The objective here is to give
the reader a reference point for evaluating the imoortance of %-3rious cost
accounts.
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will require the definition of a Refe rence Scenario at each site.
specific data (cost, time, conditional probabilities, and technolog y ) is
site-dependent.
Stages of Geothermal Reservoir Development
The developer is responsible for the exploration of the geothermal
resource and the definition of its capacity and characteristics.
responsibilities also include the subsequent drilling of the production anri
reinjection wells, and the construction and operation of the transmission
system that brings the Geothermal resource to the "front door" of the
Utility's power plant. In essence, the developer's activities can be viewed
as occurring in four stages. The next four subsections will elabo rate on
these stages.
Stage I: Proving the Resource
The objective of Stine I is to find a geologic anomaly
that allows for the extraction of the E'3rta's internal heat at a cost
:mpetitive with ,other electri_al generation technologies. Establishing
the temperature of the resour^e, a s well a s the exist ence of wa te r to
"insfer heat from the deer igneous heat sou"ie to a g eo the rmal rc!ie-volr
Allod enough to he tapped 1)y drill holes, is the goal fo r this stage.
1'ne 2riteria for success in this stage is the existence of the
firmatory geologi^ da,3 req •Ared to convince an electri^ 1tility
 ccmpanv
tn3t its investment at the field is u3r-in -?I. The list Activity
 in the gtaq,^
is An Agreement with the utility to o'i^su m
 the necessar y permits for b-iilding
a power p13nt.
The amount of time necessar y is the m afor element of uncertainty
:ni3 st3q°_, r -fle^Ling the ge3lig icil '] :oRrt91'lt'/ 3bo-it the q'jalit y A nd
31Le of the reservoir based on preliminary geologi c_ lets. For pxAmnle,
Reference 3 estimates that 123 areas mast be examined in orde r to get one
successful site. This assum ption is not aporopriate to the Reber site because
esrli2r exploration by oil and gas com panies had revealed the geothermal
anamoly while looking for natural gF.s reserves.
Cost Accounts. Stage T includes three major activities: p^eltminary
iresource identification and land leasing; exploration well permittin?: and
exoloratory drilling and complete well logging. The ass , imotions and data
Isources for each activity are described below.
a. Preliminary Resource Identif : ,ation ani T,and Leasing. Few moJpls
and sources consider this activity ex p licitl y , so little detailed data is
available. For Heber, this activity (and the next) are alread y comoleted. In
fact., as noled above, this activity was completed 
by 
oil ex lo-ationcomoanies
m	 .any y ars ago. In reality, elements of th..s, t y re_ activt.i_	
l
eo, ar  13UIIIV
I
done at the same time.
Although the cost of a lease can become significant when viewed from
Ithe perspective of the number of leases required befo -c finding a suc,,essf'1l
site, the time delay associa`.ed with the leasing of federal land is of prime
importance in this model. There has been evidence that ^_onside^lbl- varia-
tions in the time required may occur. Reference 4 has indicated 28 months as
a good working number (see Figure 3-4).
'	 o. Exploration Well Permits. At tnis time, there seem to be two
pnilosophies as to the nature of this earl y develooment oermitting pro2ess:
t(1) The application should be male for the entire geothermal
'	 field and thus Aliminate the future uncertaint y reg3rdtn7
the acquisition of the proper a ,;thorit y to develop thQ
resource. The large oil comp anies seem to nrefe^ this
option because it helps them in their subsequent negotia-
tions with electric_ utilities.
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I
(2) The application should be made as if the one explora-
tory well is the only well to be drilled at the site.
Future production and reinjection wells must then be
approved under a separate permitting process if devel-
opment takes place. This approach is favored by smaller
companies that cannot afford the up-front costs of an
environmental impact analysis without having a nigher
'	 assurance of the economic success of the geothermal
resource.
The former approach is more expensive because of the scope of
analysis. However, in California under AB884, the upper limit on the time
required to receive or to be denied authority to continue with the development
project is the same.
c. Exploratory Drilling and Complete Well Logging. During
'	 exploratory drilling, some further resource identification tests are done,
'	 includirg flow tots, reservoir modeling, material tests, and reinjectinn
e-periments.
'	 Beginning now, the parties involved in the geothermal development
(e.g., the field developer and the plant operator) will start to negotiate
`	 on the contractual terms for the sale of the geothermal energy to the elec-
tric utility. During the early development of geothermal resources this
has been a slow and tedious process because of utility skepticism over the
reliability and cost effectiveness of the investment. The electric utility
wants assurance of the capacity (We years) of the resource to justify its
'	 investment in support facilities (substations, transmission lines) for its
power plants. A typical figure for the required capacity is 200 MWe for
30 years.
1	 3_,
3.2.1.2 Stage II: Development Permits Application, Review, and Approval
Otjective. Having completed Stage I, the producer and the electric
utility must now apply for the necessary permits from the federal, state, and
local authorities to develop the resource and construct a power plant. No
capital investment by either the producer or the electric utility will take
place prior to the completion of approval on all necessary permits. There-
fore, this stage must eventually include the activities of both the utility
and the developer.
Permits for the Developer. The necessary permits for the developer
were discussed under the process of exploratory well drilling. As noted, in
California, the ,pper limits of time allotted to application review should
help to reduce the uncertainty over the time required to get a decision.
This scenario assumes that the developer will seek approval for full
field development and not just for the wells required to produce energy for
the first scheduled Vower plant. This assumption is made because full f:eld
permits will provide the utility with greater assurance as to the viability of
capital investment at that site.
In addition, with the passage of the AR884, the maximum time required
for a full field permit and a one powe- plant reservoir permit is identical.
This maximum time is 1-112 years after the completed application is received
by the lead agency. Therefore, the producer will he saving time in the long
run by avoiding permit applications and reviews for the wells for future power
plants. The direct cost for the permits to the developer are minimal since
the required permits do not involve filing fees. However, the indirect costs
incurred for environmental studies and for preparing applications could be
expensive, though probably not influential, in relation to the total capital
cost.
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'	 3.2.1.3 Stage III: Reservoir Development
'	 Objective. The developer and the electric utill *.v are now in a
position to begin the actual development and construction of their respective
'	 facilities. By now, the ch3r3^teristi^_s of the resourne have been establiihed,
the developer has agreed with the utility -)n the price and amount of hea ,% to
be sold, and 311 the neces33^y pe^mils ani authorizations have been received.
This stage for the developer includes the development and start-up
'	 operation for 311 the oroduction and reinjection wells, and the construction
and testing of the geothermal transmission nvstem.
Stage III is different fram Stages T aid II in that engineering
and procurement uncertainties affect the actual time involved. Stage I is
characterized by tie geologi uncertainty, and 3t3g p II is Bete-p ined by the
administrative procedures of several bureaucracies. The following section
looks at the cost accounts and their relationships to the tasks.
Cost Accounts. The largest single ex penditure for Stage III is the
drilling of wells. The R^ferPnce Scenario for Bebe" has thi^teen n^oduetion
wells and seven injection wells  at depths ranging from 4000 ft to 10,000
'	 ft. 75% of this cost will be treated as intangible t r illing cots and 25`F
will be capitalized. The second largest expense is for surface facilities,
which also includes the cost of down hole pumps fo^ the production weals.
Half of this cost is treated as intangible drilling costs and the oth ar, lial;
is capitalized.
r3.2.1. 4 Stage IV: Operation of the Facility
Objective. Stage IV describes the costs incurred by the devel-
oper over the economic life of the power plant. These include the general
3 Of the 13 production wells, two will be snares, and of the 7 injection
wells, one will be a spare.
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operation and maintenance of the existing equipment as well as the development
of new production wells to maintain the necessary energy flow to the power
plant. Fcr example, if the flow rate from existing wells decreases or the
temperature of the resource degrades, more wells will he required to make up
the difference. Also, with time, some wells might fail and have to be
abandoned necessitating, new wells to be drilled nearby to take advantage of
the known resource. Although this degradation is not modeled explicitly by
this study, a redrilling program is assumed to take place and new wells are
scheduled to ker p the heat content constant for the life of the geothermal
field.
Success in this stage is defined as being able to continually operate
the reservoir at some stated capacity for the life of the power plant. The
treatment of various levels of non-success and its effect on cost has not yet
been completed.
Cost Accounts. The frequency of subsequent drilling-related
activities and the annual operation and maintenance costs are given in
the site-study in Table 2-4c.
3.3
	
SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF GEOTHERMAL RESOURCES
The uncertainty surrounding the successful aevelopment of a gee-
thermal can arise from a large number of sources. But, although many sources
may contribute to the uncertainty, only those that impact the ultimate cost to
a substantial degree need to be considered further. If changing the value of
a variable within a realistic range introduces signifi,-^ant changes in the
costs of power, then that variable is considered to be important. In this
section the identification of important variables will be done in two steps.
The first step is to identify those variables whose per unit
variations have the greatest impact on final cost. This is obtained by
3-14
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I
I
varying the value of 3 given parameter, and di 3 iding the resulting change
in power cost by the change in the parameter.
The second step is the ietermination of hcw much each parameter might
reasonably be expected to vary from an assumed mean value. Some variables can
be expected to have a value that falls within a narrow range, while others can
be expected to fall somewhere within a wide range of values. Thus, the second
step identifies Lhose variables that can be expected t.; hare the largest
fluctuation in their bwn values, while the first step identifies those
variables whose per unit changes Cause the largest variatinn in Cost.
Accordingly/, those variables whose per unit influence on total Cost is high
ai r' which can fluctuate widely will he more important sources of uncertainty
tnAn those variables whose per unit influence on total cost is li'<ewise high,
but which are not expected to fluctuate very much, and so on.
The first step is exemplified by Table 3-1, which is the result of a
sensitivity analysis from Reference 7. This shows the change in final :post
due to a change in a given parameter. The first item has the highest ri;i31
cost change per unit oarameter change (obtained by divid.ag
 the reduction in
power ecst by the change in tre parameter), with the following items listed in
descending order.
The second step is the determination of now m l v,h each parameter can
reasonably be expected to change. For examole, although the cost of ^aoit3l
is the second most sensitive variable, producing a 0.62' reduction in power
cost for every 11 cnange in the cost of ca p ital, it is not likely that the
Cost of capital would vary by mo re than 5% fo- 3 particular compan y . This
number is known as soon 3s 3 utility company is known, and thus the cost of
capital would not be considered an im portant variable 3s far as its contri-
bution to the uncertainty of the final Cost of the resource is coneprned.
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Table 3-1: Results of Sensitivity Anal y sis for
Reference Case with Power Cost = 28.2 Mills/kW-hr (from Reference 7)
— --- — Change in
Parameters, Reduction in
P ar meter Reference Value New value S Power Cost,	 S
.,..nead Temperature 200 0C 2500 + 25 19
Cost of Capital (Reduced by half) - 50 31
Cost per Well f500,00n $300,000 - 40 20
Well Flow Rate 500,000 lb/h 750,000 lb/h - 50 17
Plant Capital S'_4.9 million $1.5 million - 50 14
Internal Power
Consumption 10.5 MWe 5.25 MWe - 50 11
Taxes (All	 tax rates reduced by 1/2) - 50 10
Cost of Tran3mis3i0n
and Disposal Systems (Reduced by half) - 50 9
Reinjection Costs Reinjection No Reinjection. -100 16
Well Life 10 years 20 years +100 10
Excess Producing 201 of Projec- 5% of Production
Wells tior. Wells Wells - 75 6
Cooling Tower Included Excluded -100 6
Operating Expenses (Reduced by half) - 50 3
Royalty Payments 10% 0 -100 5
Dry Wells 20% of P-oduc- ^% of Produc-
tion Wells tion Wells - 75 4
Exploratior. Costs Included Excluded -100 4
Plant Life 30 years 40 years + 33 1
Transmission and
Disposal Systems
Maintenance Rate
	
0.05
Intangible Write-off	 Allowed
Plant Life	 30 years
0.025
	 - 50	 1
Not Allowed	 -100	 -10a
ra20 years	 + 13	 - .
a Indicates an increase in cost of power.
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'	 At this point, one problem with Table 3-1 should ')e mentioned. It
'	 provides sensitivities at a given point (at the reference cost given in the
table). Like the concept of point elasticity, this sensitivit y is dependent
on the point at w'nicn it is measured. It is a variable, and thus linear
extrapolations may not be accurate.
The first five variables in Taole 3-1 are:
(1) Wellhead temperature.
(2) Cost of capital.
(3) Cost per well.
(4) Well flow rate.
;5) Plant capitai cost.
The fo'_cwing subsections 3iscuss the uncertainty inherent in well-
head temperature, the cost of wells, and well flow rites. The mathematical
model presented in Section 3.4 shows how these variables (wellhead temDera—
ture, cost per well, and well flow rate) are incorporated in the model. The
computer program can handle any numner of cost and resource uncertainties,
but the user has to specify the scaling eQlitions for earth	 ty.
3.3 . 1 	 Wellhead Temperature
Wellhead temperature, as is seen by Table 3-1, heads the list is the
variable 'Co which power cost is most sensitive. By drilling dee per, highe-
temperatures can be reanhed. However, with existing technologv, there must be
3 reservoir of Mater or Steam to tr3nsDOr t, the .'felt. Typi--all y , the presence
of Water creates convective cell and, 33 lndi-, ated by Figure 3-5 (Reference 8,
page 72), a convective Dell has 3 fairly constant tempe^ature ov°_^ it3 deoth.
Figure 3-6 snows this for the Mesa anomaly, which is some miles northeast of
'	 the Heber site. Using Figure 3-6, it is nlear tha t., 31though a characteristic
reservoir temperature can be listed, individual well temperatures can vary
t	 3-17
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significantly. Taking a 5000-ft well, temperatures as shown in Figure 3-6
vary from 3000 E to about 3600F, a 20% variation. Because most wells reach
360
0F somewhere near that depth, and hold it over a wide range of depths,
3600F would be considered the resource temperature.
Temperature affects plant cost in several wa y s. Decreases in temDera-
ture are anticipated. Chevron estimates 3% per -ear for Heber (Reference 10).
Such a degradation of the resource can Ue compensated for by increased well
flow rate. However, this depletes the reservoir more quickly and increases
the capital cost requirements. Past a certain point, the power olants operat-
ing characteristics may need alteration. For example, Holt/Procon p lans for
roughly 2 $u million investment after 9 years of plant ope-ation to re-optimize
the initial power plant design points for the new, lower tem p erature at the
Heber site (Reference 10).
	
3.3 .2 	 Cost per Well as a Function of Well Depth and Rock Type
In the literature, the quoted value for the c.)st per well has ranged
from $300,000 to $2 million dollars. Most of this variation is due to well
depth. Figure 3
-
7
 snows an estimate as to well cost per meter, with a 90%
confidence interval. This estimate compares favorably with the medium hard
to hard rock curves in Figure 3-8 which shows that the nariness of rock is
an important determinant of drilling costs and thus well cost. The actual
drilling costs used in the Heber site-study are discussed further in
Section 2.2.
	
3.3.3	 Well Flow Rates
Figure 3-9 shows a 90% confidence interval for wellhead flow rate
^sus well deptn. Using a 5000-ft deep reservoir, flow rates are about
375 + 125 Mlb/h, a variation of about 33%. Table 3-1 indicates that this
variation would produce an 114 change in Dower costs. Figure 3-10 shows the
-iariaoility of well flow rate over time.
3-20
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Effect of Depth on Geotnermal Drilling Costs
(in 1975 dollars) (from Reference 11)
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1	 3.3.4	 Other Sensitive Variables
Table 3•-1 indicates that the cost of power is also sensitive to the
cost of ca p ital and to plant capital requirements. These va r iables are not
I
treated stochast::cally in the model for the reasons given in the following
paragraphs.
Cost of capital was used as an example previously to show that,
i
although the cost. of power might be sensitive to changes ir. a variable, the
1	 likely value of this variable will fall within 3 small range. If the average
cost of capital for an electric utility compan y is 12%, it is unlikely that
the cost of capital would fall outside the range of 11% to 13`b. This small
variation would only lead to a 5% change in the power cost. Thus, the
1	 effective influence of the cost of capital is not considered important. A
similar argument holds for the producer, even though a la"ge oil eompanv has a
I
higner debt/asset ratio than that of a small venture firm. Thus, once 3 firm
is specified, the range in cost of capital for that firm should be small.
Table 3-2 shows a variety of "predictions" of geothermal capital
costs. Variation is due to different resource tem peratures, technologies
used, cooling water availability and environmental controls required. Thus,
I
one must be careful as to which plants can be compared. For the 200-mW steam
plants, the cost per kilowatt was found to vary by 27% around the mean. Flash
I
plant predictions for the same size p lant varied by 30% about their average,
ar.d binary plants varied by 21% about their average. There were not enough
small plants of the binary and flash type to do this for any but the 200-mW
plants. Based on these r63UItS, if 3 25% variation in rower plant capital
costs is assumed, only a 7% change in power cost is expected.
'	 The other variables listed in Table 3-1 can be similarly evaluated.
Their effects on power cost can be calculated, with end result being theI
1	 3-25
Table 3-2
Capital Costs (Field and Plant)
(from Reference 12)
Source Type
Capacity,
MW
Feld
Investment
Cost-
(1076$ ) ,
$/kW
Generating
Plant
Investment,
$/kW
Tot-a!,
$/kW
Greider Steam 200 162 'kW 230 407
Greider Flash 200 172 429 617
Greider Binary 200 173 527 717
Barr Steam 200 140
Barr Flash 200 232
Barr Binary 200 341
Armstead Steam 200 103 173 277
Bloomster Flash 55 174 274 447
Holt and Brugman Binary 50
at 250F 560
at	 r "'0°F 297
Holta Flash 50 200-300 450-550 650-850
Binary 50 200-300 450-550 650-850
Can, Hersam Geysers
Khc and Krumland Unit	 14 110 149
Krumland b Geyser2
Unit 14 110 260
Goldsm , th (Flash) 150-200 159-310
Geyse- Geysers
Historical 502 116 166
Cerro Prietoc (Flash) 75 314
Racine (Binary) 50 700-800d
Hankin (Flash) 50 742
Project
Independence (Brine) 200 560-860
(Geysers) 1000 364e
a Holt supersedes Holt and Brugman.
b Krumland Supersedes Dan, Hersam, Rho, and Rr,wiand.
c From Greider.
d Racines costs projected for 1982.
e Project Independence projected costs for 1980.
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tdemonstration of the importance of the three variables--wellhead temperature,
cost per well (well depth and rock t y pe), and well flow rate--relative to the
others.
The only variable whose effect on cost has not been examined in the
literature is the length of time required for the stages o f
 development
discussed in Section 3.2. Figure 3-11 shows the effect of the time lag from
the signing of a contract betwe e n the producer and the elect r ic utility to the
start of fluid sales on the expected present worth of the venture. Data from
PG&E demonstrate the un^ rtainty about the time elapsed during one stage. The
last three units (13, 14, 15) at Geysers were expected to take 28, 36, and 28
months, respectively, to acquire the California Public Utilities Commission
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity. These predictions were made
almost two years before the certificate procass. Tho: actual realized times
'	 for units 13, 14, and 15 certification processes were 32, 33, and 26 months,
4
respectively.
'	 The time effect is explicitly discussed and stressed in the previous
section. The computer model has the capability to handle this important
tfactor, in addition to the resource uncertainties discussed above.
3.4	 GEOTHERMAL PROBABILISTIC COST MODEL
'	 3.4.1	 Introduction to Probabilistic Modeling
Because the cost of developing a geothermal resourre ii intrinsically
uncertain,, no venture analysis technique can evaluate the cost or profit of 3
project with any degree of confidence without conslde ,, ing the uncertainties
oresent. Partial accommodation of these uncertainties can prod l^ce results
4 Data from attachment to letter from Richard H. Peterson, Vice Chairman of
the Board, Pacific Gas and Electric Compan y to Mr. Leo T. Mc r3 rthv, Soeaker
of the Ansembly, California. The attachment is dated .January 12, 1976.
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which are misleading. Probabilistic cost modeling, however, sloes provide
she oppor*. , A ty to properly incorporate tn?se uncertainties into the final
results. This paper describes one such model that has been developed at the
Jet Propulsion 1,3boratory and discusses its application to a geothermal site
at Heber, California.
The concept underlying probabilistic modeling is that the values
for the model inputs a:^ not known, but that th°ir distributions can be
estimated. A decision tree showing each possible sequence of events and the
associated probabilities can then be contt^ucted, and from this, p roiect costa
and other financial measures can be appropriatel y aggregated into probability
distributions. By generating entire distributions, this model enahl°s the
inclusion of a decision-maker's risk preference into his investment decisions.
The shaded area in Figure 3-1 shows that even though the ex pected cost of a
new technology may be higher than the current cost of conventional technol-
ogies, there might be a considerable rrobability that the new technology is
competitive with the existing technology. Likewise, there may be a significant
probability Lhat the cost of the new technology will reach unacce ptable levels.
The possibility for a decision maker to consider risk preference is
precluded when only point estimates are made. It might be argued that calcu-
lating a point estimate requires less information than constructing a complete
dist r ioution. This is not true, however, hecause calculating the exoectel
value 1-olicitly uses 311 the relevant information contained in a orobability
distribution. This model uses that information ex p licitly and calculates
the probability distributions for cost, required capital, 3rd orofit. Th",
ex pected value and variance can be deriveA from these distributions, and risk
preference may then be introduced.
The most distinguishing feature of the rjeothermal Probabilistic Cost
Model is that it allows the outcome of one variable to be dependent upon
3-?9
the outcomes of the other variables. Conditional probability distributions
can thus be used. For example, the p robability distribution for the length
of a development stage may be dependent upon the lengths of the stages that
precede it or 1pon the depths of the wells that have to be drilled, none of
which may be known at the beginning of the project. In this way, any
correlation--either positive or negative--between characte-istics can be
considered explicitly and a joint probability distribution tha t his all
existing dependency relationships factored into it can be ,onstructed.
Therefore, this model can ccrrectly aggregate the statistical
variances in the stage time distributions. Unlike the expected value of
the sum of two random variables (which is the sum of the_- ex pected values),
the variance of the sum may be greater than, equal to, or less than the SllT
of their variances. It depends on whether the two random variables are
Positively, neutrally, or negatively correlated to one another. 5 The
distributions in Figures 3-12a and 3-12b are of the same shape. The only
A fference is tneir orientation. With the mayor axis tilted to the right
(indicating positive correlation), the distribution leads to a corresponding
iistribution of total project cost with a wides pread (large) variance (see
Figure 3-13a). The opposite case is obtained for the distribution having its
major axis tilted to the left (indicating negative correlation). The corre-
sponding distribution is more concentrated around its mean (low variance; see
Figure 3-13b). The expected value approach can not capture all Lhese results.
7 Let x and y be two random variables. Variance (x + y) = Variance (x) +
Variance (y) + 2 Covariance (x,y). Variance (x + y) = Va r iance (x) +
Variance (y) if and only if Covariance (x,y) = 0.
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3.4.2	 Formal Model
In section 3.2.1, four stages were identified for th e RgferencR
Scenario of 3 geothermal resource development. These stages a^e:
(1) Stage 1: Proving the resource.
(2) Stage 2: Develo pment per-nits aDo U catLon, ^9view and iporovil.
(3) Stage 3: Reservoir development.
(4) Stage 4: Operation of tae facili`.:' until the field is 190leted
of an economicall y valuable genth—nal -esour
These four stages have been use ,-1 to motel tn? RR°°^'nce S^en3^L
here. Altho'ign any numbe" o f stages is Doss:bl°, ` n 'linty-^. a -n1n1ge1`?1e
111	
n-imoer of stages an! to Drivent .`h°_ n'lmtier of	 `,-,, h9Lng
too large, six stages should 'ie set as the '1on•:r limit. -,) tll l ist ratR the
j	 JroDlem' let th^_ n° Z)9 two 91terna3 iV93 i%	 stago. '4i `l'i r) stag-s'
rT	 are 64 ;^_enarioS. If the number of alternatives is thr !P, .`n°_^e i n 9 tota l of
729 3 cena^ids! Thus, tie -ise-s -)f this !1')lel a-- i—e! t o	 on th?
[	 enoice o.° stages and physical oarameters under ,onsids"ation while disaga^e-
gating '_ne problem `.^ 23,^.t3^e s'i'ne '7a'	 e 13'gen .`s if
i	
3.4.2.1 The Met:lodology: An Overview
f
To inzo rpor3te the uncerta int y arising fro^i sta ¢e length ti-n-9 any;
unce rtain variables into the analisis of project cost, the -nil -^l ^`^nSiders
Lniividually in succession 311 diffe rent Dossible De^m'jtati ,)ns of val:ies
I .-nose	 v?ria^'es. "rom each s'1 ^_h De-mutation of values and tines, a
"scenario" is constructed and ther. analvzed.
A scenario thus reDresents onR oossible oath th rough a le.!i4Lon
tree. Specifically, a scenario is iefined by foi r attributes:
(1) a set of durations soecifVLng th e length of each of the stages;
'	 (2) a set of values for the uncertain physical Darameters (e.g.,
well head temperature, flow rate);
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(3) the probabilities that each stage and each physical parameter
takes the value specified for it in (1) and (2); and
(4) the dollar value costs for all cost accounts in all stages.
To avoid the enormous information costs of leriving the cost
accounts (4 above) for each possible scenario, the model uses a baseline
case, or Reference Scenario. The Reference Scenario is defined as the most
likely path through the decision tree. In the computer program, the cost
accounts are input to the program only for this Reference Scena rio. (These
along with Reference stage tines and Reference physical oirameter values
npletely specify the Reference Scenario.) For all other scenarios, only
:,eir stage times, physical parameter values, and associated probabilities are
input: thei r cost WCOInts are derived within the orog^am ov modifving the
Reference cost accounts for any differences in the length of each stage or for
any differences in the values of the physical pa rameters. Thus, as des2ribel
below, the Reference Scenario is really a baseline ^_ase from l'-,ich all other
scenarios are derived. If this were not so, based on the or Cevious dese^io-
tion, the req'lirei amount of information would be enormous. Dollar costs for
every cost account for each scenario would be requ:^=d. Because. a Reference
Scenario is used, the lengthy and difficult task of providing detailed cost
accounts for the site under stud y 4is to be performed onl y once (fo r the
Reference Scenario).
To illustrate this procedure, if in the Reference Scenario, Stage J
is assumed to take 10 years, then a Cost Account i in Stage .J is estimated
based upon the 10 gear figure. If, however, Stage J is later assumed in
another scenario to last 20 years, then Cost Account i in Stage J for that
scenario would oe doubled to reflect the now longer stage time. Additionally,
if a particular cost account is affected by an uncertain physical variable,
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the model would make an adjustment through the use of appropriately defined
scaling functions. These adjustments are done in subroutine GSCALF.
'	 In a like manner,	 the cost-accounts for each of the other scenarios
are derivej. Because the lengths of the stages are different from scena r io to
scenario,	 the cccurrence of the cost-account expenditures in each scenario
will be staggered. The model accounts for the staggered tine f rames by
appropriately accounting for time differences when the financial analvsis is
performed. The financial subroutine in the model calculates levelized energy
cost, life-cycle cost, and profit for each scenario. With the p robability of
occurrence for each scenario (and thus of their out puts) having bePn :non*_5
as part of the scenario description, a com p lete set o r v31ies and their
probabilities are obtained fr,• levelized energy cost,	 and
for profit. From these, 3Coarate orooabiiit y f-ii. *.ions °or bot! of the cost
categories and for profit can be constructed.
3.4.2.2	 The Computer Program
a. Stages. Ti the model the stages are 1-g ignated 5v the variable
JA, with JX ranging in value f r om 1 to J. The ooe^atiin31 stag y , the list
stage, is the J'h stage.
b. Stage Duration. -orrespon"ling to ea^h stage •TX the re is 3 time
lapse for completing 311 a:'tivitl-?3 in that stage. In o-ier '_o ^ r lei, t th-
uncertainty for the completion `_ime of 3nv given stage_, th? -'age time i3
ItreateJ a3 3 random variaole and 13SUIlel to h3v? 7. I'SZrete !	 '7f 0'1t7OmeS.
In the Reference Scenario, the length of Stage • 1X is jenotei tii " 19(JX); in
any other scenario, the Length of Stage JX is 3noted by T?(•JX,MM), wher e '4f
6 Actually, only the conditional probabilities fn- each stage length tine
anJ physical parameter val-les a re inout. Their oroduct cal^ , elated in the
program, yields the probability of occurrence for each scenario and its
output.
I
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is the number of that scenario. Likewise, the length of the final stage
(Stage J) in the Reference Scenario is TPR(J), and the length of Stage J
in any other scenario is TP(J,MM) where again MM identifies that scenario.
c. Stage Intervals. Each stage is divided into intervals. The
number of intervals into Which a specific Stage JX will be subdivided is
denoted by M(JX). The M(JX) remain fixed for all scenarios. All intervals
in a given stage are the same length, and thus are found by the quotient
TP(JX,MM)/M(JX). The M(•JX) are judiciously chosen to correspond gener-411v to
the number of times costs will recur within a stage. By dividing long stages
into intervals, it is possible to specif y costs for pe^iods on the o rder of
one year which enables the modeling of non-uniform cash flows throughout the
stage.
d. Cost Accounts. There are two kinds of ^osts: time-deoendent and
time-independent. TLme-dependent costs, as their name imalies, vary 3s the
lengtn of 3 stage (and hence as the length of the stage's intervals) varies.
(Stage times vary from scenario to scenario; the number of the stages and the
.amber of intervals in each stage are specified at the outset and remain fixed
ill scenarios.) Time-independent costs are 'Assumed to remain constant
,gardless of the length of the interval in which they ^jcur.
An ?ximpie of 3 tims-dependent cost could be the legal fses c-lid
•ig tae permitting process. The longer the process, s he longer legal
_. .,^es ire required, and the gr?3ter will be the ^oat. An examole of a
time-independent ^_ost could be 3 bulldozer purchased for the development of
tae field. Once purcnased, the cost will not change if the development of
tae field takes an additional length of time. (Although strictly speaking,
operations and maintenance costs might ^hinge.)
As mentioned before, detailed cost accounts are in put for the
Reference Scenario only. For each time-dependent cost account, expenditures
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Iare input for each interval of the specific stage in which that dependent coat
account occurs. This expenditure, or dependent cost for the Refe^enoe
Scenario, is denoted by CDR(JX,NX,MX,KDX). The index JX denotes the stage in
which the cost account occurs; NX signifies the 3 ,2counting lifetime of the
expenditure; MX denotes the interval in which the cost occu r -,; and '-%DX
designates which cost account is being le gorioed. Thus, CDR (2, 1, 4, 3)
signifies the time-dependent expenditure of the first accounting li fe t ime for
the third cost account in the fourth inte"7il of Stage ? of th- Rcfe^en,a
Scenario.
A typical cost account for a time-dependent a^t.ivit y is shown below.
It is the Exploration and Well Logging account for Stage 1 of t l e Refg^eno-?
Scenario. Note that the expenditure rate is not Zecessa-ily uniform for the
duration of Stage 1. This is ln ,iicated by iifferent dollar costs (in
thousands of 1980 dollars) for each of the six intervals into which Stage 1 is
divided.
240.0
	
240.0
	 800.0	 800.0	 800.00	 8,30.0
The entire "mat-ix" of tine-dependent cost accounts for Stage 1 world
appear then as follows:
i
1
I
i
i
i
68.75 68.75 68.75 69.75 68.75 68.75
0.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
240.0 240.0 800.0 800.0 800.0 800.0
91.67 91.67 91.67 91.67 91.67 91.67
79.0 43.0 96.0 96.0 96.0 96.0
An individual entry his the label CDR(JX,NX,MX,KDX) where JX,NX,MX and KDX are
defined as before. All costs given in this report and used by the model are
in 1980 dollars; if occurring any number of years after 1980, these costs
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are escalated appropriately by the model to account for inflation and real
increases in price at rates specified by the user.
e. Subroutine GSCALE The afo rementioned adjustments to the
Reference Scenario Costs Accounts are per,ormed for each sc?nario in the
GSCALE subroutine. Time-dependent costs are assumed to be orcoort Lori al to
the length of Reference Scenario stages. Thus, if another scenario has a
stage length (and nence stage interval length) twice t`iit of the Reference
Scenario, all of its time-de pendent cost accounts would be twice that of the
Reference Scenario. This effect is ca ptured by the TP(JX,MM)/TPR(JX) tern in
AJMOD.
The cost accounts are also escalated in GSCA!.E. The cost accounts
^e multiplied by their cost escalation factors, AD(JX,VY,KOX), raised to the
exponent PWR, where PWR is the number of years up until the Cost actually
occurs. PWR is Composed of two parts: PSUM(,JX,MM), ~h am n •JTb° r of years uo to
the JX stage; and MX • !TP(.JX,MM)/RMJX), tha number of v-^ars into the stage
tnat the cost occurs.
Once the cost accounts h,ve been adjusted for time differences,
,,SCALE then calls subroutines that make adjustments fo r ,iff ,^rences in t'ae
levels of physical variables. These subroutines are OPT 1 through OPT N.
These are user Specified and tncir forms are dependent on the 3pecifie Site.
f. OPT Function Subroutines. The "OPTn" function subroutines are
^ailed by the FCTMOD subroutine in GSCALE to modify the cost accounts for any
iifferences between the Reference Scenario levels for the ohysical parameters
and the levels of those parameters in the scenario being examined. The three
physical parameters nonsidered in this study are wellhead fluid temperature,
flow rate, and well depth. The OPT functions ar°e physical relationshios that
must be supplied by the user for the project being studied. The following OPT
functions are used for the Heber Reservoir.
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OPT 1:	 Effect of Temperature. The references equation for OPTI is
w ($/kW) =	
51.107 Z exp [3.3884 x to -4
 7.]
	
w	 T f + 273.15
'	 ^W T
,, 
- T^ - ( To + 273
.15) In Tg + ?73.15
from Reference 5. When the equation is used to evaluate the effect of
resource temperature on well cost, the well depth, Z, and flow rate, m 
w
, are
Iheld constant to define the temperature rxto oniv. The cost relationshin
then becomes
Cost (scenario) = Cost (reference) * Temperature equation (scenario)
Temperature equation (reference)
or
OPTI = RVAL * IP2-CON(l) - (CON(1)+273.) *[ALOG (P2+273.)/
I (CON(1) +273.)]! /IP1-CON(1) - (CON(1)+2'73.)
ALOG [( P1&273.) /( CON(l) +273. )1'
where
l	
OPT1
	 = adjusted cost returned to FCTMOD
l	 RVAL	 = cost account data input to OPTI
P2	 = reference fluid temperature (Tgf), 0 
P1	 = scenario fluid temperature, 0 
CON(1) = ambient temperature, To input for each site, 0 
I	 Note that the constant 3.8884 x 10 4 is used when Z is
t	 input in meters. Ii well depth is in feet, the constant
'	 must be adjusted.
OPT 2: Effect of Flow Rate. The same equation from Reference 5 can
oe used to define a flow rate relationship with
I	 Cost	 (scenario) = Cost	 (refer nce) * Flow rate equation (scenario)
	
well	 well	 Flow rate equation (reference)
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If the well depth, Z, and temperature T gf , are held constant, this
relationship gives
1/m scenario
OPT2 = RVAL
	
1/mw reference = 
RVAL * P1
w	 w
where
OPT2 = adjusted cost returned to FCTMOD
P2	 = reference flow rate
P1	 = scenario flow rate
RVAL = cost account data input to OPT2.
OPT 3:	 Effect of Well Depth. Again, in the same referenc?
equation, temperature and flow rate can be held constant to loo'< at the effect
of well depth on well cost. This gives:
Z exn 3.8884 x 10-`' Z,
q)w ( $/'.<W) (scenario) = 4)w ($/kW) ( referee ^e) * s	 `	 -4 s
ZRexo [3.8884 x 10	 ZRl
or
OPTS = RVAL * (P1 /F2) * 7,XP[(CON(6) * (P1-P2))]
where
OPTS
	
= adjusted cost returned to FCTMOD
RVAL	 = cost account data input to OPT,!
P2	 = refe^ence well depth
P1	 = scenario well .4epth
CON(6) = constant, 3.8884 x 10 4 from Reference 5.
Note that the constant 3.8884 x 10 4 is used whey,
Z is input in metQrs. If well depth is in feet, the
constant must be adjusted.
With these equations, we can incorporate any uncertainty in the
resource characteristics into the derivation of the probability density
function for resource development costs.
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I g. Subroutine RCOST. After the modifications by GSCALF, to each
scenario, HCOST discounts all ^_ost accounts in all the stages to present
dollars as of the hepinnine of Stave 1. Thi:3 is performed one stage at a
time. For each stage in succession the entries for each cost account (i.e.,
the costs in all the time intervals) are discounted to the beginning of that
stage and summed t.ovether. This yields a sinv l e fi gure for all the costs in
that stage. This number (CDT in the program) is expressed in dollars as of
the beginning of that stage; it is then discounted back to the beginning of
Stage 1 and summed into the variable CD. Referring to Figure 3-1 4 , the costs
in a given intetvol are added together into variable CDTT, and then discounted
to the beginning of the stage as CDTT	 I*d**  MX * TPR(JX)/MLIM]. This is
summed into variable CDT. CDT is then discounted to the beginning of the
project by CDT*D**PSUMR(JX), where PSUMR(JX) is the number of years prier to
the beginning of Stage JX in the scenario being considered. This is done for
all stages, JX = 1 to J.
The present value cost fivures thus obtained are then operated upon
in RCOST to find levelized cost and life cycle cost for the scenario unde.-
nonsiderat'on. Because cost accounts with different accounting lifetimes
are treated differently for tax purposes, the cost accounts of differinv
accounting lifetimes must be segregated by accounting type. This is
accomplished by the first Do Loop in RCOST. It first performs the above
discounting for accounts with a 1-year life; then does so for the second
accounting type; then for the third, and so on. Thus, costs will be indexed
by accounting type, NX, e.g., CAPR(NX), CR(NX).
RCOST also computes "upfront capital cost" or the costs of the stages
'	 prior to the final or operating stage. To do this the cost of the upfront
stages must initially be kept separate from the cost of the final stage. This
'	 separation is achieved by the second Do Loop which considers all stages except
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the last. After that Loop, the cost accounts for the final stage are dis-
counted. CAPR M ) designates the upfront capital costs for accounting type
NX, and CR(NX) the total project capital costs for that accounting type.
Thus, the total project cost of the second accounting type, CR(2), consists
of the upfront capital costs of the second accounting type ,_ CAPR(2), plus
the discounted time-dependent and time-independent cost accounts of the
second accounting type for the final stage, Stage J.
After the present value cost is obtained for each accounting type
with a Lifetime longer than one year. 
11 
the effects of taxes, depreciation,
and investment tax credits are accounted for through `he use of the fixed
charge rate (FCR). Because the FCR is a function of the accounting lifetime,
it can now be seer. why, up to this point, the costs have been segregated by
accounting lifetime. Multiplying CR(NX) by the FCR yields the constant annual
amount that exactly pays back this capital investment with interest over the
lifetime of the project, after taxes (which have been adjusted for the effect
of depreciation and any investment tax credit) have been paid. Dividing this
constant annual payment by the capital recovery factor (CRF) give3 the present
value sum of those payments. The present value sums for each accounting type
can then be added together. In the program, this aggregate sum is denoted by
CDUM, an intermediate "dummy" variable for cost.
Thus far, this sum does not include the effects of depletion allow-
ante and royalties. To account for these, the final sum, CDUM, obtained
above is multipli&d by 1-t+at-ROY+tROY' where ROY is the royalty rate, t the
tax rate, and a the depletion allowance rate. The quotient is simply the
ratio:
	
1 - t	 _ PV all costs with depletion allowance and royalties]
1-t+at-ROY+tROY - PV [all costs without depletion allowan-e and royaltier-1
7 Costs with a lifetime of one year are expensed; no taxes are paid on the
income required to cover them, and no depreciation or tax credits are
applied.
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When multiplied by the amount necessary to cover 311 costs without a depletion
allowance ind royalty p3ynencs, which is what is thus far obtaine ,l above, the
amount necessary to cover all costs with lepl^tion allowance and rovalty
payments is obtained. If the depletion 3110w3nce is calculite ,4 on g^oss
revenues net o` rents and royalties, the life cycle ^ost of the prolert can be
expressed as
LCC = 
L
EL * CDUM I +( at	 * ( RE-MY1^,
	
LLF.Sr,AL
_
where EL =
	
t
1-t+at-ROY+*_ROY and RENROY is the sum of ^ents and rov31t*-s. This
is for the regulated case. (Note that in order for the orogram to handle them
, urrectly, rents and leases for each stage, exce pt the Last, must be `_nnutted
into the program as the .first ti-ne-dependent cost account for those stages.)
Profit, in the non-r^3uiated case, is obtained by Reven-ie minus 7-ife
le Cost. As the effects of taxes, depletion allowance, and royalties have
ceen factored Ln on only t-ie cost side, 3n'j tot the revenue side, the dLff'=! -
once REV - "CC must be multiplied by (1-t+at-ROY+tROY) to aporopriit•Lv redo ^_P
revenue retained b •y the firm as profit to -eflect the effects of depletion
ind rovalty payments. This leads to in exp ression for LCC as (l-1 * CDUMI+
[
i%	 *	 v^-.L	 /	 r	 * D	 e 
e F
, C	
LL	 J
^v
ESC AL	 (	 JRENRO'il E .. + ,1-ESCA^i 	R .0 , wh re. .S ,4L is (1-t+it-ROY+6 , ^ .
To find Levelized Energv Cos*, calculating the ',ife Cycle Cost atone
is nit suffi^_Lent. The economically recoverable Dirt of the resour^_ r, an d th e
life of the resource must be ^<nown to determine the energv cost. Over time,
the teinpera ire of the resource and possibly the flow r,,e from the wells will
iegrade. While this degradation is not nolelel explicitl y by this studv, a
redrLllLng pr,)gr3^n is assumed to t3xe ol3ce and new wells i-e sc'iedu.-d to
keep the heat content, E, from the wells constant for the life of the geo-
thermal field. The costs of this progr3m are included in the cost i^counts
for Stage IV and are reflected in the final k: ost figures.
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With a given E, we can calculate the generalized energy cost  as
i nno . rri
CEL =
U', . G
This follows directly from Equation 0-12, in Reference 13, when both numerator
and denominator are multiplied by annual energy output. The constant 1000 is
a conversion factor to yield $/kWh from -sills/kWh.
h. Probabitistic :LaalySiS. The probability associated with the
energy cost for a scenario ;s simp ly the oroluct of the conditional o^ob-
abilities specified for stage tunes and physical variables in that scenario.
1ne3e are input as P(JX,I). If the stage times and/o r the DhySiCal variables
are assumed to De independent, then the probability of a specific value occur-
ring for a variaale remains the same regardless of what the preceding va-iables
:night turn out to be. If any of the variables are correlated, the inputted
probabilities would have to reflect this correlation.
As discussed in the introduction to the formal model, it is likely
that the number of scenarios for a specific project under evaluation ma y be
Generalized energy cost is defined as that price per unit of energ y which.
if held constant in real terms throughout the project life would provide
the required re%enue to finance the life cycle cost of the project, assum-
ing that all cash flow interim requirements or excesses are borrowed or
invested at the utility's internal rate of return. Levelized energy cost
is defined as that price per unit of energy which, if held constant in
nominal terms throughout the project life would provide the required
revenue to finance the life cycle cost of the oroject, assuming that 311
cash flow interim requirements or excesses are borrowea or invested at the
utility's internal rate of return. We caution that the ^oncept of level-
ized energy cost as an energy cost index is defective. Tt can be used to
rank ..:der different energy projects only if they have the same project
life. Clearly, the optimal project life design should depend on the
physical characteristics and economic trade-offs thereof, and should not
be arbitrarily standardized. If projects have different lifetimes, choices
based on levelized energy costs may bias towards short life projects, even
though they have the same fixed costs and proportionate variable costs.
Generalized energy cost will not have this problem. Thus, we suggest using
the latter as an output from the computer model. In the computer program,
a generalized energy cost is used. Uniform energy cost is a spe^_ial case
of the latter with nominal energy cost escalation factor being one.
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very large. In that event, the costs of calculating all these scenario costs
may be Drohibitively large. Fortunately, we hive a well-'{nown 3tatisti^.11
theory, the Kolmogorov-S rnirnov Theorem, which shoos that we can randomly select
150 scenarios as a sample to approximate the required Drobahility distribution
The likelihood of selecting a scenario should be weighted b y its probability,
and the approximate distribution will be good within 901 confidence. (However,
we caution the users of this model that even though the computational cost is
cut to a minimum, the d_ia colle^.tion costs may still be orohibitive.) The
Kilmogorov-Smirnov Theorem is: Let ^;.t) be the underlying ^_ontinuous cost
distribution, and X 1 ,	 X  be a samole from F(x). Define F n (x) as
the proportion of obser- I ?d values in the samole which are less than or equal
to X. Let
DR = 
- Slip.I	 Fn(x) - F(x)
The Filmogorov-Smirnov Theorem states that
lim Pr D	 t	 = 1- 2 n (_1)t-1 e-?_t`i2
n—n	
nl/2	 j
i = 1
Let H(t) be the value of the right hand side of the equation. A ` -ale of
H(t) is given in Table 3-5. As an ex3mole, consider 901 ^onridence, i.e.,
(.1(t) = 0.90. The corresponding t is 1.22. Su ppose we want D  - 0.1. The
•equired sample size, n, will then be calculated as:
1.222
n 0.1
150
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Table 3-5
'	 Probability Limit for the Kolmogorov-5mirnov Theorem
t	 H (t)	 t	 H(t )
0.30 0.0000 1.20 0.8878
0.35 0.0003 1.25 9.9121
0.40 0.0028 1.30 0.9319
0.45 0.0126 1.35 0.9478
0.50 0.0361 1.40 0.9603
0.55 0.0772 1.45 0.9702
C.60 0.1357 1.50 0.9778
0.65 0.2080 1,60 0.9880
0.70 0.2888 1.70 0 9938
0.75 0.3728 1.80 0.9969
0.80 0.4559 1.90 0.9985
0.85 0.5347 2.00 0.9993
0.90 0.6073 2.10 0.9997
0.95 0.6725 2.20 0.9999
1.00 0.7300 2.30 0.9999
1.05 0.7798 2.40 1.0000
1,10 0.8223 2.50 1.0000
1.15 0.8580
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PART THREE
INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF GEOTHERMAL DEVELOPMENT
CHAPTER 4
INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF GEOTHERMAL DEVELOPMENT
Leasing, Contracting, Insurance
i
4.1
	 INTRODUCTION
Electric power is usually produced
mechanically to a turbine. One way to make
its vanes with expanding steam. This steam
water with fossil or nuclear fuels, or by o
ground in a form called geothermal water or
by a generator that is coupled
the turbine rotate is to bombard
is produced either by heating
btaining it directly from the
steam. Although its role in
generating electricity is very much like that of coal, oil or nuclear fuel,
the institutional structure upon which a geothermal power plant operates is
'	 quite different fro:.. g hat of planto using other fuels. These differences and
the reason why they exist are discussed in Section 4.2.
NThree kinds of institutional arrangements are common to geothermal
developments. First, rights to land with geothermal potential must be
obtained and its development potential assessed. This component hereafter is
referred to as "Leasing". The developer then makes an agreement with a
utility that seeks to use the produced geothermal resource in the production
of electricity. The geothermal resource could also be used in direct
applications, such as space heating, etc. This stage will be discussed under
the heading "Contracting"
	
Finally, the utility and the developer operate in
an uncertain environment. Earthquakes, cold water breakthroughs, vapor 'low
cessations, natural calamities, and underground pressure leaks are some
natural causes of uncertainty in the quantity and quality of geothermal water
or steam and hence in the quantity of power generated. Both the developer and
the utility need protection against this uncertainty. In the case of fossil
'	 fuels, such natural causes of uncertainties are not as threatening to
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utilities because of the availability of alternative sources of fuel.
Geothermal resources cannot be sold over long distances because the reduction
in the pressure and temperature of the steam during transportation is too
great and the piping cost runs too high. A discussion of the methods for
coping with this uncertainty appears under the heading "Insurance".
Section 4-2 spells out the general aspects of leasing of land in the
case of coal, and oil resources, and provides a
	 ption of the leasing of
land of geothermal resources.
Section 4.3 analyzes the leasing, contracting and insurance problems,
and highlights their interrelations.
Section 4.4 summarizes this report. The appendix has a brief survey
^al eV3P1t. , : ` erature l,r i-7u-rinne, and an nvorvi --w of ' 1 - ' ' -	 *	 t:
single and multiple object auctions.
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4.2
	 LEASING
4.2.1
	 Characteristics of Leasing
Leasing is the process by which potential developers of a resource
acquire the rights to it. The details of the leasing arrangement are
important because they affe-,_t the incentives of the developer in selecting
among alternative strategies for exploring and exploiting the resource. Three
'	 aspects of the leasing process are significant: (1) the amount of competition
for the lease and the institutional rules for awarding the lease; (2) the
method for determining the financial compensation to be paid to the owner of
the land; and (3) the duration of the lease, including the nature of the
performance requirements for keeping it active.
The cxtent of competition for a iease depends in part on the method
by which it i_s awarded. In some case:, leases are awarded by some sort of
auction process which is announced ir. advance and which transpires at a
specific place and time. Although unattractive lands may attract little
interest and therefore produce few competing bids, normally auctions produce
spirited competition among several bidders. A less common method of awarding
rights to land is a lottery, whereby a lease is given to one of the applicants
b: drawing applications at random. The source of revsnue from such a process
is some combination of an application fee and a predetermined payment or
payment formula. Although this process may produce numerous applicants, it is
not a competition in the economic sense because the expression of willingness
to pay throug" bidding is absent. Finally, in some cases leases are awarded
on a first-come, first-served basis, perhaps requiring a filing fee and/or
another financial commitment.
Whereas literally infinite variation i.: possible in the methods for
1	 compensati-g owners of land, all such methods are a combination of at most
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five elements: (1) an application or filing fee (e.g., a payment for the
right to request a lease); (2) a royalty, or a payment expressed as a fraction
of the revenues or profits from exploiting the resource; (3) an extraction
fee, which is a payment based upon the physical quantity of the resource that
is extracted, regardless of its value; (4) a rent, or an annualized payment
for the right to use the land, regardless of the amount of proaueti.on that
takes place; and (5) a bonus hid or initial, up-front payment to secure the
lease, regardless of its duration or the future productivity of the land.
Normally, if a lease is awarded in a competitive process, the caner of the
land will predetermine all but one of the preceding elements (perhaps at
,ero), and award the lease to the party that submits the highest bil in the
^-i t,ariahl-, -. q .. the remii — nc, fr p,- l i m s n4l ,f1.
The selection of a bid variable is important for two reasons. (1) It
allocates the risk about the size and development expense of the resource
between the lessee and lessor. (2) It affects the development .incentives
facing the winning bidder. As a general rule, the allocation of risk depends
upon the closeness of the relationship between the ultimate profitability of
exploiting the resource and the formula for determining the payments to the
owner of the land. Tnus, systems emphasizing fixed fees and bonus bids put
more risk on the developer, whereas rormulas emph- zing profit-sharing
between the developer and the land owner spread the risk most evenly. In the
middle are extraction fees and royalties cm sales. nj is relationship can be
represented as follows:
Risk Allocation
More risk	 More Risk
to Land Owoe r
	to Developer
Royalty an	 Foyalty on	 Extraction	 Annual	 Bonus	 Filing
Profits	 Sales	 Fee	 Rent	 Aid	 Fee
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IThe incentives of a compensation formula on development, activities
'	 depend on the extent to which payments to the land ^wner are related to
development. The holder of a lease will find development less attractive if
payments are dependent on direct development activities, such as is the case
if royalties depend on the quantit y of production (regardless of sales or
profitability). At the other extreme, high fixed financial obligations (and
little or no dependence of payments on development) are most conducive to
exploitation of a resource.
The duration of the lease, and its depend ence on performance, can
affect development incentives. One common practice is to set either
I	
expenditure re,luirements or production targets that must be .•ntisfied for a
to re"__.. :.. . _, _ _ .
In selecting a combination of lease characteristics, a rational
landlord will be cognizant of ri::k differences between buyer and seller.
Although in discounted present value terms a land owner will reap higher
returns if the leasing, arrangements minimize the risk of the leaseholder, s-ich
arrangements are not optimal if the land owner is more risk.-averse than the
lensing entity. Thus, private individuals might well adopt str.te;'ies for
leasing land that allocate more risk to leaseholders than the strategies
adopted by large corporation.4 or the government because the former are likely
to be more risk averse than either of the latter. Nevertheless, the Federal
Government has elected to organize most of its leasing activities in a manner
that allocates most of the risk to the developer. The following summarizes
federal leasing activities of lands for energy development.
a.	 Coa, mining and on shore drilling of oil. Generally, the
procedure or obtaining a lease on a piece of land for coal
development is as follows. An interested party applies Lor 3n
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"exploration license". Upon receipt of such an application
for a permit an officer of Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
conducts an environmental analysis of the a^ea to be affected.
Following the completion of this analysis, i report is submitted
desc; • iling what parts of the land should be excl-ade rl from
exploration activities and whatever other requirements should be
included in the permit. Exploration licenses are never granted
for lands in natioral parks or monuments, or in Naval oil shale
n^serves.
Once a valuable coal lepos'_t is discovered and is -eported
to the BL.M, the discoverers can nominate the particular tract
for lease. The lease is then obtained through a competitive
bidding process. A competitive bidding process involves suhmit-
Ling bids which carry a fixed percent royalty 'lsu?	 '^ 2/3;,
with a cash bonus as t om- bid variable. The leave convevs the
rights to obtain the coal and to use only as Bauch of the surfac-
as is necessary for mining (goal. 1"?aSe3 a^e usually subject to
readjustment every 20 years.
b.	 Off-shore drilling. Lands located in the o•lter continental.
shelf (OCS) are not public '_ands. That is, once the land has
been !eased, the BLM cannot oversee or interfere in any wav w?tl,
the way the land is being ised until *he 1.ermination. of the
lease period.
Tracts selected by the government are 'eased through a
process of competitive bidding.  The lease carries a fixed
(usually 16 2/3x) royalty, with a cash bonus as the bid vari-
able. Such a bidding procedure creates entry harriers for
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small firms which are either not able to meet the usually urge
capital requirements up front or unable to dive-sift' their
risks. To offset this effect, most leases are sold in auctions
in which there is no prohibition on the rendering of bids by a
consortium. This reduces the entry barrie
	 to some extent.
Recently, DOE has adopted a proposal from the Council of
Wage and Price Stability to experiment with a net profit -share
leasing system as an alternative to the conventional kidding
system or, outer continental shelf (OCS) tracts. One
experimental s y stem lets profit-shares or rovalties be the hid
variable. The advantage of this system is that :t - educos entry
. arriers, ski.°ts some of the risk about the value- of the lane. to
the government, anal encourages more efficient development of
A	
leases.
j	
Jeothermals.	 The types of land which can hp
 lea gad fn^
!	 geotkermal exploration are either federal, state, or private
Lands. Federal lands include two types of geothermal resource
areas. The Known Geothermal Resource Areas (KG W are leased
through a competitive bidding process. Lands not within a KGRA
are :eased to the first qualified applicant. There are
proposals pending before the Congress to alter the definitions
of KGRA and to change the competitive bidding methods. The
actual leasing of federal land is governed by the Geothermal
Steam Act of 1970, and which excludes several broad categories
of land: national parks, wildlife ranges, game ranges, wildlife
management areas, fish hatcheries, wildlife refuges, national
recreation areas, Indian trust land and other or restricted
lands.
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Federal :	 ;s are	 led 'r,to four categor_es:	 '1) those cont^olled
by the U.S. Department of Interior: (2) those controlled by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture; (') those controlled by the t ► .S. Do partmer.t of
Defease; and (4) land for which the Federal Government owns min e ral ^ights,
but not surface rights. 3ecause most a eothe-ma'. resources within federal
lands are contm..rlled by the U.S. Department of Interior, the discussion of
this section will pertain to this spe:ific category of federal land ')nly.
4.2.2	 Competitive and Nonconpetitiv- Federal Geothermal Resource°
Leasi nR Procedures
According; to the Code of Federal Regulations 'CFA), Reotherma'.
resources mean geothermal steam and asso^.iated geothermal resources such as
hot water and mineral by products. A geothermal lease 's ^ne i3s , ied under the
authority of tfro geothermal Steam Act of 1970 (?.L. 91-581 1 . rhe•^e a — two
--is of fede • ai geothermal resourca leasing: competitive and n?ncompetitive.
are reviewM in that order. Two ag encies of the U.S. Dec3rtn!en' of the
or are involved in the federal leasing of geothermal resources: *he
eau of Land Management (BLM) and the G.S. Geological Su ~re•: "ISnq),
Competitive leasing is one coveri.rg federa. ianc's within a Knowr.
Geothermal Resource Area (KGRA). A KGRA means an area in which the aeol•oV,
nearby discoveries, ^ompetitive interests, or othe- indic.a wouli 'ead to
belief that the prospects for extracti. n of geothermal resources are good
enough to warrant investment for that purpose. I The most controversial
item is that of the term of "competitive interest". Competitive interest is
inferred to exist, if at least one-half of the lands covered by an application
In contrast, the concept of KGRA differs from that of Krown Geologic
Structure (KGS) in oil and gas leasing in that the designation of a field
as a KGS requires a producing well.
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for noncompetitive leasing is also ccvered by anoth e r application, which is
filed during the same application filing period. 2,3 A notable case is that
a company inadvertently created a KGRA through erroneously filing t.wire on
some of the same land in the same application filin g period. b However-,
current
_ regulations prohibit an applicant which overlaps any of th e land
covered by his first application.5
?he KM can accept nominations for ^-rnpetitive leasing of federal
lands within a KGRA or may on its own nomi,a to one. b
 The role of the USGS
enters at this point of the leasing procedures by being regpznsible for
determining ':he appropriate parnelling of tracts and for establishir 4; ^'nta'_ft
and royalties. The 'JSGS also reports to the BLM on needed lease ter," and
condititz,g , including, environmental and surface rehabilitation stipulations,
relating to resource exploration and development. Mcre. important at this
stage is that the USES makes all geologic. engineering, and economic value
determinations including a resour:-e evaluation on each tract to be offered and
a post sale recommendation to the BL.M regar eling acceptance or re iPction of the
highest bonus bid on a given trac t_. That '.s to say that the BLM With the
cooperatior of t'ie GS sets a reservation bid on all geothermal, -r_Qource tra^ts
offered for competitive leasing.
2 An application filing period begins, or. the first working day of each
calendar month and ends at the close of business on the last working da y of
that month. (",FP 3210.2 -2.1
3 Forty-seven of the 108 eitsting KGRA'! , ware designated as such entirely or,
the bas's of "competitive interest". See Appendix T, page 13 of the Peport
by the Comptroller Gene.al of the United States, "How to speed development
of geothermal energy or, federal lands", EMD-90-13, October 26, 14'9.
4 Ibid, Appendix I, page 14.
5 Code of Federal Regulations 3210.2-2.
5 Code of Federal Regulations 3220.1.
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Separate identified sealed bids are submitted by interested parties
for each resource tract offered. All sealed bids are opened at the same time
and the highest bonus bid will be accepted if it exceeds the reservation hid;
otherwise, it is rejected. If the bid is accepted, the bonus hid will be paid
either in a single payment upon the award of the lease or in two equal annual
installments due and payable within 2 years. 7
 Standards for diligent oper-
ation of the lease are then set by the Secretary of Energy. This completes
the descriptior. of the process of competitive leasing of federally owned
geo•.hormai resource lands.
Lands not -ithin any KGRA are avilable for noncompetitive leasing.
When an application is filed without the BLM, the date of filing is stamped on
the envelop-. The envelope rontainirg the application remains sealed until
the end of the application filing period during which t''.e application is
filed. On the first working
 day following the end of the application filing
period all applications are opened, and it is determined which applications
are for lands included in .a KGRA, especially those newly created KGRA through
the concept of a show of "competitive interest." App lications for land
determined to be KGRA are rejected. If any application covers both land
within a KGRA and land outside a KGRA, the applicant will be granted the
opportunity to amend his application to exclude the portion included in a
KGRA. 8 This completes the description of the process of noncompetitive
leasing of federally owned geothermal resource lands.
All leases, be they competitive or noncompetitive, are f . )r a primary
terrr. of 10 years. If the lessee commences actual drilling before the end of
the primary terr and is being diligently prosecuted at tnat t ime, a lease can
I Code of Federal Regulations 3220.5 and 3220,5.
8 Code of Federal Regulations 3210.1 and 3210.2-2.
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be extended for an additicnai 5 years. If geothermal steam is produced or
used in commercial quantities within the primary term of a lease that lease
will be extended up to 40 years. And at the end of these 40 years
extension on the lease, the lessee will have a preferential right to a renewal
of the lease for a second 40-year tern upon such terms and conditions as
deemed appropriate by the BLM. Note that production or use of geothermal
'	 steam in commercial quantities is defined as the presence of one or more wells
producing or capable of producing geothermal steam in corLmercia'. quantities
and a bona fide sale of geothermal steam for delivery to or use by a facility
or fac'_ :t:es not yet installed, but scneduled for installation not later than
15 years from the date of commencement of the primary term of the lease (CFR
3203 1-2, 3 203 1 -3, 3203 1-4).
I
I
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4.3
	
THE LEASING, CONTRACT I NG AND INSURANCE PROBLEMS
This section summarizes specific institutional aspects of geothermal
development and their effects in the production, distribution, and use of
geothermal energy. It addresses two questions: (1) What is unique about
geothermal energy as compared to conventional sources? (2) What are the
problems specific to it that need further analysis?
4 .3.1	 The Leasing Problem
The very fact that geotherma l resources differ from conventional ones
creates considerable confusion as to the application of the pre-Pxisl.ing
regulatory schemes that were designed to deal with other kinds of resources.
For example, in most jurisdictions there are separate bodies of law governing
tract ownership and extraction of minerals, water, and oil ana gas. Unfortu-
nately, some g^othermal resource consists of Tineral laden water that must be
drilled to be produced. Thais, there is some uncertainty as to the ownership
of the resource and the bo-ly of the law that governs its exploitation. (The
courts usually decide on a case-by-case basis.) As pointed out later, it is
important to determine who the owner is, for this will affect the leasinv
procedures and related 'Incentives to the lessee.
As another example, in states where there is already pre-existing
regulation of drilling for oil and gas, the question arises whether such
requirements and benefits are equally applicable to the d r illing of geothermal
wells. (Tax incentives enjoyed by oil and gas developers are a case in
paint.) In fa(--., today there are increasing instances of litigation to seek
resolution of conflicts in law.
There are usually several problems facing a firm that wants to enter
a market in which substitutes for its goods are available; but, in addition,
because of the complexities of the institutional Environment, the geothermal
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developer must face strict performance standards. From its beginning,
geothermal development has been subject to extensive supervision and to
constant evaluation of its proposed actions for their potential environmental
impact.
Geothermal developments face one institutional factor for allocating
risk that is not common for other rsources. 	 On federally owned lands, if the
tract is a KGRA, the lease is allotted by a competitive bidding process. If
it is not a KGRA, the BLM leases the land to the first qualified applicant.
Thus, a potential applicant should be reluctant to explore a tract before
obtaining a lease for it lest discoveries by the potential applicant lead it
I
to be reclassified as KGRA. On the oth e r hand, ,.n appli^ant who obtains the
lease before exploring faces the risk that the tract is dry.
This kind of a problem does not arise in the case of state or
privately owned lands, where a prospecting permit gives the pros pector the
'	 first shot at bidding, and only if the bid is _nreasonable is the tract opened
I
for ,_ampetitive bidding.
4.3.1.1 Revenues from :.easing of Federally OwneC Geothermal Resource
Lands
Revenues are generated through, the leasing of federally owned gao-
'	 thermal resource lands. These revenues come from three major sources in
addition to the usual corporate income tax c,n profitable ventures. '_and
rentals and royalty from rommer^ial sale of geothermal resources are gener-
ated from both competitively and noncompetitively leased federal Ian-is:
(1) rentals, (2) royalty, and (3) bonus bid. The third source, bonus bid, is
generated only from the competitive lease ales.
(1) There is an annual rental charges of $1 per acre on all leases
'	 and beginning with the sixth year of a lease and for each year
thereafter until commercial production of geothermal resources
i
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begins, the annual rental will be increased by $1 per acre per
year.9
(2) A royalty rate, as part of the lease terms vroposed by the U.S.
Geological Survey, lies between 10 to 15% of the value of steam.
or any other form of heat ur energy derived from oroduntton
under the lease and sold or utilized by the lessee or reasonahl.y
susceptible to sale or utilization by the lessee. ror bv-
products, a royalty rate of no more than 5% will be set. 10
(3) From January 1974 through May 1979, there were 59 competitive
public lease bids, about $73.5 million in total bonus bids, and
about $36 million in total winning bonus bids. The Geysers KGRA
alone accounted for over $24 million in total accepted bons
bids. 11
The escalated rental charges are designed to encourage orderly and
time_, exploration and Jevelopment of geothermal resources. Unfortunately,
the time --pan from obtaining a lease to commercial production is not
completely under the control of the lessee. Three -ime fp.r!tors enter the
picture. First, there is the time lag for negotiating a contract with a final
user, for example, a utility company. Time is definitely consumel in the
process of convincing a final jser that the geothermal resource can sustain
throughout the operating life of the production facilities of the final use-.
Careful negotiation of the price of the deli vered geothe-ma: -esourres over
time is necessary. Finally, there must be careful consile ratinn of how the
risk will be shared. All these nc-g ,)tiatior.s are time consuming.
9 Code of Federal Regulations 3205.3 -1, and 3205.3-3.
10 Code of Federal Regulations 3205.3-5.
11 Report by the Comptroller General, op. cit., Appendix I, Page 5.
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Second, even when a contract is negotiated, there are regulatory
delays for the utility company to obtain a certificate of public convenience
and necessity (at ?east for the case of California utilit'es). Tn the tahle
below, the actual. experience of Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E.) of California
is documented. It is clear that the time required to obtain a certificate has
increased in leaps and bounds. For units 1 through 6, the time requi^ed
ranges from 1 to 5 months with a general decline in the time required as the
regulatory agency (the California Public utility Commission) learned to
streamline 'he regulatory procedures for a new en--gy source. For units 7 to
11, there was a jump in regulatory delays. Antitrus t_ issues were raised. The
time lag ranges from 6 to 12 months. For units 12 to 15, environmental issues
were raised. There was another ,jump in regulatory delays. The timE lag
increased to a range of 26 to 41 months. Again there was 'i general decline in
the regulatory c:e:ay as the regulatory agency learn ed to deal with the
intervening iss ,es .
Third. after a certificate is issued, the lessee still has to allow
:ead time for the utility company to construct its generating plant
facilities. For capacity size less than 50 1,5N, the time lag ranges from 17 112
to 31 months. For capacity size ranging from 50 to 100 MW. th F time lap
ranges from 21 to 36 months. For capacity size over 1 M MW, 'he time lag
ranges from 39 to 53 months.
It can be concluded that there is supporting evidence that developers
face time lags for t;* commencement of commercial production of ge,)thermal
resources tha" are nct fully under their control. Moreoever, these time lags
can easily owr more than 5 years without including the time needed for
exploration and identific^lion of a commercially exploitable geothermal
resource. As the escalated rental rates is likely to be invoked, it is
e
s
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Table 4
-1 Time to Ohtain CPUC Certificate
Time to Completo the Construction o f
 Electricity Generating Facilities:
	
The Experience of PG&E
	 N
Time Requi^ed
to Complete the
Construction oO'
Time Required	 Electricity
	
to obtain	 Date of	 Generatinq
Size,	 Application Certificate
	 Certificate, romrercial Facilities,
Unic	 MW	 Date	 Date	 months
	 Operation
	 Months
1 11 12/ 5/58 4/ 7/59 5 9/Z5/60 17-1/2
2 13 4/19/61 7/11/61 3 3/19/63 20
3 27 7/15/64 9/22/64 2 4/28/67 ;i
4 27 5/ 6/66 7/12/66 2 3/ 2/69 19
5 53 12/11/67 1/23/68 1 12/15/71 35
6 53 9/18/68 11/12/68 2 12i15/71 25
7 53 5/11/70 11/10/70 6 8/18/72 21
8 53 5/11/70 11/10/70 6 11/23/72 24
9 53 11/24/7() 11/23/71 12 10/2r-/73 23
10 53 11/24/70 11/23/71 12 11/30/73 24
11 106 21 4/72 9/:2/72 7 11/20/75 38
12 106 7/19/72 12/30/75 41 3/ 1/79 38
13 135 3/22/74 11/23/76 32 5/15/80 42
14 110 7/24/73 4/20/76 33 9/12/80 53
'.5 55 3/	 1/74 4/20/76 26 6/17/79 38
Source: Pacific Gas and Electric Company
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reasonable to conclude that the starting date for escalating rental rates
should be readjusted to allow for a larger lead time even though there is
current provis.or, that the Bureau of Land Management ma y , upon a showing of
sufficient justification by the lessee, waive the pavm , nt of all or any
portion of the additional rental (CFR 3205.3-3).
The discussion of royalty is a bit premature because, as of
October 26, 1979, the Comptroller General reported to Congress that there was
no commercial geothermal production from, a federal lease.'	 Nevertheless;
there are several interesting points deserving a short discussion. Setting uo
a royalty rate provides a form of risk sharing. Because rovalty pavment is
due only if there is commercial sale of geothermal resourc es, lessees face no
additional penalty if their leases turn out to he of no Pcononir , value.
However, the FeAeral Government receives its share of t he pav ­ ff if commercial
sale occurs. Moreover, imposing a royalty rate lowers the expected net
return. Thus; competitively bidding will lead ti a smaller bon y : bid. This,
in turr, lessens the upfront cash requirement and attracts more bidders
especially the relatively lower running capital geothermal develope r encour-
aging more competition in the competitive leasing process. The unwarranted
affect of royalty is that a higher royalty rate will shift the pattern of
resource extraction to the future.
Although the Geothermal Steam Act of 1970 calls for the Secretar y of
Interior to unilaterally readjust the terms of a geothermal lease, the current
regulations state that rentals and royalties readjustment of anv geothermal
lease "may be readjusted at not less than ?0-year intervals beginning 35 vears
after the date geothermal steam is produced." (CFR 2305.3-9) As geot.herma.
power plants are usually designed for a 30-year lif e , there seems to be no
1	 11 Ibid, page 2 of the main text.
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Total Acreage
relinquished or
terminated
Total Acreage
under active leasesType of Lease Issued Active Ended
Noncompetitive 1,320 988 332
Competitive 296 265 31
Total 1,616 1,253 363
Number of Leases
528,158
66,037
994,195
1,672,562.61
444,416.20
2,116,978.81
dji:ior:al restraint on developers or ;n utilities to exploit geothermal
potential.
The presence of a competitive bonus bid essentially allows the
rede,r.l Government to capture the pure economic rent from econotr , cally
valuable geothermal re scurces. It is interesting to note that a bonus bid in
the absence of a reservation bid by a seller will lea,". to no distortion► of the
path of resource extraction. However, is bonus bidding redistributes economic
rent from developers to the federal governemnt, it is obvious that, ceterus
paribus, developers prefer noncompetitive than competitive leases. The
evidence given in Table 4 -2 does not seem to contradict this statement. As of
June 1, 1979, data on leasing activities under the two forms of leasing are
available.
Table 4-2. Leasing Activities
Source: Report by the Comptroller General, op. cit, Appendix I, page 5
Noncompetitive leasing is fat , more active than its competitive
counterpart. This is borne out by the number of leases issued as well as the
number of acreage leased. It is also not surprising that far more numbers of
leases obtained through noncompetitive leases are relinquished or terminated.
This is true also on an acreage basis (absolute or relative). The reason is
that it only ccsts $50 service charge to file a noncompetitive lease applica-
tion. As noncompetitive leasing is allowed only for non KGRA lands, especially
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lands without a show of competitive interest, it is clear that manv leases
turn o:.t to be of no economic value. This empirical observation coup l ed with
the fact that there was no commercial geothermal production fror. • a federal
lease indicates that the form of leasing procedure is not an impediment to
geothermal resource exploitation. The key is that more promising geothermal
r
resources have not been identified. Public policy should be addressed towards
the enchancement of discovering economically valuable geothermal resource in
order, to foster the tapp_ng of geothermal resources.
It is now apparent that there is a need to study the role of informa-
tion in fostering the development of geothermal resources. In particular, the
'	 r-le of information is studied under two contexts--ore-leasing and post-leasing
situations.
4.3.1.2 Information in a Pre-leasing Context: The Nash Equilibrium Case13
To expos=. the importance of information, the sim p lest case is
examined. Specifically, it is assumed that a geothermal resource tract
offereu for lease can be one of two economic values, designated by V  f-, • a
high value tract and V  for a low value tract. The likelihood of the tract
to take on the high value is given by the probability p and the low value by
the probability 1-p. Let there be two bidders interested in this particular
tract. The probability values are public knowledge to them. Suppose that at
a cost K > 0, any one of the bidders can acquire a piece of perfect information
telling him which is the true value of the tract. The interest here is to
identify and study the Nash equilibrium (or eq-jilibria) for this rivalry
situation.
13 A Nash equilibri l in for two bidders using strategy	 i = 1,2 is defined
as a strategy pair (' 1 *, _2*), such that:
1 ('. 1 *,	 2*)	 1( 1 , '2*) for all a 1
ana 
-2 ( ' mi l * , ' 12*) > 'T2 ( i *, % 2) for all c 2.t
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The strategy of bidder i = 1,2 is given b y a triplet 0  = ( Ki;bi,bi
where
Ki = 1K if purchase information
0 otherwise
bHi = bid on tract if information indicates high value
hLi = bid on tract if information indicates low value
The adopted convention for the case of no information acquisition is that
bH = bi = b i . The strategy of the seller is assumed passive and pessimistic;
namely, the reservation bid of the seller is set equal to VL . Last of all,
it is assumed that the following inequality holds true:
(1-p) (V4 - VL
) > K
F
The inequality says that condit.on on the true value of the tract offered for
lease is low, the benefit of knowing, that as measured by ;l-p) (VH - V L ) should
be greater than the adjusted cost condition on the true value of the tract
offered for lease is high anyway, K/F. Thin is a reasonable assumption on the
seller side.
Three cases are considered. These raser are liscussed below.
3. Case 1. Both bidders acquire the information, i. e .. K i = K, 1 = .,2.
Since bidding is competitive, if the true value of the tract is revealed
to be high, each bidder will bid V H . If one binder bids less than that,
the other bidder can win the lease by hidding o small amount above that.
It is obvious that none of them will bid more than V H . Thus. the claim
is proved. The same line of argument will lead to the conclusion that if
the true value of the tract is reveal.-d to be low, each bidder will bid
VL . Thus. the strategy is i = (K; V H , VL ) i = 1,2. But then the
expected p rofit for each bidder will be 	
- K < 0. Fach bidder will
sustain a loss equal to the cost of information. Moreover, there is a
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Iduplication of information acquisition effort. Define V  = pV H + (i - o)
VL . It is clear hat the expec.ed profit to the seller is s = Ve.
b. Case 2. In this case, only one bidder acquires the information. Without
n 	
loss of generality, let bidder one acquire the information. Suppose
s	 bidder two' Q strategy is
.; 2 = (0 ; VL , VL)
Then bidder one's strategy ought to take the form
`T 1 =
	
(K;  V, +
	
V.
where E is a very small positive number that allows bidder one to win the
bid if the true value of the tract is high. However, bidder two's
strategy will then be - 2 = ( O, VL+F+•, VT .+. ,,- ) . But bidder one will
have incentive to raise his bid if the tract is of high value. Bidder two
will in tern either raise his bid and the process continues or will ^Pturn
to the strategy - 2 = (O,VL ,V2 ). Thus, there is no pure strategy
Nash equilibrium for the bidding part of the twc stage game. If mixed
strategy is introduced, a Nash equilibrium exists and is given by a pa'l
of bid distributions. Bidder two's bid distribution is
(1-P)^VH-VL'I
G(b) =
	
"H - b
If the tract is informed to be of high value, bidder one's bid
'	 distribution is
1-0(b-VL)
P(VH-b)
'	 where_ b UL ", I Note that F stochastica l l y dominates Go. Thus, it is
expected that the informed bidder will, on the average, hid hi gher than
the uninformed bidder '_f the tract is of high value. For low-value tract,
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the uninformed bidder will, on the average, bid higher than the informed
bidder. The expected profit of the uninformed bidder is zero, and that of
the informed bidder is p(1 - 0)(V 4 - VL ) - X. The equilibrium mixed
strategies are, th?ref ore, given by
02 = (0; (b), G(b)I
_ 1 = (k; F(b), VL).
c. Case 3. Suppose both bidders do .riot acquire t'r-- information. Thev will
have identical bids. If not, the higher bidder can lower his " , id by a
small amount and still win the bid. Moreover, the bid should be equal to
Ve . If the identical bid is greater than Ve , both bidders hav,- a
negative expected profit and it pays for one of the bidders to hid less
losing the bid and making zero expected profit, a definite improvement.
If the identical bid is less ;.:,an V e , then both bidders have a positive
expected profit and it pays for ore of the uIlders to break the tie tiv
bidding a small amount high—, winning the
 ''i d a-1 making hijzt— ex:pntPd
profit. Th»s, it can be concuded that the s:rategv ?f the two h:ddPrs is
given by
r0• v	 v 
^i =	 e' e
-he exp-c'e ri profits of t ,e oidde-s are given 5y
7 1 _ 0; i = 1,2
..)e seller's exp-7 ,-P-d profit it
-	 VG	 p
"hree points gust be noted. First, if a b"A der decides to acquire
information given the other does not and if the 'nforned bidder decides to
use a mixed straterj , it pays the first bidder to inform the other bidder
that he has adopted such a strategy. If not, the uninformed bidder (sav
bidder 2) will maintain his strategy at
(0 Ve , Ve`
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Table 4-1. Paviff Matrix
Bidder 2
1	 Acquires information	 hoes not acquire information
Acquires information	 (-x, -K)	 (p(1-p)(VH-VL) - K, 0)
Bidder 1
Does nest acquire
information	 (0, a(1-p)(VH-VL) - K	 0, 0)
'	 Bidder	 pr-f_' will then be .-ern. The informed bidde- usin g his mixed
strategy will not win the lease b^eaurp
'	 =(b) > 0 for b-_ IVL 1 VPl.
His expected profit is -K, which is less than that whf^h he ran get if he has
informed hi3 opponent of his information acquisition decision.
'	 Second, the resul ts can be summarized in a payoff matrix (aasuming
information acquisition 3ecision is announced: see Table 4-3).
'	 The Nash equilibria are asy-netrical and not interchanReahi p . It is
that the Nash equilibria may not be stable. Without coordination,
over or under investment in information acquisition ma y be the case. Thus.
'	 noncompetitive leasing nay be preferable. However, this conclusion could be
dubious: :'Dr t:+ reasons: (1) Tive seller is a gglimed to be pessimistic. If the
'	 seller is not pessimistic, he may set a different reservation bid and the
conclusion may be different. (2) The seller is assumed to be passive. If the
'	 seller is not passive. to may provi .ie the information to the two bidders frPF
of charge. In that event, the strategy of th e bidde-s is given by
- i = (0; VH , VL ).	 i o 1,2
and their profits
- 1 = 0; i	 1,2
'	 The expected profits of the seller are
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VH . (1 - a) V  - K
1 - K0
which could be greater than his expected prof" under one o f the asvmmet^ical
Nash equilibria. Thus, one concludes that if ^eservation hid is set at the
love: value, it is possible that it pa_ s the seller to provide the kind of
inf ,oration described.
Third, if the asymmetrical Nash equilibrium is the final solution,
two interesting properties of this solution emerge. The prediction of this
form 7f asymmetrical equilibrium is that one bidder will bid high on some
tracts and low on others while the other oidder will Did low or. the first set
of tracts and high on the others (depending on which set of tracts iQ informed
to to good or bad) a commonly observed result of resource :easing. This is
consistent with empirical observatix., below.
In th- January 22, 19 74 , geothermal :ease sale held in Sacramento,
:ifornia, there were eight GeysQrs KGRA tracts, both for which Signal Oil Co.
and Union Oil Co. of California submitted bids. The data on submitted bids
are 
r
ecorded as listed in Table 4-4.
in a similar type of runoff between. Union 011 Co. and Phillips in the
July 30, 1974, Roosevelt Hot Springs (Utah) geothermal lease sale, the
following data on submitted bids again reconfirmed the prP1iztions of the
model: see Table 4-5.
4 .3.1.3 Information in a Pre-leasing context: The "StackelbErg" Case
The as_-amptions will not be changed for the rest of the discussion
with the exception that only one bidder is considered. It should be noted
that the result in this section can be easily generalized for a two-bidder
case. For ease of exp-.;sition, a one bidder case is considered. Specifically,
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rTable 4 -4,	 Data on Submitted Bids: Signal Oil Co.
and Union Oil Co. of California
tract	 Acreage Name of Bidder Amount
' 1	 2,340 Signal	 Oil	 and Gas Co.,	 et al.	 $1.516,660.00
Union Oil Co. of Calif. S	 7749867.60
4	 101 Union Oil	 Co.	 o!' Calif. a $48 314.36
Signal Oil and Gas Co. $2
7	 626 Union O;'	 Co.	 of Calif. $318,120.68
' 'ig.ial Oil
	 Co. $180,288.00
8	 250 signal Oil	 Co. $75,600.00
Union Oil Co. of Calif. $57,045.00
16^ Union Gil	 Co.	 of Calif. $129,161.00
Signal Oil and Gas Co. 3	 3?,480.00
10	 22.2 Signal Oil and !as Co. $78,-,88.00
Union Oil of Calif. $67,634.52
11	 45 Union Oil	 Co.	 of Calif. $22,868.10
Signal Oil	 and Gas !'o. $ 4,770.00
' 12	 737 Signal Oil and Gas Co. $5666666.00
Union Oil Co. of Calif. $18 :631.36
' a Bids underlined are accepted winning bids.
'Table 4-5. Data on Submitted Bids:
	 Union Oil	 Co.	 and Phillips
Tract
	 Acreage	 Name of Bidder Amnunt
1 2,560	 Union Oil $r,1,993.60
$1301.60Phillips
2 1,640
	 Phillips $87,543.20
' Union Oil $62,090.40
4 2,453.5	 Phillips $314,199.05
Union Oil $	 93,234.14
6 1,940	 Phillips $248,391.58
U n ion Oil $	 4^,672.30 —
Source:	 Montgomery, W. David,	 "The Structure of the Geothermal Industry
`	 t Th,•ough 197 4 " Environmental Quality Laboratory, Report Nn.	 11,
Ju'y	 1975. California Institute of Technology, Pasadena,	 California
91125.
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it is assumed that the seller is active and knows what strategy is adopted by
the bidder.
a. Suppose the bild-r does not acquire the information. Then the strategy
for the bidder is giver. by
(0; Ve , V 
given that the seller's -eservation bid is V 	 expected profit of
the bidder is
n1=0
.he expected profit of the seller is
= V
s	 e
b. Suppose the bidder a,^quires the information.. Then the strategy for
he bidder :s
01 = (K; V - K, VL)
isn '-:idt	 seller's reservation hid is V H - p. The expected
profit of the bidder is zero, an(, that of the seller is
s = P ' V  - p
It is noted that the seller's expected profit is higi°Aer under Case 1 than
un6er Case 2. If not,
p ( Vy-n ) ' Le = P VH +(1-P) VL
or - K _ '.l-p) V  contradiction.
Hence, one corclu•ifs that if the seller sets reservation hil appropriately,
the seder has no incentive to encourage bidders to gather information.
If the seller provides tree information, his experteh profit is
ns = V  - K
less than the ^_ase of no information.
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Thus. one concludes that. if the seller sets reservation bid
appropriately, the seller has no incentive to provide f ree information of the
type described.
it, 3.1.!]	 Information in a Post-leasing contex*
In a post-leasing context, the developer has obtained a lease. He
has to decide and actually carry out exploratory and/or development
'	 activities. There are two major informational problems in this context. The
first problem is externality, which can be easily disposed of. This subject
I
is discussed first. The second problem is provision of public information.
a. Externality. There are two forms of informational externality.
First, if a developer finds an economically valuable geothermal resource,
there will be one less resource remaining to be discovered. Tf the finding is
not revealed to other developers, there may be over investment in resource
exploration. This is known as the Easter egg problem. For lands located
within a KGRA, this problem can be disposed o f , as all major resource findings
'	 are publicized. For lands outside of any KG,.A, there is definitely an
'	 incentive not to disclose a discovery lest valuable lands around the discovery
will be classified as KGRA and have to be competitively leased. However, two
reasons seem to counteract this incentive. For one, it is difficult to cover
up. Moreover, the lessor (THE BLM) may revoke any lease so obtained if a
coverup is unraveled.
'	 Second, if there are racts close together belonging to the same
geologic structure, the failure or success in finding a geothermal resource
will signal to other lessees in the neighborhood whether development is
worthwhile or not. This information spillover leads to a free-rider problem
because every lessee in the neighborhood will wait for someo:ie else to do the
'	 exploration. If every lessee behaves alike, there will be no exploratir,-i or
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at most, up to the point of minimally satisfying the diligent exploration
regulation. This problem can be disposed of by the formation of unit
agreement. The remaining question is how to split the :osts and benefits
among members of a unitized field. Rules of thumb such as proration accordin¢
to the number of lessees or according to the number of acreage are common.
b. Public Information. To study the role of public information,
there is a need of clarifying how to estimate the benefits of information,
There are two concepts generally used. The first is called theaig n in
irfo:,mation. To explain this concept, it is best to consider an example.
Suppose a decision-maker's preference is represented by a utility function
U(a,w) where a is the decision variable a A, the set of all decision
variables. Let there be four states of the world wi t w2 , w 3 , w4
stating the net payoffs to the decision making. The decision maker's prob-
ability assessment of the likelihood of occurrence of these four states of
the world is 
P 1' p 2' p
3' n4' resrectively, with p l + P 2 + Pe + P 4 = "
Suppose a piece of information is available which will inform for such whether
the true state is either (:a l , w 2 ) or f w 3 , w 4 ). If f w i , w2 ) is the
revealed information, the decision maker's problem is
max CP+
p
U(a,wl	
pp
) +	
+	
U(a, w( )
J
 = ^^(wl,w2)
a_	
pA	 1 2	 1 2
If {w3, w4) is the revealed information, the decision-maker's problem is
max	
'3
	 U ( a , w 3	 p) , p
+	
U(a,w)^ - Q(ww
aEAI P 3 4	 3
p 4	
4	 2 3 , 4 )
But before the information i- revealed, the expected utility is
V  = (pl+ p2 ) t 1 (w l' w2 ) + (p 3 + p4).` 2 (w 39 w 4 ) given there is information to be
revealed. The expected utility of the decision maker in the absence of the
information is
4-28
V  = max [Pi U(a,w 1 ) + p2 U(a,w2 ) + p 3 U(a,w 3 ) + P 4 U(a,w4)J.
'	 aL A L
The gain in information is defined as
r	
Vr,- VI - 
VEJ
The second concept is called the value of information. To exola l n this
concept, the same example will be used with the onlv modification being that
I
the utility function is now given by
U(a,w,M)
where M is the amount of wealth of `.he decision maker. To find the value of
information, is tj seek a payment K such that the decision-maker will be
indifferent betwee •
 having the information or without it, i.e., to find K such
that	 -
(P 1 + P2	 +) max ' — pi	 U(a,wl, M - K) + — p2+	 IJ(a,w2, M - k)
'	 aEA Lp :	 2	 pl	 p?_
p 3 	 p4
	
+ (p + p 4 ) max	 U(a,w3,	 p +M - K) +	
P4
U(a,w4 , M - K)3
a^-A LP 
+ 
p3	 4	 3
'	 max [p1 U(a,w 1 ,M) + p2 U(a,w27 M) + p 3 U(a,w 3 ,M) + P4 U(a,w4,M' Ja^ A L
'	 In general, these two concepts are not the same. The latter provides a
practical measure of the benefit of information. However, for the case of
'	 linear utility functions, the two concepts coincide and car. be used
interchangeably. For the rest of the section, it is assumed that this is
indeed the case. An example of this case is when the decision-maker's
'	 objective is simply to maximize expected profits. A simple illustration it
useful.
Suppose a geothermal resource lease can sake on a high value V 
or a low ,alue VU . The probability assessment of the likelihood of these
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two events is p and 1 - p), respectively. Let V ,' = p VH + (1 - p) VL,
the expected value of the tract. Suppose the cost of development is F such
that
V  " F 
r Ve ' VH
Now, a' z cost of K, a piece of information can be purchased that can tell for
sure which value the geothermal tract will take. Then it pays to be an
informed developer if the following inequality holds:
p' V  - F) - K	 V  - F
or
F - V
	
k
L	 1-p
that is, conditioning on a bad outcome, the savings in development cost is
greater than the condition?: information cost.
It is now time to consider two types of information concatenation, namely
substitutable information and complementary information. In the substitution
information case, a piece of information is worth purchasing on its, r %wn but
the public availability of another piece of information will render the first
piece of information unworthwhile. To see this, consider the following
example. Suppose there are f,- %ur states of the world for the value of a
geothermal tract, say {10,6,4,'.} measured in monetary units. Let the
probability assessment be (1/4,1/4,1/4,1/4), respectively. The cost of
development is five monetary un.',. There is a piece of information which can
tell for sure whether the tract is of value 110,4) or {6,1). The cost of this
piece of information is 112. The value of this piece of information is
therefore
2 max [2(10) + 2(4 ) - 5,01 + 1 max [2(6) + 2(1)- 	 5,01
max I T(1 0) + x(16) + 4(4) + 1(1) - 5,0 1 =
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'	 Since this is greater than the cost of information, on its own, this piece of
information will to purchased.
Now, suppose a piece of public information is provided at. no cost to
the develooer. Th:9 piece of public information can tell for sure whether the
value of the tract is { 10,6 1 or( 4,1'. With this piece of public information,
'	 the developer's payoff is
i	 r	 l
2 max I (10) + 1(6) -5,0 + 2 max r^(4 ) . 1(1) - 5,0=	 12
l	 L
If the developer further acquires the private information, he can
tell for sure whether the value of the tract is 10 , 6 , 4 or 1 . The
I
developer's payoff under the conca
l
tenated information is	
l
4 max (10-5,0] + 4 max f6-5,0 + 4 max I4-5,0
J
+	 4 max `1-5,01 = 1^
LLLL L``	 l`	 JJJ
The additional value of the private information given that the public infor-
mation is made available at no charge is zero. Thus, this piece of private
information will not be purchased under the circumstances. This is an example
of one piece of information substituting for another.
The question that needs to be answered is under what rondi.tion will.
the provision of one piece of information displace the acquisition of another
I
piece of information. The following proposition helps to answer s he question.
Proposition: If b is the more valuatle information in the sense that V  -
IKa	V  - Kb , and if b will not he privately acquired when-
ever a is publicly provided i.e., V a,h - V  < Kb , then a
will not be privately acquired whenever b is publicly provided
I
i.e., Va,b - V  > Ka.
Proof:	 If not, Va,b - 
V 
	 Ka, but Va,b - V  < K b ; there-
fore V  - Ka
 > V  - K b , cont,,adiction.
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The next question is ender what ;:ondition a piece of information
should not he publicly provided. The following proposition helps to answer it.
Proposition: If b will not be privately acquired whenever a is publicly
provided, i.e., Va,b - 
V 
	
Kb and if a is not privately
acquired on its own i.e., V  - V  ' K a , then
if b has already been privately acquired, a should not be
publicly provided i.e., 
Va,b	 V  " Ka'
Proof	 If not Va,b - V  > Ka
or Va,b - V 	 V  - V  + Ka
= (V b
-Kb ) - (Va-Ka i + Kb
K b , contradiction.
In the complementary information case, a price of information that is
not worth private acquisition on its own may become worthwhile if another
piece of information is publicly provided. To see this, consider the
following example. Suppose there are four states of the world for the value
of a geothermal tract, say ( 10,8,4,3) measured in monetary units. Let the
probability assessment of the likelihood of each state of the world be
1!4,1/4,1/4,1/4 respectively. The cost of development is 5 monetary units.
There is a piece of information which can tell for sure whether the tract is
of value (10,4) or (8,3). The cost of this piece of information is 1/2. The
value of this piece of information is 
r	 1
2 max[ 1 (10)  + 2(4) -5,0 + 2 max L 2( 8) + 1(3) -5,0
maxi (10) -; 4(8) 	+ 1(3) -5,0 = 0
As this is less thar, the cost of information, on its own this piece of
information will not be acquired. Now, supp.• sP a piece of p-iblic information
is provided at no cost to the developer. This piece of public information can
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'	 tell for sure whether the value of the tract is (10,3) or {8,4), With this
piece of public information, the developer's payoff' is
'	 1 max 	 + 1(3) - 5,0 + 1 max 1(8) + 1'4) - 5,0 = 11 [1(10)2	 2	 u]
If the developer further acquires the private information, he can tell for
sure «het her the value of the tract is ( 101 , { 8}, ( 4 ) or ( 31. The developer's
payoff under the concatenated information is 1/4 max (10-5,0) + 1/4 max (8-5,0)
+ 1/4 max 4-5,0) + max i3-5,0} = 2.
Thus, the addition value of the private information, given that the
public information is made available at no charge, is 3/4. Thus, the private
information will now be privately acquired. This is an example of one piece
of information complementing another.
Corollarv:
	
If 5 is the more valuable information, i.e.. V  - V  - 
Kb >
V  - V e - Ka and a is privately acquired whenever b is publicly
'	 provided, i.e., V a,b - V  > Ka , then b is privately acquired
whenever a is publicly provided, i.e., 
Va,b - V  > Kb•
'	 The question that needs to be answered is under what circumstances
will the complementary private acquisition of information lead a net positive
surplus.
'	 Proposition: If a is privately acquire.; whenever b in publicly providers, i.e.
Va,b - V  ' K 3 , and if b has positive value, i.e., V  - Vp > Kb,
then if b is publicly provided the net surplus is positive,
i.e., Va 
b - 
V  - Ka
 - K b > 0.
Proof	 Adding the first two inequalities will vield the th
4.3.2
	
The Contracting Problem
Economic and technological features that are unique to geothermal
'	 energy cause some b;'_ateral bargaining problems between the field developer
'	 and the utility that buys steam. First, minimization of heat loss during
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transportation of steam and of pipeline costs requires that the generating
station be lccated centrally at the geothermal field. This makes it unlikely
that a steam user can switch from one steam supplier to another. Also, steam
suppliers find changing customers an equally difficult task. If power
wheeling is requi red by law, once the distribution system is set up, the
suppliers have more alternati v es (though the users bear the costs and risks).
Futhermore, the cost structure of geothermal development and power
generation increases the mutual dependence of utilities and developers. The
developer has large fixed costs and very small variable costs. If only one
utility were prepared to purchase steam, and if the field were developed
before the steam o n^.e is set, the developer could 	 forced to accept a price
that paid only a small return on invested capital. Similarly, a power plant
has large fixed costs and small variable costs. Consequently, a utility that
builds a plant before contracting for steam could be forced to pay a price for
steam that pays a small return on capital investment. Thus, theoretically, it
would seem unlikely that. given the developer and the utility are different
rms, any development would take place prior to their contracting.
Next, there are also some general uncertainties and lisadvantagPs
associated with geothermal enervv. First, uncertaint y regarding the depth and
boundaries of reservoirs and about the location of fractures is the rock
, suit in uncertainty about the cost and operating characteristics of every
well over time and in the possibility that a new %* 11 may be dry. Second, the
commodity is not just underground ,rater, but is underground .rater under
pr--3sur--.  And this decreases as une drills new wells, even
	 one does not
deplete the amount of :rater. The .magnitude of this decline is uncertain until
experience is gained by exploitin g t he field. Third. geothermal steam does
not have as high pressure and temperature as the a^tificially heated steam
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'	 that is used in conventional power plants. This causes lower thermndvnamic
efficiency than in normal power plants, thereby increasing the capital cost
per kilowatt of energy. Lastly, contaminants in Reothermal steam can cause
'	 damage to turbine blades.
A11 these ur=ertainties characteristic of electricit y production
'	 through geothermal steam would seem to c-ease signi ficant contracting n^oblems
between the firm producing steam and the electric utility. Incentiv e s would
'	 seem to exist for vertical integration to solve this problem.
The leasing and the contracting problems are related to each other in
that the riles regarding leasing arrangements affect the bargaining position
'	 of the developer and the itility in reaching terms :)n the contract for steam.
The expected contracting arrangements also determine nDw much one wishes to
bid on a '_ease and how many prospectors will be interested in the lease. It
'	 is useful to analyze the contracting process as a two-persun, cooperative
game. Ti..: outcome of such a game is influenced by the initial position--the
'	 "status quo"--of the players, which ratermines their "threat points" or
relative bargaining strength. Cons' jer, for example, the develope^ who is
considering development on federally owned land. As argued before, a
'	 developer wants to lease the land before any exploratory work is begun. Rut
once the developer obtains a lease, the developer is in a disadvantageous
'	 bargaining position with the utility because the lease requires diligent
development and because the developer would like to agree on a price for the
steam before beginning to spend on development. Notice that the bargaining
'	 position of the developer is stronger for leases on state or privately owned
lands since he gets the first shot at a 1)id. Then he could first explore, and
'	 if the tract turns out to be a promising geothermal source, he can make a
reasonable bid and be sure to obtain the lease. Of course, after this stage,
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although most of the risk associated with uncertainty in
tract is shifted away from the developer, he would like to negotiate the
contract before he fully develops the field.
To induce the developer to sign a contract, the utilitv must offer at
!east : price that recovers variable costs. If development need not begin
until after the contract is negotiated, th e contract must return total costs.
Moreover, in the first case the developer runs the risk of a dry field, but in
the latter case the contract can provide for sharing the risk. N rite that the
two cases put the developer in a different "status quo" position at the begin-
ning of the bargaining between the developer and the ut--lity. Differences .n
the "status quo" among the players in a game change their threat possibilities,
and hence their bargaining strategies, and hence the outcome of the bargain.
The following example illustrates how differences in the status quo
cr threat point affect the outcome of the contracting game.
Although it is true that the developer could well be a monopsonist
and the utility an oligopolist (because in the end only one developer gets the
lease on the land but more than one utility could want to buy steam from the
developer), we assume that every negotiation is between the developer and one
of the utilities only. Hence we loom- at a two-person game. Strictly
competitive games are those games in which the players have strictly opposing
preference. For example, player 1 could prefer x over y. Then player 2 would
prefer y over x and if 1 is indifferent between x and y, 2 is indifferent
too. Such players are called strict adversaries. In games like the one we
are looking at, the players are not strict adversaries. Threat strategies are
an assignment of probabilities to the pc3sible threats each player can make.
In other words, it is a mixed strategy over threats.
A bargaining problem is characterized by a region A of the Euclidean
plane where the axes represent the utility levels of players 1 and 2. Point
4-36
I
i
PLAYER 2's UTILITY
i
i
x
PLAYER 1's UTILITY
Figure 4-1
Tvpical Bargaining Region
(u*, v*) is the payoff to the players if no agreement occurs. An agreement
takes place if and only if both players agree upon a unique point of R. which
then constitutes the payoff. F :s the set of all feasible outcomes. Tt is
assumed to be closed, convex and bounded. Natu-ally, 1 If-sires a trade
represented by a point as far tc the right as possible, and 2 wishes to obtain
a point as high in R as possible. An attempt at making agreements will by
made as long as there are points both to the right and above (u*,v"). The
existence of such a point is assumed. Nash's "form ,_i.a" to arrive at a
solution is the following:
(1) Transform the coordinates so that (u + ,v*) is (0,0). -he new
region of feasible outcomes is R'.
(2) In R' find (uo , v0 ) such that uov o is the maximum of all
products u v where (u, v) is in R.
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The detail- of why this scheme and not any other was chosen to arrive
at the solution will not be discussed here, for it digresses from the purpose
of this report.
Now consider the following game.	 The payoff matrix is:
Player 2's possible action
B l B^
Player	 1's Al (1,4) (-1,-4)
possible A2 (-4,-1) (4,1)
actions
The bargaining region R is shown in Figure 2. (The region is convex
becaise the players are allc-ed t:) use joint randomization strategies, such as
deciding the payoffs to both players by a toss of a coin.) The !C;e^urity
levels (the amount each can guarantee himself, when no threats ar- -Allowed)
are (0,0). The maximin strategies are ( 4 /5 A l , 1/5 A 2 ) and (1/2 Bl,
1 112 B2 ). It is easy to see that the Nash solution is (5/2, 5/2), the
mi dpc i nt of the line  segment from (1,4)  to ( 4 ,1) .
PLA .,: . 1 , TIUtY
1
Figure 4-2
Bargaining Region for the Game
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However, from the payoff matrix, it is clear that player 2 has a
slight disadvantage. For suppose 2 threatens to play B l , then what
alternatives has 1? If he plays A l then the payoff is (1,4) - the best
possible for 2. Therefore, 1's realistic counter threat is A 2 , leading to
the payoff (-4,-1). Hence, when there are threats, the "status quo" of the
'	 game is not (0,0) but is (-4,-1). With this as the "status quo", we transform
the coordinates so that (-4,-1) becomes (0,0). The Nash solution now is seen
to be (1,4).
'	 Thus, if threats are allowed, the outcome of the game is different
frorr the case with no threats. Although, in our case, it is not the existence
'	 of threats that causes shifts in the status quo (it is the differP n^- in the
leasing arrangements).
The example given illust rates how such a shift in the st::us vio,
'	 whatever the cause, changes the outcome of the bargain. We coul(_ presume, in
our case, threats will exist as long as either party views itself in a
tposition capable of making a threat. Thus, leasing arrangements cause shifts
in the allocation of risks between the developer and the utility. These, in
turn, cause differences in the relative payoffs.
'	 It has, therefore, been shown now mere differences in the leasing
arrangements can cause changes in the status quo payoffs. This alone could
change the outcome of the developer-utility contract. Over znd above this,
differences in the le,--sing types could place one of the parties at a relative
bargaining advantage ;md hence in a position capable of making a threat. This
	
'	 too ^ould charge th► outcome of the developer-utility contract. The question
to be asked next i g : How does • ie outcome of the devPlope.,, -utilit y contract
affect the insuran :e problem?
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4.3.7
	
The Insurance Problem
In geothermal development as elsewhere, insurance ariaes as a means
for spreading risks. geothermal contracts normally call for a penalty to be
paid by the developer if the ivantity of steam that is delivered to the power
plant falls below some specified amount. The penalty, in essence, a pre-agreed
liquidation damage for a breach of the development contract, is a means of
reallocating the risk that the geotherma l_ resource will prove to be less
valuable than was otherwise expected.
If a geothermal development de l ivers less steam than was anticipated,
the developer's investmen t. in the system for delivering steam and the
itility's investment in the power plant and transmission connection are
reduced in value, perhaps even to scrap value if the geothermal resource
dimin ; 3'()es to the point that it is no longer a viable steam source for a power
generation facility. The penalty in the nontract for insufficient performance
causes the developer to bear part of the ri-k to the utility as well as the
,k that the developer's investment will suffer a loss.
-ypically, the magnitude of the penalty for insufficient performance
arge. For example, the contract between Union Oil Company and
and Electric for steam at The Geysers geothermal development. in
_f ,)rn:a relieves PG&E from the obligation to pay for steam if the
s'_eam iF__vered to the plant is not sufficient to operate the plant at fifty
percent of rated capacity. If Union does not attempt to provide adequate
steam to the facility, PG&E ma y charge Union for the cost of drilling and
equipping its own wel' g . And, for 12 months after a new unit is installed,
Union agrees to pay the capital charges on any excess capacity that results
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from Union's failure to deliver the full capacity of steam for 30 consecutive
days. 14
The effect of penalty features such as these is tc transfer most of
the risk that the geothermal resource will fail from the utility to the
developer. Obviously, such contract provisions reveal that utilities are
highly risk averse in their attitudes about geothermal. The reason is the
status of the utilities as regulated, franchised monopoly suppliers of
electricity. Only capital that is of value to rate payers, either as reserve
capacity or as a regular source of power, is likely to be included in the
calculation of the allowable costa that a utility can recover from the rate
payer-. Moreover, utility regulators are averse to ris.;s of power shortages,
and transmit this to utilities by encouraging high reliatiiit y and relatively
large capacity reserves.
In the case of many power sources, the primary source of risk is in
costs of power, not its availability. Utilities are less averse to cost risks
because, with some lag (except, for fuel cost adjustment mechanisms), regulators
will enable the utility to pass through unanticipated costs to ratepavers (see
Burness, Montgomery and Quirk). But in the case of geothermal developments,
there is also uncertainty about the ultimate quantity of geothermal steam that
can be supplied to the utility on a long term basis. Hence, there is a risk
that part of the capacity that the utility builds to use geothermal steam will
be unused because of inadequate steam supplies. The utility can be expected
to pass on to the developer as much as possible of the risk that regulators
will not permit: utilities to recoup the investment in this excess capacity.
14 anion Oil was willing to bear most of the risk because the Levers is an
exceptionally good geothermal resource, n,:mely clean dry steam.
Development in hot water goethermal resources could definitely call for
different risk-sharing schemes. Thus, the Union-PG&E contract terms are
exceptions rather than typical for hot water geothermal contracts.
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Once the developer has agreed to compensate the utility in case the
geothermal resource proves to be inadequate, there is still another
possibility for further spreading of the risk. The developer can seek to
purchase insurance against the eventuality that the penalty clause of the
geothermal delivery contract rill be :evoked. Here the insurance company
accepts the risks of inadequate steam supply, in return for a p remium from the
developer. In the past, concern was expressed that geothermal development
would be inhibited because insurers would be unwilling to insure against a
failure of the resource. As it turns out, one insurance company (INA) has
entered the business, selling insurance for up to 50 million dollars in
damages arising from unexpectedly low steam produc;:lon for the first 7 years
of exploitation of the reservoir. A requirement of the insurance com pany is
that insurance be purchased for some minimum period of time (the "minimum
earned premium"). Thus, the pertinent policy issue today would appear to be
whether the Federal Government should subsidize or directly provide insurance
for more than 50 million dollars and for reservoirs that have been in use for
more than 7 years. Because resource uncertainties are important, over a long
time period, policy on insurance must be activated before the contract becomes
effective, otherwise risk cannot be appropriately allocated.
In order to understand and evaluate the role of the government in
assuming some of this risk, some further development of how insurance works is
necessary. (A brief discussion is presented here; for n,re details sce
Appendix C.) The basis for insurance is that a person buying insurance wishes
to substitute a certain, well defined cost (the insurance premium) for
exposure to an event that is ur.,)redictable except in a statistical sense. Two
elements enter into the calculation of an insurance premium that is acceptable
to both sides. One is the expected value of the costs to which the insuring
1I_8?
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party is exposed: in the simplest case of a single event, E, that occurs with
probability, p, and that causes costs C(E), the expected loss is pC(E). The
second element is the practically important variability of the cost, that is,
the extent to which a wide range of potential outcomes is relatively likely
before the fact. To illustrate this point, compare the following two games:
(1) A coin is to be f?.ipped once for 1 dollar, and (2) a coin is going to be
flipped 100 times for 1 cent per flip. If the coin is "fair," that is, heads
and tails are equally likely, the expected value of both games is zero
(neither side in advance expects to win or lose). but the likely variation in
outcome is much larger in the first case. In game (1), someone is certain to
lose i dollar, anc someone else is certain to make an equal gain. In the
second game, the likelihood of losing or winning 1 dollar (e.g., of winning
10U nundred copse-utive coin tosses) is extremely small; winning or losing
more than 10 cents occurs only about 5% of the time.
The preceding discussion provides one explanation for the presence of
insurance. If someone accepts a large number of independent risks, the range
of their financial losses comes very close to the expected value, becoming
more and more certain to be the expected loss as the number of independent
risky events gets larger. Hence, an insurance company with numerous clients
„fiat charges premiums equal to the expected value will not only expect to
hreak even, but will 4n fact become increasingly likely to break even as the
numoer of it.:,  policy holders grows.
Of course, insurance companies seek profits, not break-even
operations. Hence, they set premiums somewhat above the expected loss, just
as gambling casinos set payoffs to gambling games that are somewhat worse than
the amount that would be necessary for a fair bet. People are nevertheless
willing to buy insurance because they are risk averse--that is, given the
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:.hoi-,e, they would prefer a certain payment equal to the expected value of a
risk over actually bearing the risk, and this preferPnc'^ is strong enough that
they would pay enough more than the expected value to mike it worthwhile for
an insurance company to bear the risk for them.
The preceding discussion provides a basis for analyzing why an
insurance market may fail to develop. First, az ? b r.sis for settini; premiums,
the insurance company and the client must be able to estimate the expected
loss. This means estimating the probability of costly events as well as
Knowing the costs that these events will impose. Second, the insurer must
sell a large enough number of policies over independent risks so that the
variabilit y in expected outcome can be narrows d to a small range around the
expected value.
Early in the development of any	 activity, like geothermal,
:ieither of these conditions may be true. Prior to the development and
operation of a reservoir through the life cycle of a power facility. the
probability of maintaining steam of adequate pres°ure, temperature and
quantity was not very well known, especially by insurers who possessed less
knowledge about the technica l aspects of the resource than did the developers
and users. In addition, the contaminants in the steam during the lifetime of
• development were also subject to uncertainty, affecting the probability that
• geothermal development could operate at full capacity for a long period of
time. Hence, it is not surprising to observe tha'. insurers placed limits on
both the duration and maximum exposure of insurance against a failure of a
geothermal development.
Part of the uncertainty associated wit:r geothermal development is
lack of knowledge about the productivity of a reservoir over a long period of
time, which in turn derives from lack of operating experience. Thus, the
n11
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operating experience in the first few developments will alter expectations
about failure rates at other developments. This means that the element of
iaq
 urance that relates to narrowing the range of outcomes owing to the
acceptance of a large number of risks is in part missing in the early stages
of geothermal development. The problem is similar to that of selling
earthquake insurance in a particular city. If the earthquake occurs, all
policy holders are damaged. (Earthquakes do not occur independently for each
insured building.) Hence, the annual variation in exposure to uamages per
policy holder cannot be narrowed Lev writing more policies in the same location.
The preceding argument is the basis for some sort of federal inter-
vention in the insura-)oe market during the transition to a situation in which
experience with geothermal developments is sufficient to sustain a more fully
developed insurance market. The transition c.n b, long, as the expected life
of a development is measured in decades. Hence, to regard federal. intervention
as "temporary" is somewhat misleading though technically correct.
An element of the issue that opens possibilities for alternative
policy interventions besides insurance subsidies is the risk-averseness of
utilities with respect to the usability of power plants that are constructed
to use geothermal steam. This risk averseness is a creature of p-'lic utility
regulation; regulation presents some of the risk of failure of a geothermal
development from being carried by the utility. An alternative to subsidizing
the developer's insurance against this risk is to permit the utility to bear
it, such as by allowing the utility to recover part of the capital costs of
the excess caparity that would result from a fall-off in geothermal steam
production, especially the kinds of costs that insurers are reluctant to cover
(e.g., more than $50 million, after 7 years). To some degree, the risk-avers
character of utilities is a cre sure „ • 'public policy, so that an alternative
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to subsidizing the costs that this risk averseness c
insurers.
A -nal issue is the choice of governmental
Insurance market, a^.r,.;ming that .;ome federal role is
three possibilities are possible:
(1) Subsidiza'ioa of private insurance.
(2) Direct ft- .ral -)envision of insurance,
rea*_es for develop e rs and
Intervention into the
decided upon. Here,
either as regular
insurance .- or developers or coinsurance for insurance companies.
(3) Disaster relief to geothermal reso ,irces that prove to be lass
valaab-.e than contemplated before development.
The first and third alternatives are inefficient because they will
induce some geothec- a.l development that is really too risky to be worthwhile.
The crucial point is to distinguish between solving a market imperfection in
the insurance business that arises because of an inadequate hasis for
developing adequate pre miuims, and subsidizing the development of geothermal
energy. Whereas society might well elect to subsidize geothermal development
because, for example, it is not vulnerable to foreign inter-uoti.ons and is
underpriced relative to its social value, the most effective means for pro-
viding -:uch a subsidy is to pay part of the costs of geothermal development,
either directly or through tax incentives. The fir=t alternative, subsidizing
insurance, opens up a diffc:rent i sl between the premiums paid by the developer
and the receipts of Ute insurance company. Assuming that the insurance is
written in a competitive environment, this means that insurers are receiving a
premium that appropriately matr.hes their exposure; therefore, the purchaser of
the insurance is paying less than the -conomic value of the risk inhering in
the development. Thus, insurance subsidies of this form will encourage
development on tracts that are too risky to warrant develo pment, at least at
the present time.
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1	 The third alternative, compensation for a shortfall of geothermal
output when it occurs without a formal insurance arrangement, is similar to
disaster relief. In a sense, it is an extreme form of insurance
subsidy--here, the subsidy is equal to a continuing premium that would
represent a ^ompetitive insurance market outcome. And like insurance
subsidies, it represents an inefficient solution to the problem of an
inadequately developed insurance market because it encourages excessively
risky developments.
I
The second alternative is preferred because it represents an attsmpt
by government to correct for a market failure. If the government sells
insurance (or coinsurance) at a best estimate of the fair premium price, it is
substituting for private insurance in the most effective manner. Moreover, if
the premiums are calculated as accurately as possible to reflect actual risks,
over time the premiums will converge to the charges that would be levied by
s
the private market, and indeed private Insurers can be expect ed gradually to
replace federal underwriting. Direct federal insurance, in particula r , has
the most attractive features, because if geothermal risks a re eventually fully
insurable, p rivate insurers will have an incentive to develop sufficient
information to get Lhe government out of the bu-,iness. This may not be true
for coinsurance, for insurers may always find it worthwhile to lav off some
risks to federal insurers even if the direct insurance market becomes fully
developed. however, this distinction relates mo re to the political aspects of
the issue than the economic aspects; as a purely economc matter, either form
of option (2) can be efficient.
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4.4	 SUMMARY
Briefly, this report provides answers to the following questions:
Q: What characteristics make geothermal resources different from other
energy sources?
A: Confusion about the status of geothermal property rights and
regulatory requirements.
-	 Is geo t hermal a mineral or water
o	 If mineral, then federal government owns geothermal
resources in federally owned lands.
•	 If water, who owns geothermal resources?
•	 Preliminary court decisions indicate that ownership is
federal.
Environmental standards are far stricter than for other energy
sources when they were in their development stage.
-	 Steam is not transportable, so that on-site use is required.
Q: What are the different leasing arrangements for leasing land for
geothermal development?
There are three kinds of land:
(1) Federally owned Known Geothermal Resource Areas;
(2) Federally owned "unknown" land;
(3) Lands owned by states or private parties.
- For (1), lease is made through a competitive bidding process.
- For (2), the first qualified applicant gets the lease if the bid is
reasonable.
- For (3), prospector gets to bid first and only if h__ bid is
unreasonable and the tract opened for competitive bidding.
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Q:	 What are the significant differences in the nature of the leasing
contract among the types of lands?
A:	 Federal leases are for 10 years and are extended further if
commercial production of steam occurs. For state and private,
extension is granted as long as the developer keeps lookin g for a new
well with "due diligence".
Q:	 What is the position of the developer at the time he makes a contract
with the utility?
A:	 On federal KGRA lands, the developer has al ► 	 sunk some fixed
costs into develo ping the field and so is at a bargaining
'	 disadvantage; for other lands the developer will begin exploring
after price of steam i3 agreed upon, in which case the developer
bears a large portion of the risk. The leasing status of the land is
'	 important because the leasing arrangement can affect the bargaining
position of the two parties, and hence 'he outcome of any crntract
'	 between. them.
Q:	 Who should provide the insurance? Should the government subsidize
tprivate ins;irers?
A:	 Public provision of this insurance could be socially better than
'	 private provision depending on the cause of an unwillingness to
provide insurance by the private sector.
Three major sour-es of revenues from the leasing of federal lands are
identified: rentals, royalty and bonuz bid. It is found that the escalated
rental charges do not allow for enough lead time for the lessee. Ro yalty rate
is identified as a form of risk sharing between lessee and the federal
'	 government. Royalty could le3sen the upf ront cost of a bonus bid and thus
encourages more competition in a lease sale. The unwarranted effect in the
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presence of energy supply constraint is that a higher royalty rate will shift
the pat t ern of resource extraction to the future. Peadjustment clauses on
rentals and royalties are found not to be an impediment to geothermal
development given the lead time before readjustment can be authorized. Bonus
bidding on its own is essentially a redistribution of economic rent from
--ssee to the lease owner. Nhsn risk is taken into account, bonus bidding
shifts most of the risk to the lessees. Eripirically it is confirmed that
lessees prefer noncompetitive leasing than competitive leasing both on the
nuiaber of leases issued and on the acreage leased under the two forms of
leasing. nf course the redistributi 3n of economic rent is also a major reason
explaining this phenomenon.
Throughout the study, it is argued that information has a ::finite
~ale in foster_ng `he development of geothermal resources. In a p-e-leasing
context, if the reservation bid is set at the lowest possible value, and if a
bidder decides to acquire information given the other does not, it pays the
first bidder to inform the other bidder that he has adopted the strategy: a
common property of the battle of the sexes game. The Nash equil,iria are
asy-metrical and not interchangeable. Moreover, these Nash equilibria imply
^gh-low bids, thus causing extreme difficulties for the seller to identify
:-iy collusive agreement. The result also reconciles the high-low bid
phenomenon observed in actual lease tales. Furthermore, it is possible that
it pays the seller to provide public information. This last ^onclusion is not
supported by allowing for an active seller. with an active seller in a
pre-leasing context, if a reservation bid is appro priately set, the seller has
incentive to encourage bidders to gather information, nor to provide public
information.
In a post-leasing context, the problem of informational externality
is quickly disposed. A careful dichotomy of two measures of the tenefit of
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:nf3rmation is provided. Conditions for the two measures to be identical are
also provided. Cases of informationa l. substitutability and ccmplementarity
are identified. Conditions for informational substitutability are provided.
Conditions for not providing public information are also deduced. nor the
case of informational complementarity it is shown that the net surplus can
never be negative for the provision of public information.
Clearly, the system as it stands today would make developers on
federally awned lands either look for resources where it is least likely to be
found or, bear a large portion of the risk by leasing the land firs*_ and then
exploring at the risk of the tract turning out to be drv. The effects of
uncertainties in nature on the ex ante probability of nonfulfillment of the
developer utility contract are less in state-owned lands as compared to
federally-owned lands. This is because the developer can lose a federal lease
if commercial production of steam does not occur, :while the lease on state or
private owned lands is not lost as long as diligent development continues.
Both of the above differences ,^ause a difference in the bargaining
positions of the developer and the utility. In general, utilities are in a
stronger relative bargaining position on federal lands. This exacuba`es the
insurance problem because utilities are especially averse to production risks.
Insuranca is really not a very big prablem. wince the return on
investment by private as well as public investors is known and the risk
premium associated with private investment, the investor with a larger net
return should provide the insurance. If this turns out to be the private
investor, then providing a government subsidy could result in a less efficient
allocation of resources. The risk premium is determined by the structure of
the developer-utility contract.
r-
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Thus we have seer how the leasing arrangements could affect the
outcome of the contract which in turn could affect the decision as to who
provides the insurance.
The analysis would support the following conclusions:
First, the definition of KGRA should be changed to eliminate this
source of risk to the developer because of the uncertainty concerning
obtaining thr lease. This could be achieved, for example, by ruling that an
"unknown" tract of land cannot be classified as a KGRA for some minimum grace
period after a prospector finds a geothermal resource in it, after- obtaining a
prospecting permit.
Second, the most efficient contract mechanism if the developer is not
a vertically integrated utility is one in which the developer is required to
supply minimum amount of steam to tho utility. Amounts in excess of the
mini- •gy m quantity, if produced, must be purchased by the utility. 9s argued in
the text, suct, arrangements make the bargaining positions more nearly equal,
-+nd hence do not create market structure barriers to development.
Third, utilities that produce electric power using geothermal steam,
should be encouraged to be less risk averse than they are under present laws.
For example, "unavoidable" supply shortages by the utility should be
pardonable. This way, a more socially optimal allocation of risk could be
achieved.
Fourth, a decision about who should provide insurance should be made
with due regard to the argument in this report.
Lastly, should it be lecided that the insurance be provided by
private insuring agencies, it it better to use direct federal insurancc or
coinsurance than to subsidize private insurance purchases.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
USERS GUIDE TO THE GEOTHERMA! PROBABILISTIC COST MODEL
This guide is separated into two parts: definitions of pr(igram
subroutines and program variables; and a description of the inputs and
instructions for inputting them.
'	 A.1	 SUBPROGRAM DEFINITIONS
Main Program
'	 Used as the calling program for the subroutine.
tINPUT
Reads all input data and makes some preliminary calculations.
ISELECT
Ured only if the number ^f scenarios to be evalua^ed is less
than the total number input. Uses the probability of occurrence
of a scenario in the process of selecting what should be
evaluated.
I
RANNUM
Random number generator called by SELECT.
RA DJST
Escalates Reference cost accounts to the vear in which they
occur.
1
A-1
GSCALE
Scales the cost data according to time differences between
scenario values and reference values. Calls FCTMOD to scale
according Lo differences in physical parameters.
RCOST
Uses scaled cost data to calculate the output cost variables.
GOPT
Generates an escalation factor in evaluating levelized energy
costs.
PICDPF
Calculates the depreciation factor depending on whether the
depreciation method is straight line or sum of years digits.
Prints, or calls the programs which print, the output values,
tables, and histograms. OUT1 is used only if the number of
selected scenarios is less than the number of scena ri os input.
Prints, or calls the programs which print, the output values,
tables, and histograms. OUT2 is used only if all input
scenarios are used in the calculations.
ASCEND
Arranges the output variables in ascending order.
OUT1
OUT2
A-2
TAB LE
Prints a table consic-ting of the scenario numbers, the scenario
probability of occurrence, and the scenario output value in
ascending order.
EX PEC 1
Calculates the expected value and the standard deviation of the
output if the number of scenarios selected for evaluation is
less than the total number input. Called by OUT1.
EXPEC2
Calculates the expected value and the standard deviation of the
output if all scenarios are evaluated. Called by OUT 2.
HI ST
Prints out the probability density function. Called by either
HISTOG or PDF.
PDF
Does some of the calculations required to print the probability
density function if all scena^ios are evaluated. Called by
OUT1, calls HIST.
i
HISTOG
1	 Does some of the calculations nece: ary to print the probability
density function if riot all scenarios input are selected for
evaluation. Called by OUT2, calls HIS:.
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FCTMOD
Function subroutine that determines the modification to cost
data required by physical parameter differences betwef•n the
reference scenario and a given scenario.
Function subroutine to scale cost data according to differences
in the scenario and reference temperatures.
Function subroutine to scale cost data according to differences
in the scenario and referenc p flow rate.
Function subroutine to scale cost data according to differences
in the scenario and reference well depth.
A.2	 VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Due to the intricacies of the program and the order in which certain
numbers occur, a particular number may have to be referred to by more than one
variable name. For example, the duration of a stage in the Reference Scenario
i- referred to as TPR(JX), where JX i.3 the number of the stage. For sco.narios
(other than the Reference Scenario) the duration of a stage is referred to as
TP(JX,fM1), where JX is again the nunber of the stage, and MM is the number of
the particular scenario. TF(JX,IM9) is then redefined as TR(JX) in GSCALE so
it can be used in the CALL RCOST statement.
OPT 1
OPT?
OPTS
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IThis happens in a similar fashion with other variables. Generally, a
variable occurring in the Reference Scenario will have an "R" at the end
(e.g.	 TPR,	 t;DR,	 CIR,	 PSUMR,	 etc.); when	 it occurs in scenarios other than
the Reference Scenario,
	 the "R" will be dropped	 (e.g.	 TP,	 CD,	 CI,	 PSUM,	 etc.).
Variable Common	 Program
Name block	 Usage Definition
A HISTOG (300)	 In HISTOG list,	 equivalent to
output variable in CALL statement.
AD DATA2	 ;)AIN,	 INPUT (10,5,10)	 Rend	 in,	 AD(IX,NX,KDX)	 Cost
GSCALE escalation factors for stage, accounting'
type,
	 time dependent cost account.
'	 ADMOD GSCALE ADMOD =	 (AD(JX,NX,KDX)**PWR)
*(TP(JX,MM)/TPR(JX)).
	
Ratio of	 the
length of a stage in a scenario to the
length of the reference stage, adjusted'
by the cost escalation factor,	 raised to
the cumulative difference between the
length of prior scenario stages and the'
length of the corres ponding reference
stages.
Al DATA2	 MAIN,	 INPUT (10,5,10)	 Read	 in,	 Al	 (IX,NX,KIX)	 Cost
GSCALE escalation factors for stage, accounting
' type,	 time independent cost account.
AIMOD GSCALE AIMOD =	 AI(JX,NX,KIX)**PWR.	 Cost'
escalation factors for time independent
costs,	 raised to the power of the
difference Letween elapsed time of prior
' scenario stages and the corresponding
reference stages.
'	 Bl INPUT Read in, State tax rate
B2 IN?UT 'ead	 in,	 Local	 tax rate
B3	 INPUT	 Read in, Investment tax credit
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B12	 DATA1	 MAIN, INPUT	 B12 = B1 + B2
SELECT, GSCALE
RCOST, OUT1
OUT2, FCTMOD
C	 EXPECT, EXPEC2	 In EXPECI, EXPEC2 lists equivalent to
the output variable in the CALL
statement.
CAP
	 DATA8	 MAIN, RCOST	 (300) Upfront capital investment.
GSCALE, OUT1
	
In CALL GSCALE, ASCEND, HISTOG, PDF,
OUT2	 EXPECTI, EXPEC2 CAP(NN) = TCAF
In ROOST list, equivalent to TCHP.
CAP = 0 if J1 1
CAP = CAP + CAPR(NX)
CAP = CAP + COSTO
CAPR	 RCOST	 (5) CAPR(NX) = CD + CI. For each
accounting type within a stage, the sum
of the time dependent and independent
costs.
CCL	 DATA8	 MAIN, RCOST	 (300) Life cycle costs. In CALL GSCALE,
GSCALE, OUT1	 ASCEND, HISTOG, PDF, EXPECT, EXPEC2
OUT2	 CCL(NN) = TCCL. In RCOST list,
equivalent to TCCL.
CCL = El*CDUM if KOPT = 0.
If KOPT = 0, CCL = E1*CDUM*ESCAL +
(1.-ESCAL)*REV
CJ	 GSCALE, RCOST	 (10,30,5,10) CD = FCTMOD(CDOPT,
JX,KDS,NX,MM,I.). Timc dependent costs,
adjusted for time variations, are
adjusted by FCTMOD for physical
uncertainties. Then, in CALL RCOST.
CD = CD + CDT if JX = 1, otherwise, CD =
CD + CDT*D**EXPO
CDOPT	 GSCALE	 CDOFT = CDR(JX,MX,NX,KDS)*ADMOD.
Time de pendent costs, adjusted for time
differences betw?en specific scenario
and reference scenario
CDR	 DATA2	 INPUT, MAIN	 (10,30,5,10) Read in, CDR (JX,MX,NX,
GSCALE, RCOST KDX) Time dependent costs indexed fc.r
stage, time interval, accounting type
and time dependent cost account. In
RCOST list, equivalent to CD.
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CDT	 RCOST
	 CDT = CDT + CDTT*D**EXPO
CDTT	 RCOST	 CDTT = CDTT + CDR(JX,MX,NX,KDX).
Sum over KDX of time dependent costs
CDUM	 RCOST
CEL DATA3 MAIN, RCOST
GSCALE, )UT1
OUT2, ASCEND
TABLE, HISTOG
CELME	 EXPECI, EXPEC2
CDUM = CR(1) + COSTO. Used internally.
Initialize COST, then sum COST
(300) Levelized energy cost. In CALL
GSCALE CEL(NN) = TCEL.
In RCOST list, equivalent to TCEL.
CEL = (1000*CCL)/(qG*E).
In CALL TABLE, ASCEND, HISTOG, PDF,
EXPECI, EXPEC2. In ASCEND list
represents all output variables.
Ordered in ASCEND.
The difference:,
 between the expected
value and a scenario value of the output
variables.
CI	 GSCALE	 (10,5,10) Time independent costs
RCOST	 adjusted for variations of time and
physical uncertainty between the
reference and scenario value.
CIOPT	 GSCALE	 CIOPT = CIR(JX,NX,KIX)*AIMOD
Time independent cost adjusted for cost
escalation factors
CIR	 DATA2	 INPUT, MAIN	 (10,5,10) Read in, CIR(JX,NX,KIX) time
GSCALE, RCOST	 independent costs, indexed for stage,
accounting type, and time independent
cost account. In RCOST list, equivalent
to CI.
CMAX	 OUT1, OUT2	 Calculated in ASCEND as maximum value of
appropriate output variable. Used in
printing, plotting output in PDF. In
CALL ASCEND, HISTOG.
CM IN	 OUT1, OUT2	 Calculated in ASCEND as minimum value of
appropriate output variable. Used in
printing, plotting output in PDF. In
CALL ASCEND, HISTOG.
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RCOST COST =	 ((OMB3-TAU*DPF)*OMTAUI*CRF+B12)
*CR(NX)/CRF.
	 Life cycle cost,
	
per
accounting type,
	
to be summed.	 (Ref.	 1,
p.	 B-7).
RCOST COSTO = 0 if DELAY = 0.	 Otherwise,
COSTO = PPRICE*E*(GD**PSUMR(J))*(l.-GD**
(DELAY + 1.))/((1.-GD)*1000000.)
Penalty cost for delay of delivery of
fuel.
MAIN,	 OUT1 COSTR = RCCL.	 Reference life cycle, or
OUT2 true cost.
MAIN,
	 OUT1 (300)	 True cost COSTT(NX)
OUT2 PROFIR-PROFIT(NX) + CCL(NX).	 Reference
profit minus scenario profit plus life
cycle cost.	 In CALL ASCEND,	 HISTOG,
PDF,	 EXPECT,	 EXPEC2.
SELECT Used in subroutine as cumulative
probability.
RCOST (5)	 CR(NX)	 = CAPR(NX) + CDT + CI
Total cost.
RCOST CRF = DM1/(1.-D**(-TSTAGE))
Capital	 Recovery Factor (Ref.
	 1,
P.	 III-9).
INPUT Read in, Commcn and Preferred stock ratio
ASCEND Used in ordering the output variables.
INPUT, MAIN Discount Factor,
SELECT, GSCALE D =	 (1.-TAU)*DINT*DER+
RCOST, GOPT (ROCS*CSPSR + ROPS*(1.-CSPSR))
PICDPF,	 OUT1 *(l.-DER)	 +	 1.
OUT2, FCTMOD In CALL GOPT, CALL PICDPF
Printed with the input variables
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COST
COSTO
COSTR	 DATA?
COSTT
	
DATA8
CPROB
CR
CRF
CSPSR
CTEMP
D
	
DATA1
CON	 DATA5
	
INPUT, MAIN	 (6) Read in, Scaling parameters
GSCALE, RCOST
FCTMOD, OPTl
OPT2, OPTS,
OPT4
DELAY GSCALE, RCOST In CALL RCOST.	 In GSCALE,
MAIN DELAY = PSU`!(J,MM) - PSUM(JCON,MM) 	 -
PSUMR(J) + PSUMR(JCON).	 At scenario MM,
the elapsed time difference between the
total scenario time at stage J and the
total scenario time at contract
effectiveness, minus the same difference
for the reference scenario.
	
In MAIN,
DELAY = 0.	 Used to calculate the
penalty cost.
DER INPUT Read in, Debt Equity Ratio
DINT INPUT Read in,
	 Interest rate on debt
DM1 RCOST, PICDPF DMl = D-1,	 In CALL PICDPF
DPF RCOST, PICDPF In CALL PICDPDF, Calculated
	 in PICDPF.
If IOPT =	 1,	 DPF =	 (1.-D**(-TN?)/
(DM1*TNI),straight line depreciation
factor.
If IOPT = 2, DPF =
2.*(TNI-(1.-D**(-TNI))/DM1)/(TNI*(l.+TNI)*
DMI), sum of years digit depreciation
factor.
DPL INPUT Read in, Depletion Allowance
E DATA1	 MAIN, 1NPUT Read in, Annualized Energy Output
SELECT, GSCALE
RC^ST, OUT!
OUT2, FCTMOD
El DATA1	 MAIN, INPUT E1	 =	 (1.-TAU)/(l.-TAU*(1.-DPL)-ROY)
SELECT, GSCALE
RCOST, OUT1
OUT2, FCTMOD
ESCAL RCOST ES CAL	 =	 (l.-TAU)/El
	 =	 (1.-TAU*(1.-DPL)
-ROY).	 The escalation rate used to
calculate life cycle cost,
	 CCL,	 if an
unregulated utility with profit is being
examined.
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ES!rDD RADJST FSMOD = AD(JX,NX , KDX)**PWR,
where PWP is the time until thi
occurrence of account KDX.
ESMOI RADJST ESSMOI = AI(JX , NX,KIX )**PWR, where
PWR is the time until the occurrence
of account KIX.
FXPECT OUT1, OUT2 Expected value of the relevant output
EXPECT, EXPEC2 variable.	 In CALL EXPECI, EXPEC2.
EXPO ROOST Used as an intermediate definition to
calculate capital costs.	 EXPO
represents the time exponential.
F CTMOD GSCALE, FCTMOD Function variable.	 Cost variable
modified by stage and physical
uncertainty if required.
"AY HIST Maximum frequency.
^EQ PDF, HISTOG (20) Calculates the frequer.^v of each
HIS: interval for each output.	 In CALL
HIST.	 Used in plotting output.
FRFQM PDF Used to determine scalin ¢
 factor for
frequency for plotting purposes.
•,	 DATA! MAIN,	 INPUT Read in, Energy cost escalation
SELECT, GSCALE factor.	 In CALL GOPT
ROOST, GOPT
OUT1. OUT2
F CT MOD
GD	 DATA4	 INPUT, MAIN	 GD = G/D
GSCALE, ROOST
GG	 RCOST, GOPT
	 In CALL COPT. Tf G = D (energy cost
escalation = discount factor), GG = T,
time. Otherwise, GG =
(G/(D-G))*(1.-(G/D)**T).
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I	 INPUT, PDF	 Used as an index
ASCEND, HI TOG
HIST, FCTMOD
RANNUM
'	 I1	 ASCEND, RANNUM
	 I1 = I + 1. Used internally.
I I F CT MOP
IIN DEVICE	 All
IN PDF,	 HIST
INDEX HISTOG
INN PDF
INTVAL HISCOM	 HISTOG
IOPT	 DATA1	 NfAIN, INPUT
SELECT, GSCALE
RCOST, PICDPF
'	 OUT1, OUT2
FCTMOD
IOUT
	
DEVICE	 All
ITEMT	 ASCEND
'	 IX	 MAIN, INPUT
SELECT
HIST
FCTMOD
In FCTMOD list, identifies whether a
cost variable is time dependent or
independent. if II = 1, it is time
dependent. If II _ 2, it is time
independent.
input device = 5
IN = NINT + 2 in CALL HIST.
Used to calculate frequencv interval for
plotting histogram.
INN= NINT + 1
(20) Used in calculating frequency
interval for plotting histogram.
Read in, IOPT = 1 Straight line
depreciation
IOPT = 2 Sum of years
digit depreciation
In CALL PICDPF
Output device = 6
Used to order the scenario numbers from
smallest output value to largest.
Used as index
Used to print output frequencies.
IX = J+1, the operating lifetime stage
plus 1.
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IXX FCTMOD IXX =	 I - J.	 Counts the physical
variables.
J DATA1 WIN,	 INPUT Read in, Number of stages. 	 J-stage is
SELECT, GSCALE the o perating lifetime stage.
RCOST. OUTI
OUT2, FCTMOD
RANNIIM
HIST,	 ASCEND Used as index.
J1 GSCALE, RCOST J1 = 0 - 1.	 Stage before the operating
stage.
JCON DATA9 INPUT, MAIN Read in, Stage at which contract
GSCALE,	 RCOST is effective
JFCT FCTMOD Identifies b y MOD,	 MOI	 if cost variable
must be scaled by physical uncertain
variable.
JJ DATA1 MAIN,	 INPUT JJ = J + JP.	 Total of the number of
SELECT, GSCALE stages and number of uncertain
RCOST,	 OUT1 probabilities.
OUT2, FCTMOD
JOUT KIST (20)	 Used to print output character in
histogram in HIST.
JP DATAl MAIN,	 INPUT Read in, Number of uncertain physical
SELECT, GSCALE variables
RCOST,	 OUT!
OUT2, FCTMOD
JSCAL HIST Scaling factor to print histogram.
JX INPUT, rISCALE Used to index Q'ages
FCTMDD, ROOST
TABLE 'JsAd as an index.
JX1 GSCALF JX1 =	 JX +	 1
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DATA1
	 INPUT, MAIN
GSCALE, SELECT
RCOST. OUT1
OUT2, FCTMOD
FCTMOD
Read in. If KOPT = 0, life cycle costs
are equal to revenue (CCL = REV), to be
used in the case of a utility regulated
to no profit. Otherwise, KOPT = 0, then
CCL = REV.
Equivalent in FCTMOD list of KDX, KIX.
f
f	
K
1
KD
f
KDLIM
KDX
1
KI
1
KILIM
f
KIX
f
KK
1
KOPT
1
1
KX
i
PDF, OUT'., OUT2
	 Used as index.
EXPEC1, EXPEC2
HIST	 Data variable containing ^.
HISTOG
	 Used to assign GOTO statement.
OATA2	 MAIN, INPUT
	 (10,5) Read in, Number of time
GSCALE, RCOST dependent cost accounts of different
accounting lifetimes but in the same
stage. In CALL RCOST.
INPUT, RCOST
	 Used internall; • . KDLIM = KD(JX,NX).
GSCALE	 Defines the number of time dependent
cost accounts for each stage and
accounting type.
INPUT, RCOST
	 Used to index time dependent cost
GSCALE	 accounts.
DATA2	 MAIN, INPUT
	 (10,5) Read in, Number of time
GSCALE, RCOST
	 independent cost accounts of different
accounting lifetimes but in the same
stage. In C,.LL ROOST.
INPUT, RCOST
	 Used internally, KILIM = KI(JX,NX).
GSCALE	 Defines the number of time independent
cost accounts for each stage and
accounting type.
INPUT, RCOST
	 Used to index time independent cost
GSCALE	 accounts.
TABLE	 Used internally to print out ordered
scenario numbers.
PDF	 Used internally
A -13
L PDF Used briefly as durmny to plot
probability density
	 function.
M DATA3 INPUT, MAIN (10)	 Read	 in,	 Number of time
	 intervals,
(SCALE, RCOST defined	 for each stage.
	 In CALL RCOST
FCTMOD
PDF Used briefly as dummy to plot
probability density
	 function.
MAX HIST Used in plotting histogram.
MLI'1 INPUT, RCOST Used	 internally, MLIM = M(JX) Number of
GSCALE time intervals at stage JX
MM GSCALE MM = NSC(NN) where NN goes from 1 to
NSELEC.
MOD DATA6 INPUT, MAIN (10,5,10,10)	 Read	 in.	 Identifies which
GSCALE, FCTMOD time dependent cost variables also are
dependent on physical uncertain
variables.
MCI DATA6 INPUT, MAIN (10,5,10,10)	 Read	 in.	 Identifies
	 which
GSCALE, FCTMOD time independent cost variables are
dependent on physical uncertain
variables.
MTEMP PDF Used to temporarily stori one element at
a time of array NORDER.
MX INPUT, GSCALE Used to
	 index time
	 intervals.
N DATAl MAIN,	 INPUT Read in, Number of Different Accounting
GSCALE, SELECT Life T!mes
RCOST, OUT1
OU':2,
	 FCTMOD
HISTOG In HISTOG list equivalent to NSELFC
NI HISTOG NI = NINT + 2
i
A-14
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' NINT
r NN
1
t NORD ER
' NO TH
14POINT
'N31
NSC	 DATA4
NSCEN	 DATA1
NSC EN 1
NSELEI
NSELEC	 DATA1
An
MAIN, INPUT	 In CALL INPUT, Read in. In CALL OUT1,
OUT1, OUT2,	 OUT2, HISTOG, PDF, HIST. The number of
HISTOG	 equal intervals into which the output is
to be divided to plot the histogram.
Note: the histogram has NINT + 2
vectors.
MAIN, FCTMOD
	 NN = NSC(NX). In FCTMOD list equivalent
to MM = NSC(NN).
GSCALE	 Used as an index.
OUT1, OUT2	 (300) Used to rank order the scenarios
ASCEND, TABLE
	 according to appropriate output, i.e.,
PDF
	 life cycle cost, levelized energy cost,
upfront capital investment, profit, true
cost, etc. In CALL ASCEND, CALL TABLE.
HI ST	 Data variable containing black space.
PDF	 Used in PDF as equivalent to NSCEN, the
number of scenarios.
RANNUM	 NS1 = NSELEC-1
MAIN, SELECT	 (300) (NSELEC) In CALL SELECT
GSCALE, OUT1	 statement
OUT2	 Index the number of "Selected" scenarios
MAIN, INPUT	 Read in, Number of scenarios.
GSCALE, SELECT
	 In CALL ASCEND, TABLE, PDF, EXPEC2
RCOST, OUT2
TABLE, ASCEND
FCTMOD
OUT2, ASCEND	 NSCENI = NSCEN - 1. In CALL ASCEND.
OUT1	 NSELEI = NSELEC-1, In CALL ASCEND,
equivalent to NSC°N1
MAIN, INPUT	 Read in, Number or scenarios to
GSCALE, SF.ECT	 be selected. In CALL ASCEND, HISTOG,
RCOST, OUT1	 EXPECT.
FCTMOD
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NTI
	 HIST	 Represents the dimension of TITLE
NT IT	 PDF, HISTOG
NX	 MAIN, INPUT
SELECT, RCOST
GSCALE, FCTMOD
RANN UM
OMB3	 DATA1 MAIN,	 INPUT
SELECT, GSCALE
ROOST, OUT1
OUT2, FCTMOD
OMTAU	 DATA1 MAIN,	 INPUT
SELECT, GSCALE
ROOST, OUT1
OUT2, FCTMOD
OMTAUI
	
DATA1 MAIN,	 INPUT
SELECT, GSCALE
RCOST, OUT 1
OUT2, FCTMOD
OPT1 FCTMOD, OPT1
OPT2	 FCTMOD, OPT2
OPT3
	
FCTMOD, OPT3
The diemnsion of TITLE
Used as index.
Used internally in random number
generator
OMB3 = 1.-B3
OMTAU = 1.-TAU
OMTAUI = 1./OMTAU
Function variable. Scaling equation
(scaled cost variable) used if the cost
variable is temperature dependent, and
temperature is a physical uncertainty.
Function variable. Scaling equation
(scaled variable) used if the cost
variable is flow rate dependent and flow
rate is a physical uncertainty.
Function variable. Scaling equation
(scaled variable) used if the cost
variable is well depth dependent, and
well depth is a physical uncertainty.
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INPUT (20,100)	 Read	 in as scenario conditional
probability f-)r each stage and uncertain
variable for each scenario.	 The
scenario probability is the product of
all probabilities describing the
scenario.
ASCEND, TABLE (1000) Equivalent to scenario
EXPEC2, PDF probability,	 PROB.	 In CALL TABLE,	 EXPEC2
FCTMOD, OPT1 Represents the scenario value of
OPT2,	 OPT3, OPT4 an	 input physical variable.
FCTMOD, OPT1 Represents the reference scenario
OPT2,	 OPT3, OPT4 value of an input physical variable.
INPUT, MAIN Read in,	 Penalty price in mills
GSCALE, RCOST per kWh
INPUT, MAIN Read in, Energy price in mills
GSCALE, RCOST per kWh.
P
e	
P1
'	 P2
PPRICE	 DATA9
PRICE
	
DATA9
PRO
P ROB
GSCALE	 In CALL RCOST, equivalent to PROFIT.
PROFIT(NN ) = PRO.
DATA2	 MAIN, INPUT	 (1000) (NSCEN) Calculated in INPUT as
SELECT, OUT]
	
the product of the JJ probabilities
0012	 describing each scenario. Used in
SELECT as part of the criteria to select
a scenario. In OUT1, OUT2 used in CALL
ASCEND.
PROFIR	 DATA?
PROFIT	 DATA8
PS
'	 PS UM
MAIN,	 OUT1 Reference value of profit.
OU T2
MAIN, GSCALE (300)
	
Present	 value of profit.
OUT1,	 OUT2 In CALL GSCALE statement
RCOST PROFIT = REV - CCL.
GSCALE (10)	 PS(JX1)	 =	 PSUM(JX1,MM).	 In CALL
RCOST.
GSCALE (11,300) Cumulative sum of scenario
variables,	 elapsed time.
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PSUMR
P WR
R
RCAP	 DATA?
RCCL	 DATA?
MAIN, GSCALF	 (11) In CA;L GSCALE. PSUMR(JX+1)
ROOST, OUT1
	
= PSUMR(JX) + TPR(JX)
OUT2	 Total time of time dependent stages of
reference scenario. At stage J,
PS11MR(J) = cumulat, ve time of prior
stages. In RCOST list, equivalent. to PS.
GSCALE	 PWR = PSUM(JX,MM) - PSUMR(JX). Scenario
value minus reference values.
RANNIJM	 In CALL RANNUM list. Random numt—r
generated, then ordered.
MAIN, O(JT1,	 Reference u p front capital investment.
OUT2
MAIN, OUT1,
	
Reference life cycle cost.
OUT2
RCEL	 DATA?
RENRO Y
RENSUM
RENTS
REV
R MA X
RMIN
MAIN, OUT1, ReferencE levelized energy cost.
OUT2_
RCOST The sum of TRFNTS and ROYLT.
ROOST The sum of discounted rents, calculated
fnr each stage.
RCOST RENTSQX) = RENSIJM.
RCOST Revenue REV =	 PRICF*E;*
(GD**PSUMR(J))*(1.-GD**(TPR(J)	 +
1.))/((1.-GD)*1000000).
ASCEND,
	
HISTOG RMAX = CEL(NiCEN)*1000.	 Maximum
levelized energy cost.	 Use-'	 to
represent maximum value of all output
variables.
ASCEND,	 HISTOG RMIN =	 CEL(1)*1000.	 Lowest levelized
energy cost times 1000.
	 Used to
represent the minimum value of all
output variables.
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RUPS
RO Y
i
'	 ROYLT
RTFMP
RVAL
RVECT
SQ1 EC
STDV
T
TAU
'	 TCAP
'	 TCCL
'	 TCEL
'	 TEMP
INPUT	 Read in, Rate of Return on Common Stock
', 'JT
	
Read in, Rate of Return on Preferred
Stock
DATA1
	
MAIN, INPUT	 Read in, Royalty Rate
GSCALE, RCOST
OUT1, OUT2
F CT MOD
RCOST	 Royalty payments, ROY*RFV.
RANNUM	 Used to order R( I).
FCTMOD, OPT1
	
Cost variable scaled hir the required
OPT2, OPT3, OPT4 physical parameter.
SELECT
	
( 300) In CALL RANNITM from SFLF.CT.
Equivalent to R in RANNUM.
MAIN	 Logical. Decide whether to Pvaluate all
scenarios or choose some
F
OUT1, OUT2 Standard deviation of the relevant output
EXPECI, EXPEC2 variable. In CALL FXPErl, EXPEC2.
GAPT Ir. GOPT list.	 Equivalent to TSTAGE.
DATA1	 MAIN,	 INPUT Read	 in, Federal Tax Rate
SELECT,	 RCOS'r
our l , om
F CT MOD
GSCALE In CALL °COST,	 equivalent to SAP.
GSCALE In CALL RCOST, equivalent to CCL.
GSCALE' In CALL RCOST, equivalent to CEL.
HISTOG Used in calculating frequency interval
for plotting histogram.
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TIR DATA2 INPUT, MAIN (10,5,10)	 Read	 in,	 TIR ( JX,	 NX,
ROOST KIX)	 Expendi„ure time,
	 indexed	 for
stage,	 accounting type,	 and time
independent cost.
	
In CALL PCOST.
TITLE INPUT, MAIN ( 20)
	
In CALL	 INPUT.	 Firs , data
OUT1, OUT2 card read--title--fulleard.	 In
HIST,	 PDF CALL OUT1,
	
OUT2,
	
MIST,	 FISTOG, PDF.
HI STOG
TN DATA3 MAIN,	 INPUT (5) Read in, N separate
GSCALE, RCOST Accounting Lifetimes.	 in CALL
FCTMOD RCOST.
TNI ROOST, PICDPF TNI = TN(NX).
	
In CALL PICDPF,	 the NXth
Accounting Lifetime,
	
indexed to
TP DATA3 MAIN,	 INPUT (20,1000) Read in, Scenario
GSCALF, i CTMDD variable of time or physical
characteristic_.
TPR DATA3 MAIN,	 INPUT (^O) Re,-.d in,	 Reference variables,
GSCALE, ROOST one per stage and uncertain
FCTMOD variable.	 In ROOST	 list, equivalent to
TR.
TR GSCALE (10)	 TR(JX)	 = TP(JX,	 Pte[).	 In CALL
ROOST,	 equivalent_ to TPR.	 Has a time or
physical uharacteris'_ic definition.
TRENTS ROOST Total	 rents;	 the slim of PEN"S(JX).
TS TA G£ RCOST, GOPT TSTAGF = TPR( J) . 	 In CALL COPT
VAR EXPECT,	 EXPEC2 Variance of the relevant output
variables.
X	 PDF	 Used as scaling factor for frequency.
HIST	 Used internally
XCEL	 PDF	 XCEL = (RMIN+XINT*XKK)*1.CC" . Used in
PDF to define the length of each
consecutive frequency interval.
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XTNT	 PDF	 XINT = (RMAX-RMIN)/FLOAT(NINT). The
length of the output intervals used to
plot the probability density functions.
YKK	 PDF	 FLOAT(KK )
i
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A.3	 GEOTHERMAL PROBABILISTIC COST MODEL INPUT DESCPIPTION
^ripticn of the data set will follow the order of input. Mu&
the input	 'a has interdependencies; 'hat is, if one number is changed,
then other numbers must also be changed, added, or omitted. For example, if
the discount rate is input lirectly, then certain other °inancial parameters
do not need to be input at all.
In what follo4.3, a card set number, -Ased only for pur poses here,
5egirs ar input data subset. It is followed by the name of each variable to
be listed in that section. Following each variable name is the for=at cf that
variable, and the number of columns it occupies. Then a brief explanation is
given if it is necessary to expand `evond the definition. Riven in the variable
definition section of the report.
Card Set 1
2OA4	 2-RO
:'ITLE will identify the data set in any way the user wishes.
ave the first column blank.
Card Set 2
NINT	 15	 1-r
The output will be plotted in t.hp fcr-m of histograms. The cost axis
will be divided into NINT+2 intervals.
Card Set 3
ROY
	 F20.8	 1-20
The royalty rate is input as a decimal number.
KOPT	 15	 ?1-25
This is input as integer 1 in column 5 if a profit will be taken into
account. Otherwise, enter 2 to indicate a regulated utility.
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Card Set 4
PPRICE	 F20.6
	 1-20
The penalty price is input in mills/kWh.
PRICE
	 F20.6	 21-40
The contract price for delivered energy is input in mills/kWh.
TCON	 15	 41-45
Card Set 5
TAU
	 F20.8	 1-20
The tax rate is input as a decimal (e.g., 461 _ .46).
Bl	 F20.8	 21-40
The state tax rate is input as a decimal.
B2	 F20.8	 41-60
The local tax rate is input as a decimal.
B3	 F20.8	 61-80
Input as a decimal.
Card Set 6
E	 F20.8	 1-2u
The annualized energy output is input in watt hours.
G	 F20.8	 21-40
The rate at which energy pri m_ will escalate is input as 1 plus the
deeminal percpnt.
DPL	 F20.8	 41-60
The depletion allowance rate is input as a decimal.
Card Set 7
NSCEN	 15	 1-5
This specifies the number of scenarios input. if NSCEN is greater than
1000, the dimensions of PROB ana TP must be increased.
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NSELEC	 15	 6-10
This specifies the number of scenarios to be evaluated. If NSELEC is
greater than 300, a large number of variables in several subroutines need
to be re-dimensioned.
N	 15	 11-15
This specifies the number of different accountin g, life times to be used.
Individual cost accounts are grouped according, to accountin g type within
each stage. There must he at least one accounting., type.
IOPT	 15	 16-20
If there is 3n integer 1 in column 20 (columns !6-19 blank), strai ght line
depreciation is used. Otherwise, sum of years digits is used.
Set R
D	 .=2M
	 1-20
The discount factor can be input directly, or calculated. If it is to be
calcuiated by the program, this card must hP input as 0.0.
Set 9
DIET	 F20.8	 1-20
If D = 0.0, Lhen DINT is input as a decimal used in the calculation of the
:sccunt factor. If D = 0.0, then DINT, ROCS. ROPS, PER, and CSPSR are
left out.
ROC-	 F20.8
	 21-40
This is the return on common stock, input as a decimal. See note under
DINT.
ROPS	 F20.P	 41-60
This is the return on common stock, input as a decimal. See note under
DINT.
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DER	 F20.8	 61-80
This is the return on common stock, input as a decimal. See note under
DINT.
Card Set 10
CSPSR	 F20.8	 1-20
'	 This is th- return on common stock. input as a decimal. See note und p-
DINT.
Card Set 11
J	 15	 1-5
JP	 15	 6-10
'	 J indicates the number of stages and JP the number of physically uncertain
variables. Note that while JP refers to the number of physical uncertain-
ties, it is possible to have a specific time uncertainty that is not the
length of a stage, and would show a cost effect to be evaluated by a user
s-ipp l ied OPTn routine.
Card Set 12
PCHAR(JPX,JPZ)	 20A4	 2-80
rJPX = 1,JP. This set of cards lists the titles of the physical
characteristics which are uncertain. There is one title per card and
there must be one card title per physical variable, and they must be in
the same order as the physical variables are input.
Card Set 13
M(1X)
	
16I5
	
Every F spaces
JX = 1,J. The cost accounts are to be put in by `imp intervals for each
stage. The number of intervals is not recess.irily equal to the number of
'	 years ir, the reference or any other scenario. M(JX) indicates into how
manv intervals each stag^ is divided.
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Cara Set 14
TN(I)
	 4F20.8	 Every 20 spaces
I = I.N. This; gives the length of ea^h accounting lifetime. The 'irst,
TN'l ), must be I Year, ^.e., 3 ncounts that are expensed. The rest must be
in the order that will he referenced later; i.e., 7N(2) is "Accounting
.ype 2 n , and so on.
Card Set 15
CON(I)
	 4F20.8
	 Every 20 spaces
1,6. CON is dimensioned 6 fo: •
 convenience. It can he changed at the
iser's need. The CON(I) are site specific scaling parameters used in the
OPTn function subroutines to show the eff-ct on cost of physical uncertain-
ties. The user can supply his awn A PT eouations as well as the CON(I)'s.
In the temperature equation, CON(I) has been use ,i to refer to amtient
temperature in degrees Centigrade. In the well dept:, equation, CON(6)
fers to a constant in the literature from which the equation was
obtained.
Card Sets 16-26
Note here that blocks of data are read in, then repeated in blocks o"
•:e same order:
For each stage:
KD(JX,IIX)
For each KD(JX,NX) = 0 of each accounting tVDe:
ADTITL
CDR(JX,MX,NX,KDX)
AD(JX,NX,KDX1)
KI(JX,NX)
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	For each KI(JX,NX)	 0 of each accounting types:
CiR(JX,NX,KIX)
TIR(JX,NX,KIX)
'	 AI(JX,NX,KIX)
	 ,
AITITL
t(Please see the example card layout following the descriptions below.)
'	 Card Set 16
KD(JX,NX)
	 1615
	
Every 5 spaces
NX = 1,N. This card is entered at the beginning of data for each stage.
One number for each accounting type specifies how manv accounts will he
read in.
Card Set 17
ADTITL	 20A4	 2-80
A title card is required for each co--t account. Leave the first column
blank, and use only one card. The title is read, then the cost account,
and repeated until all cost accounts of a specific accounting type and
stage are read.
Card Set 18
'	 CDR(JX,MX,NX,KDX)
	
4F20.8
	 Every 20 spaces
CDR are the time-dependent cost accounts. Each account consists of M(JX)
dollar figures, with the dollar amounts entered in thousands. A title
'	 card is read, then the cost data over arid over again for all KD(JX,NX)
accounts. In describing the Reference Scenario via these Reference cost
'	 accounts, adjustments must be made for the case when costs are in annual
amounts but the length of the interval is other than a year (i.e. the
r	 number of intervals i^ other than the number of years in the reference
scenario stage).
M.
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Card Set 19
AD(JX,NX,KDX)
	
4x20.8	 Fvery 20 spaces
Following each complete set of cost accounts (i.e., for a given stage and
a given accounting type) and their titles, the escalation rates for each
account are entered as 1 plus the escalation rate in decimal form. This
is one escalation rate per account, and it remains fixed for the life of
tha project.
Card Set 20
KI(,JX,14X)	 1615
	
Every 5 spaces
NX = 1,N. This card identifies the number of time dependent cost accounts
per accounting type for the JX.th stage, and follows all data referring to
time dependent cost.
If KI(JX,NX) = 0, then the cards for CIR,TIR,AI, and AITITL (Card Sets 21,
22, 23, and 24) are skipped.
Card Set 21
CIR(JX,NX,KIX)
	
4F20.8	 Fvery 20 spaces
CIR are the independent cost accouints. Each account ^onsists of a singl,
dollar amount. If KI(JX,NX)
	
0, there must be KI(JX,NX) cost accounts
for the given stage and accounting type.
Card Set 22
TIR(•JX,NX,KIX)	 1IF20.8	 Every 20 spaces
TIR identifies ir which interval a time-independent cost occurs. There
are KI(JX,NX) numbers per each card set.
Card .`,et 23
AI(JX,NX,KIX)
	
4F20.8	 Fvery 20 spaces
There is one escalation rate per cost account.
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aCard Set 24
AITITL	 20A4	 ?-80
There is one separate title card per time independent accounts. All title
cards for a given stage and accounting type appear together, following the
1
	 rest of the time independent cost account data. They must be in the same
order as the cost accoUnts they are identifying.
Card Set 25
M,OD(JX,NX,KDX,IXX)
	 1615
	
Every 5 °?aces
There is one number for each account identifying whether a time dependent
account is dependent on a physical variable. The numbers entered are 0 if
'	 there is no dependency on the physical variable, or 1 through 4 depending
on which OPTn, N = 1,2,3, or 4, equation relates that physical uncertainty
to the cost account. There is one se parate set of MOD(JX,NX.KDX,IXX)
cards for each physical uncertainty, each set completely read in before
the set for the next physical uncertainty is read. Within each set, there
I
is a separate card(s) for each stage and accounting type for which cost
data was entered. These cards must be listed in the same order as the
ecst accounts. Each card contains the identifying MOD numbers for all
cost accounts for that stage and accounting type.
Card Set 26
1
	 MOI(JX,NX,KIX,IXX) 	 1615
	
Every 5 spaces
See the note on MOD(JX,NX,KIX,IXX). The MOI do exactly the same thing for
all time independent cost accounts. The MOI cards for a given stage and
accountin g type follow the MOD cards for the Same stage and accounting
type. (Thus the MOI cards sra "sandwiched" in between the MOD cards.)
'	 This is done for the first physical uncertainty, ai6 then thf process is
repeated for the second physical uncertainty, ana so on.I
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Card Set 27
TPR(JX)
	
4F20.8
	 Every 20 spaces
JX = I,JJ. The Reference Scenario stage length times and values for
physically uncertain variables are entered.
Card Set 28
TP(JX,I)	 4F20.8	 Every 20 spaces
The data for each scenario is Antered with stage time data and physically
uncertain variable data given in exactly the same order as the Reference
Scenario data they correspond to. Each card(s) describes a complete
scenario, with NSCEN scenarios read in. kne program will assign an
identifying number from 1 to NSCEN to each scenario, based on the order in
which it is read in.
Card Set 29
P(JX,I)	 4F20.8	 Every 20 spaces
The probability of occurrence of each stage and physical -haracteristic is
entered to exactly correspond in order of entry of the valuer of each
scenario. For a given stage the probabilities of all the possible times
must sum to 1. Likewise, for a given physical variable, the probabilities
of all the possible outcome values must also num to 1. As with the
TP(JX,I), the program will identify the probabilities for each srPnario
with a number from 1 to NSCEN.
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A.3.1
	 Example Card Layout
The order of cards is shown here for a fictional Stage 4. There are
3, 1, and 2 time-dependent cost accounts of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd accounting
type respectively. There are 2, 1, and 3 time-independent cost accounts of
the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd accounting type respectively.
STAGE 4
KD (JX=4, NX)
	
3	 1	 ?
ADTITL
CDR (JX=4, MY, NX =1, KDX=1)
ADTITL
CDR (JX=4, MX, NX=1, KDX=2)
ADTITL
CDR (JX=4, MX, NX=1, KDX=3)
AD (JX=4, NX =1, KDX)
Accounting_Type 1 _
Accounting Type 2
ADTITL
CDR (JX = L , MX, NX=2, KDX=1)
AD (JX=4, NX =2, KDX)
Accounting Type 3
ADTITL
CDR (JX=4, MX, NX=3, KDX:1)
ADTITL
CDR (JX=4, MX, NX=3, KDX=2)
AD (JX=4, N;( =3, KDX)
- - - - - •. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1
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2	 L	 3KI (JX=4, NX)
CIR (JX=4, NX=1, AX)
TIP (JX-4, NX=1, KIX)
AI (JX=4, 'X=1, K:X)
AITiT1,
AITITL
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Accounting_Type 1
Accounting Type 2
CIR (.IX=4, NX=2, KIX)
TIP (JX=4, NX=2, KIX)
Al (JX=4, NX=2, KIX)
AITITL
Accounting T ype 3
CIR (JX=4, NX=:, KIX)
TIP (JX=u, NX=3, KIX)
AI (JX=4, NX=3, KIX)
AITITL
AITITL
AITITL
The data for each stage is put in as one block complete in itself,
as shown ahnve. These blocks occur in the same order as the stages. (If
KD (JX,NX) or KI (JX,NX) is zero for any of the accounting types, NX,
then all the cards pertaining to that accounting type would be left out.
They are included in the above scheme for completeness.)
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Following the last stage the MOD/MOI cards appear. (It is assumed
here that there are 4 stages, JX, and 3 accounting types, NX.)
t-	 - - - - - - - - -	 - -	 - -
MOD (JX=1, NX=1, KDX, IXX=1) 	 Variable 1, Stage 1
MOI (JX=1, NX=1, KIX, IXX=1)
1	 MOD iJX 3, NX=3, KDX, IXX=1)
MOI (J7=3, NX =3, KIX, IXX=1)
Variable li Stage 3- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Variable 1, Sta^e 4
IXX =1)MOD (JX=4, NX=1, KDX,
' MOI (JX=4, NX=1, KIX, IXX=1)
MOD (JX=4, NX=2, KDX, IXX=1)
MOI (JX=4, NX=2, KIX, IXX=1)
MOD (JX=4, NX=3, KDX, IXX=1)
MOI (JX=4, NX=3, KIX, IXX=1)
Variable li Stage 4-
Variahle 2, St-+ge 1
MOD (JX=1, NX=1, KDX, IXX=2)
' MOI (JX=1, IJX=1, KIX, IXX=2)
' MOD (JX=1, NX=2, KDX, IXX=2)
MOI (JX=1, NX=2, KIX, IXX=2)
MOD (JX=1, NX=3, KDX, IXX=2)
MOI (JX=1, NX=3, KIX, IXX=2)
Variable 2i Stage 1_
Variable 2, Stage ?
' MOD (JX=2, NX=1, KDX, IXX=^)
MOI (JX=2, NX=1, KIX, IXX=2)
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MOD (JX=2, NX=2, KDX, IXX-2)
MOI (JX=2, %X=2, KI •., TXX=7)
The MOD/MOI cards are input in blocks fo- each uncertain physical
variable (IXX=1,n). The block for the first variable occurs, and the block
for the second variable, and so on. If there are no cos`_ accounts of a
particular accounting type for a stage, then the MCD/MOI cards are left out
for that accounting type in that stage.
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APPENDIX B
CASH FLOW LEVF.LIZATION
k`hen we levelize a stream of cash flows 3C(t); we construct a new
stream JB(t)j with the following properties:
a) B(t) is of constant value for all t either in real or nominal
terms, depending on the type of levelization
b) The net present value of "C(t)} equals the net present value of
;B(t)j, or
"l	 N
C(t)(1 + K) -t
 = r B(t)(1 + K)-t
t = o	 t=,moo
where K is the discount rate.
If there is positive inflation, the real levelized flow will increase
over ti- ,
 in terms of nominal. dollars in order to maintain a constant
purchasing power. This case is shown in Figure B-1.
C M
actual cash
flows
real
levelized
average
nominal
levelized
time
I
Figure B-1. Cash Flow Levelization
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APPENDIX C
A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE THEORY OF INSURANCE
Insurance and insurance type phenomena arise because some people are
milling to accept the certain loss of a small sum (the premium) in preference
to the small chance of a large loss and a large chance of no loss. A
theoretical analysis of such phenomena should rightly begin by attemptin g, to
explain how people choose between alternatives involving risk. Although
eronomic theorists have tried to exp l -.in
 such choices, such explanations
had ne arer been integrated with the theories that account for choices among
riskless alternatives until the pristine effort by Friedman and Savage
ef?rence 19).
Such an attempt, however, led to a drastic revision of unreasonable
belief in the concept of diminishin g marginal utility. For they showed that
such an assumption was wholely redundant in the expl?nation of insurance nr
gambling.
There they oefined the expected utility of an alternative involvingv
risk, namely A, that has a chance a of an income I 1 ana the complementary
probatility of an income I2, as
U(A) = all(I l ) + (]_1) 11(I^)
and consequently if I* is the certain income that has the same utility as A
(see Figure C-1), i.e., U(I*) = 7(A), then the maximum amount he would be
willing to pay to insure himself against the uncertainty would be:
I - I* where I = :II I + f l-U) I2
Figure C-1
Expected Utility
and Certain
Equivalent
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Their paper thus set the basis for an expected utility maximization
analysis for insurance type phenomena--an approach buttressed by the arcz,iments
of Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (Reference 15).
This was in 1948. Several years late r in 1476, Benjamin Edon
(Reference 5) showed the converse in a rigorously elegant paper. Assuming 'he
expected utility hypothesis he showed that U" `- 0 is a sufficient but not a
necessary condition for insurance type pheonomena. He proved that people will
eliminate fut,arc- risk by insurance and create t'ie desired (if it exists)
present risk by gambling. In fact, doing so makes everyone better off.
Having delved or the fundamental assumption leading to insurance
theories, we shall proceed to the theories themselves. 3 ,st before doing so,
let us identify some features of rurrent insurance firms so that fro,n the
firms we can coati nue to the theory of their functioning.
It was pointed out by Marshall (Reference 7) that it is mainly
because of these features that insurance companies do -lot insure
catastrophies. The features being:
(1) Reserves: He defines it thusly: If z is the ratio of reserves
to total liability,	 the probability of loss L, and if there_
are n people, with k losses a year, then the firm is ruined if
KL > n,+ L + nLz
and sin; p by the Steak Law of Large Numbers kWLLN), for a fixed
z > 0,
Flim k/n =	 ,
economies of pooling reserves exists wherever an increase in n
tends to concentrate KL/n around `L as n increases. In other
words, he showed that there is no economy in pooling resources,
ana hence no role for insurance if WLLN does not apply.
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(2) Mutuality: under mutuality
upon other's losses through
level. Thus, in this case,
brokerages that exchange apj
individuals.
each person's consumption depends
dependence on the aggregate income
insurar -P
 companies merelv act as
)ropriate bundles of claims between
Most insurance companies work on one of these two principles, mainlv
the former. Marshall adds that catastrophes involve interdependence of risk
and hence rule out to WLLN rendering insurance under the reserved principle
}	 impossible.
In all of the theories to follow, therefore, interdependence of risk
is assumed away, and with .stochastically independent risks across individuals,
w,: can talk of functioning insurance firms under the referred principin.
THE THEORY OF INSURANCE AND OPTIMALITY UNDER INSURANCE
Perhaps it is apt here to start by mentioning Pauly's paDPr
(Reference 8) which, trough not the first one renders a ,ucid discussion on
the theory of insurance. Pauiv, Arrow (Reference 1) and Johnson ( Werence b)
have together F-ovided sufficient literature or. the theory of and optima?itv
under insurance.
Their simplest form (Pauly's) has a 2-state model in which individ-
uals face a possible loss of a fixed amount L, and protects himself by h,rv'_ng
insurance, X < L an" engages in an activity z which can reduce 	 the
probability of the loss.
Thus with
U
0
and assuming
< 0Jx —
we have 3r > 0.
^x —
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Characteristic of t:A3 model and a truth in real life) is f.ne fact that,
P
	
1	 _ 0
X. = X#
	
1	 1	 1
which is the essence of moral hazard, a problem well defined by both Pauly and
Johnson, i.e., under moral hazard, the insurance induces the individual to
alter his value of z. since
^
	
-	 . (z. ).1	 1	 1	 1
°.x.
And so-- 11 x 0
`i
".
	
le 1	 *=0
	•z . Ix 	 - x.
	
1	 _	 1
Pauly makes an attempt `.hough to provide a theoretical solution to
the problem of moral hazard. He begins by envisioning an individual to buy
insurance by solving a two-stage problem.
For an initial wealth if he is indeminified x i , s',
	
and if
_xpected utility can be given by:
	EU = (1-- (z i )) - u(s° - z i - pi)	 ..(t1) u(s° - z i
 - p i + x i - rl
he can be looked upon as optimizing EU wi
t
h respect to z  first and *_hen gets
z!(x i ). !text he optimized EU with recpect to xi.
If z  is observable by the insurer then the insur- 4 would set x i = L
and choose that level of z i such that
L -' = 11z.
1
However, z  is unobservable. What is in fact observable is xi.
;Spence and Zeckhauser (Reference 10) go into groater detail.) Then assuming
i = -i(xi), the price of x i = p(x i ), i.e., the premium for x i is
given by
	
^p	 ix
X.
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n At this point, Pauly shows that in the cise of competitive
'	 equilibrium, given tnc assuRintions, the price of insurance pf.r unit purchased
(=p) is a constant. Zero profit conditiors demand.
'7-.X.
e
X.
i
Since x i is the same g?vc-i p
<n +x3Tr^
x
and hence in competitive equilibrium there is an over production of
insurance. Further, in the competitive model
dp	
r -
dx
which means x = L. Pence a person who buys anv insurance at all huvs full
coverage.
While Pauly proves that in the presence of moral hazard, x = L, krrow
shows why such a state is suboptimal. Thu s,, Pauly concludes that for
"rational" decisions, the individual's premium must vary as much as possible
with his expected loss. That is to say, his recommendations to tide over
moral hazard is to provide public provisions that either:
(a) require the individual to buy as much insurance as he would have
under optimality jr,
(b) force him to declare his total purchases x i to every firm from
which he outs insurance.
Adverse Selection: This is another problem well formalized by Pauly
'	 (Reference 8). Under adverse selection there exists Lwo indistinguishable
risk classes G and n13 such that
'	 7T	 r B
If they were distinguishable, they could be charged prices under competitive
equilibrium
'	 C-5
MO
;a	 "	 OG	 Gp	 = ^^	 and p	 = '
Ncti ^^ since '.^;ey are supposed to be indistinguishable, let there be a price
P E ,:harged to all. Clearly under zero prot'it conditions °E is the lowest
(an aspect well dealt by Johnson 6 ) amount that satisfied,
B-
BXB(pE) { G IT X (pE)
pE 
= B 
xB`pFl ; G xG(pE)-
u
Determination of p  (Reference 8 and Reference 6) is the following: "'there
will be an excess of payments by type-G individuals over their actuarially
premiums and a defici^nc • for tv t B. AS
	
}	 p	 pE increases from p Gfair	 , the
sum of excess payments by type-G individuals will increase to a point, reach
an interior maximum and decline, J demand curves are negatively sloped, while
the sum of deficiencies ire payment by type-B individuals will increase
continuou::ly as p falls. Equilibrium will be reached at a point when the sum
of excess payments equals the sum of deficiencies. (See Figure C-2)
Figure C-2
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A solution t- this oroh'em of adverse selection is the following: If
compulsory insurance x  mus` be purchased and if voluntary additional
insurance could be bought, c cinly	 that this will be bought only by type
B people at an equilibrium price p*B.
Thus here compulsory insurance laws tells the sellers that anybody
who buys insurance over the mandatory quantity is a type B person and hence
can be charged p*B
Compulsory insurance is useful here in contrast to thF moral hazard
case.
Note that the 6:fference is mainly because in the moral hazard case
x is a continuously increasing function, and so int'ormation on x is needed
1.1. .a ob ,_::	 = :.But	 the adverse selec .ion case, there dre
only 2 classes -C and B and the problem is to be able to classify
individuals. Thus, wh " - compulsory lr.ws could help in this classification,
they provide no infornation on x.
Of several other concepts that attracted theoretical ventures, one
deserving of mention is that of coinsurance, whose existence was first shown
by Arrow (Reference 1). He proved that if both the insurer and the insured
are risk averte rs. and there are only cnverage costs, then,
0 < dx(L) . 1
dL
It has thus been acknowledged that in the operation of contingent
claim markets (insurance markets are an example) it is necessary for the
insurer (e.g.) to monitor actions taken by the insured that affect the
probability and/or the magnitude of loss and hence the payoff function. In
real world this nay not be possible. A series of gapers were written to view
the real world functioning of these markets. Most noteworthy are those by
Spence and Zeckhauser (Reference 10 and Reference 12).
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Spence and Zeckhauser show that if u is the utility of wealth w, the
act of nature is n, and if the individual action is a. g(s) the oayoff
function over the information s monitored, and R - y(n,a) iz the return on
individual action,
f(n) the distribution of n, then:
(a) If the insurer can monitor y directly the insurance scheme can
operate like a traditional continent claims market. No adverse
incentives, and full risk spreading is achieved.
(b) If the insurer can monitor R, when it exists, adverse incentives
problem can be warded off by stgructuring g(, • ,a) to enforce
appropriate a = a*.
(c) However if g( ) = g(3), then i,he individuai alters a to increase
g(a), and although the insurer is aware of this adverse
selection problem, he cannot overcome it leading to improper
risk spreading.
Illustrating with the case of catastrophic illnesses, Zeckhauser
(Reference 12) points out further problems in the establishment and efficient
running of a contingent claims market for a coverage of such illnesses. His
model shows how insurance, a mechanism to transfer money between states of the
world to maximize expected utility, works to get efficiency. The process
involves transfer of resources from states of high utilitv but low marginal
utility to states of low utility but high marginal utility. Several variables
like annuities do not satisfy this property.
Even assuming the market has been established, possible
inefficiencies, other than those due to adverse selection and moral hazard,
could be:
W Actuarial: i.e.; we ought not to consider the ^ffi ciency of the
contingent claims payment sclely on the context of the states in
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Iwhich they are paid. We should rather be seeing the patterns
requested by individuals before his condition became known.
(ii) Ceremonial: where money is spent (as the frills in medicP1
coverage) even though total welfare could be better cff by
conserving the expenditure
In general the literature dealing with real world contingent claims
markets clearly show the incapacity of these markets to achie _ t! efficiency
levels purported by related theory.
Equilibrium ana Dynamics of Insurance and Reinsurance Markets:
Equilibrium in these markets have been studied just short of
constructing a dynamic model that analyzes how companies would adjust their
rl °i.	 t:, changes	 the m,-: •kPi.. The maost illuminaLing work Is by Arrow
(Reference 19), Allais (Reference 18) which has been referred to in an
exhaustive work by Borch (Reference 3). An a::iomatic analyses, however, has
been best done by Wilson (Reference 11).
Borch extends the Walras-Cassel model to markets where decisions are
made under uncertainty, typically the reinsurance market. He posits that of
the total claims to be paid by the ith insurance company is x i , and if the
treaty made by this company is y  (x i ... xn ), then y  will_ depend
only on x  + x 2
 ... xn , i.e.; the total amount of claims made on the
industry. And hence that any pareto optimal arrangement is equivalent to a
pool arrangement. Further if F i (x i ) is the risk distribution, then prices
for these treaties P = P(F), if they exist, do not lead to a pareto optimal
arrangement under utility maximization, althou h to an equilibrium.
This result is in apparent c r)ntradiction to the results arrived at by
Arrow and Allais. The reason is tfiat Allais (dealing with the market for
lett.;ries) assumes that the lo:,teries are indivisible and that there is only
e
e
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one kind of ticket, which has a normally distributed prize associated with
it. As Borch points out "the problem will completely change if the model is
generalized by the introduction of several kinds of tickets ( p rize is drawn
from different probability distributions." The p roblem can then be analvzed
in a way similar to Borch',,• if op,^ iccepts the Bernoulli hypothesis. Allais,
however, emphatically rejects this hypothesis.
Arrow's model is more general. But the difference in the results
noted above arises because his mode l has a price associated with every state
of the world. The price being the same for all states that lead to the same
amount of total claim payment. Instead Borch's model has one specific price
of risk P = P(F).
;.J;I	 (Pr, f .a^r,1,-" 111 -t._!''iP^	 a_ —ation -± f insur a nce po11cies in
a competitive market when firms cannot distinguish between different risk
classes of consumers. Unfortunately, it can be .hown that in models with self
sele^tion, there can be no equilibrium if firms have static expectations.
However, he later shows that it is possible to revise the expectation of firms
in such a way that an equilibrium exists.
Conclusions:
In closing, it can be ^emarked that while existence of insurance and
insurance type phenomena together with the problems entailed by their
theoretical explanations, have been analyzed by scholars, removal of
in^ffiencies in the real world eludes formal expositions. It would also be
interesting at this point to s-t up a dynamic model that analyses how
insurance corrpa.lie5 coulr alter their policies with charges in the market
parameters.
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